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Abstract 
 
 
Image content authentication is to verify the integrity of the images, i.e. to check if the 
image has undergone any tampering since it was created. Digital watermarking has 
become a promising technique for image content authentication because of its 
outstanding performance and capability of tampering detection. However, many 
challenges for watermarking techniques for image authentication still remain unsolved 
or need to be improved, such as tamper localization accuracy, image quality, security, 
synthetic image protection, and so on. In this thesis, we propose different solutions for 
the content authentication of natural image and synthetic images respectively, 
improving the tamper localization accuracy and the watermarked image quality. In 
addition, we develop new watermarking schemes with region of interest masking to 
tackle the problem of high image fidelity requirement in special applications. 
First, we propose a watermarking technique for natural image authentication. By 
introducing the random permutation strategy in the wavelet domain, the proposed 
watermarking technique significantly improves the resolution of tampering detection 
with lower watermark payload. Due to less watermarks being embedded, the image 
quality is therefore improved. Furthermore, thanks to the random wavelet coefficient 
grouping, the scheme is intrinsically secure to local attacks. Also, scalable sensitivity of 
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tampering detection is enabled in the authentication process by presetting the noise 
filter size. 
Second, we study the unique characteristics of synthetic images and develop a novel 
watermarking scheme for synthetic image authentication. The proposed watermarking 
algorithm is fully compatible with the characteristics of synthetic images. With less 
pixels modified, the authentication system can still achieve pixel-wise tamper 
localization resolution. Moreover, we propose a new embedding strategy, which 
enables the capability of recovering the altered image content of the authentication 
system. Hence, not only can the authenticator localize the tampered area but also it is 
able to recover the removed content and identify the forged parts. 
In addition, in order to tackle the high image fidelity requirement in some special 
applications, we propose a framework for ROI-supporting watermarking systems, 
which can be applied to different watermark embedding schemes. Based on the 
framework, we present the non-ubiquitous watermarking schemes with ROI masking 
for natural images and synthetic images respectively. Unlike the common holistic 
watermarking schemes, the ROI-based schemes do not embed the watermark 
ubiquitously over the whole image but avoiding modifying the content of the specified 
important regions. Although there is no watermark embedded inside these regions, their 
integrity is still well protected as well as other image parts. The same tamper detection 
resolution is achieved both inside and outside the specified ROI regions.  
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Zusammenfassung 
 
 
Die Authentifizierung von Bildinhalten verifiziert die Integrität von Bildern, in dem es 
beispielsweise überprüft, ob an einem Bild nach seiner Erstellung Verfälschungen 
durchgeführt wurden. Digitale Wasserzeichen sind inzwischen eine vielversprechende 
Technik zur Authentifizierung von Bildinhalten geworden. Sie bieten eine ausreichende 
Effizienz, um Veränderungen nachzuweisen. Es hat sich aber herausgestellt, dass 
einzelne Herausforderungen hinsichtlich der Bildauthentifizierung anhand von 
Wasserzeichen noch ungelöst sind oder verbessert werden müssen. Dazu gehören eine 
präzisere Lokalisierung der Veränderungen, die Bildqualität, die Sicherheit, sowie der 
Schutz von synthetischen Bildern. In dieser Arbeit werden verschiedene Lösungen für 
den Schutz des Inhaltes von natürlichen und synthetischen Bildern präsentiert, wobei 
die Lokalisierung der Veränderungen und auch die Qualität der Wasserzeichen 
verbessert werden. Zusätzlich entwickeln wir neue Wasserzeichenansätze mit der 
Maskierung von ROI (Region of Interest), um in speziellen Anwendungen das Problem 
der hohen Anforderungen an die Bildqualität zu lösen. 
Als erstes wird ein Wasserzeichen zur Authentifizierung von natürlichen Bildern 
vorgestellt. Die angewandte Wasserzeichentechnik verbessert die Erkennung von 
Veränderungen im Bild durch eine zufällige Auswahl von Wavelet-Koeffizienten 
signifikant. Dabei wird nur eine geringe Wasserzeichenkapazität benötigt, wodurch die 
Zusammenfassung 
 iv
Bildqualität verbessert werden kann. Aufgrund der zufälligen Auswahl der Wavelet-
Koeffizienten ist das Schema sicherer gegenüber lokalen Angriffen. Das Erkennen von 
Bildmanipulationen ist durch Einstellungen der Filtergröße im Authentifizierungs-
prozess zusätzlich skalierbar. 
Weiterhin identifizieren wir einheitliche Charakteristiken von synthetischen Bildern 
und stellen ein neues Wasserzeichenverfahren für Bilder dieser Art vor. Das 
vorgestellte Wasserzeichenmodel ist komplett anwendbar für die Authentifizierung 
synthetischer Bilder. Selbst nach der Modifikation weniger Bildpixeln lokalisiert das 
Authentifizierungssystem die Modifikation pixelgenau. Wir präsentieren eine neue 
Einbettungsmethode, die eine Wiederherstellung des verfälschten Bildinhaltes 
ermöglicht. Das Authentifizierungssystem lokalisiert den veränderten Inhalt, stellt den 
ursprünglichen Inhalt wieder her und identifiziert die verfälschten Bildkomponenten. 
Um in einigen Anwendungen die Anforderung der hohen Bildqualität zu bewältigen, 
stellen  wir ein Framework für ROI unterstützende Wasserzeichensysteme vor, dass 
von diversen  Wasserzeichenalgorithmen benutzt werden kann. Wir präsentieren ein 
Wasserzeichenschema mit ROI Maskierung, dass sowohl für natürliche als auch 
synthetische Bilder angewandt werden kann. Vor der Einbettung wird eine Vorauswahl 
von ROIs durchgeführt. Entgegen üblicher Wasserzeichen bettet das ROI-basierte 
Schema das Wasserzeichen nicht gleichmäßig in das komplette Bild ein. Es vermeidet 
eine Veränderung der vorausgewählten Regionen im Bild. Auch wenn kein 
Wasserzeichen in diese Regionen eingebettet wird, so ist doch deren Integrität genau so 
gut geschützt wie die der übrigen Teile des Bildes. Es wurden die gleichen 
Detektionsergebnisse innerhalb und außerhalb der ROIs erreicht. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
 
1.1 Motivation 
With the rapid growth of multimedia systems and popularity of Internet, there has been 
a vast increase in the use and distribution of digital media data. Digital images become 
more and more popular in various applications. People can not only conveniently 
obtain and exchange digital images, but also can easily manipulate them [ZST04]. By 
using the powerful personal computer and image editing software, even an 
inexperienced user is able to edit a picture at will, such as adding, deleting or replacing 
specific objects. Some powerful software, like Adobe Photoshop, can even help a 
common amateur, who doesn’t have any professional skills, to make ‘perfect’ 
manipulations without introducing any noticeable traces [CMB01]. Figure 1-1 shows 
an example of image manipulation, which was published by Spiegel Online in April 
2005 [SO05]. In the Deutsch Bank annual report of 2004, an old photo of the board of 
management from the annual report of 2003 was reused after some manipulations. As 
can be seen in Figure 1-1 (b), one person on the right was removed and another person 
on the left was moved to the right side. The tampered image looks visually perfect and 
genuine. The “new” photo conveys to the viewer the information that the management 
board met again in 2004, but in fact they did not.  
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It is very hard, if not impossible, for a human to judge whether an image is authentic or 
not by perceptual inspection. As a result, the old proverb “Words are but wind, but 
seeing is believing.” is not true any more in this digital era. Therefore, no visual data 
can be considered trustworthy before passing certain integrity authentication. A 
pressing security need is emerging to protect the visual data against illegal content 
tampering and manipulation [ZS03].  
Visual data authentication is to verify whether the visual content has undergone any 
tampering since it has been created [CMB01]. It resembles the problem of message 
(a) 
(b) 
Figure 1-1 Example of image manipulation: (a) Photo of the board of management 
of Deutsch Bank in the annual report of 2003, (b) Photo of the board of management 
of Deutsch Bank in the annual report of 2004. 
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authentication that has been well studied in [S95] yet has some unique features. The 
traditional cryptographic solution to message authentication is to make use of digital 
signatures. A digital signature scheme normally consists of two algorithms: one for 
signing which involves the user’s secret or private key, and the other for verifying 
signatures which involves the user’s public key [G04][MOV96].  
However, cryptographic solutions, like digital signatures, are not well suited for visual 
data authentication due to their characteristics. First, digital signature provides only 
bitwise authentication. The targeted data must be identical to the original copy in order 
to be considered as authentic by the digital signature. Even one bit difference will 
render the whole content unauthentic. In the visual data applications, the perceptual 
content instead of its binary representation should be authenticated because the same 
visual content may have different yet equivalent representations. Due to the massive 
volume, visual data are usually stored and distributed in compressed ways. Such 
compression methods are often not lossless and will render the compressed data 
slightly different from the original copy. For example, many digital images on the Web 
are commonly stored in JPEG format, which compresses the image in a lossy way. In 
JPEG compression, the image data is quantized; some image data, to which the human 
eyes are not sensitive, is even discarded. Moreover, the data may also undergo other 
incidental distortions in the transmission, such as random bit errors and packet loss. 
Obviously, a digital signature can not survive these inevitable common processing of 
the data, while all of these distortions are acceptable in visual data applications because 
they are usually imperceptible and do not break the data’s integrity. In other words, the 
conventional digital signature technique can not distinguish between the incidental 
distortions and intentional manipulations, also known as malicious manipulations, of 
the visual contents. 
In addition, digital signatures can neither provide any localization information of the 
manipulations nor have any capability of recovering the original data. For visual 
content authentication, the capability of localizing the manipulations is a particularly 
desirable feature in most applications [ZS03]. Not only the content integrity needs to be 
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verified, but also the knowledge of the tampered positions is very useful. With the help 
of the localization information, other parts of the content can still remain trustworthy 
and useful when the original data is not available. Knowing the exact position where 
the manipulation occurs can also help to infer an adversary’s motives in applications 
like forensic evidences. Recovering the original data from the tampered version is also 
a desirable feature, which helps to estimate the extent of the modifications and reveals 
how the original content looked like, although it is not always possible. 
Moreover, digital signatures are stored separately and externally attached to the data to 
provide the authentication. The need of additional storage significantly decreases their 
compatibility and portability in the practical applications. Furthermore, this property 
also renders them easily to be removed either incidentally or intentionally [CMB01]. 
For example, given a JPEG image with a digital signature stored in the JPEG file 
header as metadata, when the JPEG image is converted to another format that has no 
space for the signature in its header, the stored signature will be lost. 
Therefore, new security solutions are demanded for visual data authentication which 
should meet the special requirements of the corresponding applications. Digital 
watermarking is such a technique concerning multimedia security [CMB01]. Compared 
with cryptography, it is much better suited for visual data protection. Digital 
watermarking could be completely compatible with multimedia systems because it is 
not only transparent to both the viewer and the system but also able to survive the 
common media processing as well. Image content authentication is one of the 
application fields of digital watermarking. For image content authentication, it has 
many advantages over digital signatures. It can fulfill the above-mentioned 
requirements, not only being able to verify the integrity of multimedia content but also 
providing much more tampering information. Due to its outstanding advantages in 
multimedia data protection, digital watermarking has become a very active research 
field and been widely accepted as a very promising technique for multimedia security. 
1.2  Digital Watermarking 
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1.2 Digital Watermarking 
Digital watermarking is a technique that hides some additional information, which is 
called a ‘watermark’, into the ‘cover data’ by slightly modifying the data content. The 
term ‘cover data’, also known as host data, is used to describe the original media data, 
such as audio, image and video. After a watermark is embedded, the cover data 
becomes the ‘watermarked data’. The process of inserting a watermark into the cover 
data is known as embedding, while the process of extracting or verifying the presence 
of a watermark is known as watermark detection or extraction.  
Figure 1-2 and Figure 1-3 illustrate the general watermark embedding and detection 
processes respectively. Unlike the conventional visible paper watermarks, the 
watermarked data is perceptually identical to the cover data, i.e. the embedded 
watermark is invisible or inaudible. In order to insert the watermark in an imperceptible 
way, the watermark embedding process usually uses perceptual models to control the 
modification amount, known as watermark strength, adaptively in the different parts 
and components of the data. Although it is imperceptible to human observers, the 
embedded watermark is detectable by the watermark detector afterwards. At the 
watermark detector side, the original data is an optional input. If the detector requires 
the original data in order to extract the watermark, we call it ‘private’ watermarking; 
otherwise, it is known as ‘public’ or ‘blind’ watermarking. The latter is more feasible in 
Figure 1-2 Watermark embedding process 
Watermark 
Embedding 
Perceptual Model 
Original Data Watermarked Data
Secret Key 
Watermark 
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practical applications, because the original data is often not available at the detector 
side, especially in the authentication applications. A secret key is usually used to 
control the embedding and detection processes, which ensures the security of the whole 
watermarking system. Without the access to the secret key, the proper watermark can 
not be successfully embedded, detected or removed.  
Generally speaking, digital watermark has many characteristics, out of which we 
selectively outline the most important ones below [CMB01][KP00][CS07]. 
Transparency: Imperceptibility is one of the most important characteristics of a digital 
watermark. All kinds of watermarks must satisfy this requirement.  The embedded 
watermark must be transparent to the viewer and must not introduce any undesirable 
artifacts, which will cause quality degradation and even destroy the data’s commercial 
value. 
Robustness/Fragility: This property is highly application dependent. Depending on the 
intended application, the embedded watermark should be immune to or easily 
destroyed by the intentional content modifications or incidental distortions. Or it must 
satisfy both the requirements simultaneously, that is to say, the watermark can survive 
incidental distortions caused by the common signal processing, like channel noise, 
filtering, lossy compression, re-sampling, print and scan, etc., but will be easily 
impaired by the intentional manipulations of the media content.  
Watermarked Data Watermark Detection 
Secret Key 
Original Data 
Extracted 
Watermark 
Figure 1-3 Watermark detection process 
Channel Noise
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Payload: The term “watermark payload” refers to the number of bits a watermark 
encodes within the cover data or within a unit of time [CMB01]. It is also known as 
watermark bit rate in the cases of audio and video watermarking. The required 
watermark payload varies greatly from application to application.  
Portability: Unlike the digital signatures that are stored separately or appended as 
metadata in the file header, the embedded watermark is inseparable from the host data. 
It does not get removed after changing the data’s store format or their digital/analog 
representations. This property makes digital watermarking particularly suitable for 
multimedia data protection. Compared to the traditional cryptography, the digital 
watermark always remains present in the multimedia data. It therefore can provide 
further protection to multimedia data after decryption, making the security intrinsically 
a part of the content. 
Security: Different from the robustness, the watermark security refers to the ability to 
resist intentional or hostile attacks. It should be difficult for an adversary to remove or 
forge a watermark without the knowledge of the proper secret key even if the 
watermarking algorithm is publicly known. For robust watermarking, any attempts to 
remove or destroy a watermark should result in severe quality degradation of the host 
data before the watermark is lost or becomes undetectable. For the authentication 
watermarks, such attempts should destroy the data’s authenticity. 
According to different applications, digital watermarking has to comply with more 
specific requirements in the above-listed aspects. In general, the digital watermarking 
applications can be categorized into four main groups: copyright protection, 
fingerprinting, content authentication and annotation [CMB01][KP00]. These include 
both security-related and non-security applications. Every kind of application has 
different levels of robustness and security requirements. In the following, we briefly 
introduce these four kinds of different applications and the corresponding requirements.  
Copyright Protection: The embedded watermark is used to claim the ownership of the 
host data, which is typically an exclusive owner or producer’s identifier. This kind of 
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application requires a very high level of robustness. The watermark is expected to 
remain in the protected data until the data’s quality is degraded so severely that the 
content becomes commercially useless. The watermarking process is usually protected 
by a secret key that only the owner knows. Without the secret key, any unauthorized 
party cannot embed, detect or remove a valid watermark. 
Fingerprinting: Unlike the copyright protection applications in which the same 
watermark is embedded in all the copies, in fingerprinting applications a unique 
watermark is embedded in each individual copy of the host data in order to trace back 
illegal copies and find the piracy origin. The watermark is usually a customer or 
buyer’s identifier instead of the owner’s. High robustness against both incidental and 
intentional distortions is also required. In addition, because each copy contains a 
different watermark, the embedded watermarks must also be secure to collusion 
attacks.  
Content Authentication: The watermark information is embedded into the host data in 
a fragile way to monitor if the host is modified or not. Based on the application 
requirements, different levels of robustness are specified. According to the robustness 
levels, authentication watermarks fall into two classes: fragile watermark and semi-
fragile watermark [CMB01]. Both kinds of authentication watermarks can identify 
intentional or malicious content manipulations. Fragile watermarks have the lowest 
robustness and are extremely sensitive to any signal sample value’s change, while 
semi-fragile watermarks can survive moderate signal processing and hence are able to 
distinguish incidental distortions from malicious content manipulations. As discussed 
in the previous section, in content authentication applications, localizing the 
manipulations and recovering the original data are usually desirable capabilities. In 
order to identify the whole host data, high watermark payload is commonly required for 
authentication watermarks. Also high security level of preventing unauthorized 
embedding and detection must be ensured. 
Annotation Watermark: Additional data-related information is embedded into the host 
data as content annotation. Thus, more information is conveyed together with the 
1.3  Thesis Organization and Contributions 
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transmission of the host data. The embedded information can be anything related to the 
content. For example, an image or a song could contain additional embedded 
information on its author, type, copyright or a link to a Web address where more related 
information can be retrieved. Annotation watermarks require a moderate robustness 
against the common signal processing and the lowest security level. 
In this thesis, we will mainly focus on digital watermarking techniques for image 
content authentication. In the following chapter, we will discuss more specifically the 
framework and requirements of the fragile and semi-fragile watermarks. Following the 
overview of the related work and the existing challenges, we propose several novel 
watermarking schemes for content authentication of different types of images 
1.3 Thesis Organization and Contributions 
This thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we first introduce the basic 
framework of the watermarking technique for image authentication and then 
summarize the previous work and identify the existing challenges. From Chapter 3 to 
Chapter 5, we present the main contributions of this thesis, which are listed as follows. 
In Chapter 3, we propose a semi-fragile watermarking scheme for natural image 
authentication. The proposed scheme reduces the necessary watermark payload by 
applying a random permutation process in the wavelet domain to build up a random 
mapping of all the image locations. With a lower watermark payload, the authenticator 
still achieves high tampering localization capability. The maximal resolution of tamper 
detection is not bounded by the unit size that is used to embed the watermark. Because 
the embedded watermark is distributed in the selected wavelet coefficients that are 
especially suitable for watermark embedding, namely, causing less perceptual artifacts, 
the quality of the watermarked image is improved. Furthermore, the random 
permutation process enhances the security of the whole system against local attacks. By 
embedding the watermark in different wavelet decomposition levels, the proposed 
scheme can achieve robustness against incidental distortions, such as JPEG 
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compression. Multi-level resolution authentication can be enabled by embedding the 
watermark in all the levels of the wavelet decomposition in order to identify different 
extents of the distortions. 
 In Chapter 4, we propose a novel watermarking scheme for synthetic image 
authentication. By identifying the challenges of embedding watermark in simple 
images, in the proposed algorithm every watermark bit is utilized to identify a group of 
pixels which are referred to each other in a random way. Thus, all pixels of the image 
instead of blocks are identified by much fewer watermark bits. The low watermark 
payload enables to impose more strict criteria on the selection of the embedding 
positions. Only the pixels whose change causes the least visible notification are used to 
embed the watermark. The watermark imperceptibility is therefore improved. Thanks 
to the random permutation and the statistical detection based on the density of 
unverified pixels, the proposed scheme can localize the tampered region with pixel-
wise resolution. In the embedding process, we propose a new quantization strategy to 
improve the odd-even and look-up table embedding method by introducing a dummy 
quantization entry. Based on a statistical detection of the types of the unverified pixels, 
the proposed achieves the capability of recovering the original data in a binary way, 
which is enough for the most applications of synthetic images such as text images. 
In Chapter 5, we identify the special requirements of some particular applications, 
which require extreme high image fidelity in important regions that are referred to as 
region of interest (ROI). In order to fulfill such requirements, we propose a framework 
for ROI-based watermarking. A non-ubiquitous watermark is applied to the targeted 
image for a ubiquitous integrity protection. Based on the proposed framework, we 
extend the watermark embedding schemes proposed in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 to 
support the ROI concept. The watermark embedding only occurs outside the predefined 
or interactively selected regions of interest. The ROI(s) is kept intact during the 
watermark embedding process. Thus high fidelity in the preferred image parts is 
achieved, while the content integrity for the whole image is still protected. The image 
authenticator can localize the manipulations both inside and outside the ROI(s). One 
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important advantage of the proposed scheme is that no ROI information is required in 
the watermark detection and image authentication processes. Furthermore, the 
localization resolution of tampered areas remains equal inside and outside of the 
watermarked regions. The proposed framework can also be applied to other watermark 
embedding schemes to support ROI-based watermarking. 
Finally, we conclude the thesis in Chapter 6 and discuss some possible directions for 
the future study. 
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Chapter 2 Preliminaries 
 
 
In this chapter we first introduce a general framework of the watermarking techniques 
for image authentication to explain how authentication watermarks work. Then we 
specify the general requirements and features of an effective watermarking system of 
content authentication. Afterwards, a comprehensive review of the existing 
watermarking techniques for image authentication is presented. Two categories of 
authentication watermarks, fragile watermarks and semi-fragile watermarks, are 
discussed respectively, followed by an introduction of the watermarking techniques for 
synthetic images. Finally, we identify the existing problems and challenges with regard 
to the watermarking techniques for image content authentication. 
2.1 General Framework of Authentication Watermark 
Content authentication is one of the main application fields of digital watermarking. In 
contrast to other kinds of applications, like copyright protection, fingerprinting and 
annotation, the objective of content authentication is to verify the integrity of the test 
data and detect any possible manipulation.  
Since authenticity is a relative concept, a reference is always needed to verify the 
targeted test data. For instance, in the traditional message authentication applications, 
digital signatures are usually used as references. The receiver reproduces a digest from 
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the received data and uses it to verify the appended signature that is generated from the 
original data. If they match, the received data will be deemed as authentic. Otherwise, 
they have been modified. In watermarking systems, the embedded watermark serves as 
a reference. As the watermark is embedded in the data, it will undergo the same 
transformations as the data itself. When the data is corrupted, the watermark will also 
be changed. Therefore, the integrity of the data can be verified by comparing the 
extracted watermark and the original one. 
Figure 2-1 illustrates the general framework for a watermarking system for image 
content authentication, which basically consists of two parts: the watermark embedder 
and the watermark detector. In the watermarking systems for authentication, the 
watermark is used as an authentication code, which can be a random sequence, a visual 
binary logo or certain content-related features. This authentication code is embedded by 
the sender into the original image (also known as the cover or host image) in an 
imperceptible way. Although it is transparent to human observers, the code can be 
extracted by the watermark detector under certain circumstances. The detection 
conditions are determined by the system designation corresponding to the particular 
application requirement. For instance, what kinds of image distortions should be 
tolerable and should not impair the embedded watermark. At the receiver side, the 
extracted code is compared with the original to verify the integrity of the received 
image. If any mismatch occurs, it indicates that the image content has been 
manipulated. Therefore, in authentication applications, the watermark detector is also 
called the authenticator. To ensure the security of the whole system, a secret key is 
usually used in the authentication code generation, watermark embedding and retrieval 
processes. No knowledge of the secret key prevents the attacker from changing the 
embedded watermark or forging an image with a valid authentication code embedded. 
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Basically, for an effective image watermarking system for the content authentication, 
the following features are usually desired. 
1. Imperceptibility: the embedded watermark should be invisible under the normal 
viewing condition, i.e. high image fidelity must be maintained; 
2. Capability of detecting whether an image has been maliciously tampered or not; 
3. Capability of localizing the manipulations with good accuracy: the authenticator 
should be able to identify the locations of the manipulated regions with a 
desirable resolution and verify other regions as authentic; 
4. Compatibility: the authentication system should be able to survive the incidental 
distortions caused by the common image processing to some extent, i.e. being 
able to distinguishing the incidental distortions from intentional/malicious 
tampering; 
5. Portability: the authentication information should be embedded in the host 
image and no separate storage is required; 
Original Image Watermark Embedding 
Authentication Code  
(random code, visual binary logo, 
content related features) 
Secret Key
Tampered?
Where? 
Watermark 
Retrieval 
Watermarked 
Image 
Comparison Test Image 
Secret Key
Secret Key
Attacker
Net
Figure 2-1 General framework of watermarking for image authentication 
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6. Security against forgery and unauthorized operations should be ensured. 
Among the above listed features, portability is an intrinsic property of the digital 
watermark as we introduced in Chapter 1 since a watermark is always inserted into the 
host data itself. However, other several features are mutually competitive with each 
other. For example, the imperceptibility is determined by the embedding strength and 
the total watermark payload. Stronger embedding can make the watermark survive 
more distortions caused by the common image processing and higher watermark 
payload will usually render a better resolution of tamper localization. But stronger 
embedding and higher watermark payload will both degrade the image quality and 
cause the embedded watermark to be more visible. Therefore, a reasonable tradeoff 
should be found according to the application requirements in designing an effective 
watermarking system for content authentication. 
2.2 State Of The Art 
In the literature, a variety of watermarking techniques have been proposed for image 
content authentication. According to the types of the authentication they provide, the 
existing watermarking algorithms can be classified into two categories: watermarking 
for exact/hard authentication and watermarking for selective/soft authentication 
[CMB01][ZST04]. The watermarking algorithms for exact authentication are usually 
referred to as fragile watermarks, and the watermarking algorithms for selective 
authentication are known as semi-fragile watermarks.  
2.2.1 Fragile Watermarks 
Fragile watermarks provide a strict tamper detection, which has minimal tolerance of 
content manipulations. Even one single bit alteration will impair the embedded 
watermark and render the image inauthentic. Therefore, it resembles a digital signature 
in authentication function except that it does not need separate storage. Actually, many 
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fragile watermarking algorithms also make use of the cryptography techniques to 
achieve a high security level.  
The simplest fragile watermarking algorithm is the so-called LSB watermark, in which 
the least significant bits (LSB) of pixels are modified to embed the desired watermark 
information [W98][YM97][FGB00][F02][CSST01]. Since the change of the least 
significant bit of pixel value is assumed to be imperceptible, the whole corresponding 
bit plane can be replaced by random or structured watermark patterns. In [W98], a 
public key LSB fragile watermark algorithm was proposed for image integrity 
verification. The image is divided into non-overlapping blocks and in each block the 
LSB plane is replaced by the XOR result of the watermark bitmap and the hash value 
of the image size and the pixel values in the block except the LSB. The XOR result is 
encrypted using the user’s private key before embedding. In the detection process, the 
LSB plane is extracted from each block and decrypted using the corresponding public 
key. Then the embedded watermark bitmap in each block is recovered from the 
decrypted information by doing XOR operation again with the hash value recalculated 
from the same block. If the watermark bitmap is complete, the corresponding image 
block is deemed as authentic. Otherwise, the corrupted position indicates the location 
of the alterations. Because it separately authenticates the image blocks, this fragile 
watermarking algorithm was subsequently observed to be vulnerable to the vector 
quantization (VQ) attacks (also referred to as collage attack) [HM00]. Therefore, some 
improved algorithms were proposed in [CMTWY99] and [WM00]. In [CMTWY99], 
overlapping blocks are used in order to resist the VQ attack. This method, however, 
causes a significant loss of tampering localization capability. Therefore, Wong et al. 
proposed another improved scheme in [WM00], in which a unique image-dependent 
block ID is added into the hashing procedure to prevent the VQ attacks. This method 
preserves the tampering localization property of the original technique. 
Another popular fragile watermark algorithm was proposed in [YM97], which is 
known as the Yeung-Mintzer scheme. This scheme uses a binary function (a look-up 
table), generated by a secret key, to enforce every pixel to map to the corresponding bit 
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value in a secret logo. Either a binary logo or a random pattern can be used in this 
method. An error diffusion process follows the watermark embedding to improve the 
watermarked image quality. Because every pixel is individually watermarked, the Y-M 
scheme can achieve pixel-wise tamper localization accuracy. The security of this 
algorithm was examined in [SMW99], followed by some simple modifications. It was 
reported that the search space for inferring the look-up table can be significantly 
reduced if the secret logo is known. In [FGM00] and [FGM02], it was further proven 
that even if the used logo image is kept secret it is still possible for the adversary to 
deduce the secret embedding function or successfully perform a VQ attack when 
multiple watermarked images with the same secret key are available. An improvement 
of the Y-M scheme was proposed in [FGB00]. The improved scheme introduces the 
neighborhood dependency in the mapping function to thwart the aforementioned 
attacks, although this modification decreases the tamper localization capacity. 
Nevertheless, in [WZLL04], Wu et al. further discussed that only a single authenticated 
image plus a verifier (oracle) is enough to successfully mount an oracle attack on the 
Y-M scheme and some of its variations. The proposed oracle attack does not need any 
knowledge of the used logo either. 
In [F02], Fridrich presented an overall study of the security of fragile image 
authentication watermarks that have tamper localization capability. After investigating 
the possible attacks and the vulnerabilities of some existing schemes, the authors 
concluded that the inherent sequential character of the embedding in the pixel-wise 
watermarks was the reason that caused the security vulnerability against oracle attacks. 
Therefore, they turned their focus to block-based schemes and proposed a new block-
based fragile watermark. The proposed scheme is a variation of the Wong scheme in 
[WM00]. In the new scheme, the authentication of the content and its origin are 
separate in order to identify the swapped blocks. A special symmetry structure is used 
to compose the binary logo that is used to authenticate each image block. The logo 
consists of the information about the image and the block origin, like image index, the 
block position, the camera serial number, etc. Although the proposed scheme is secure 
to all the known attacks that are addressed in the paper, such as VQ attacks and oracle 
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attacks, it reduces the tampering localization capability significantly as it is essentially 
block-based.  
To thwart the VQ attacks, another fragile watermark was proposed in [CSST01], in 
which the watermark has a hierarchical structure.  The image is divided into blocks in a 
multi-level hierarchy and the signatures for each block are inserted in the LSB plane. 
Signatures of the small blocks on the lowest level of the hierarchy ensure the accuracy 
of tamper localization and the higher level blocks signatures provide resistance to VQ 
attacks. This method achieves the superior localization property as a block-based 
scheme, but it is more complex than the Fridrich scheme. 
To further improve the accuracy of tamper localization, recently a new statistical fragile 
watermarking scheme has been proposed in [ZW07]. In this scheme, the tailor-made 
authentication data consists of two parts. One part is a set of tailor-made authentication 
data calculated from the five most significant bits (MSB) of each pixel. The other part 
is a set of randomly generated test bits. The combination of these two parts replaces the 
three least significant bits (LSB) of each pixel to complete the embedding. In the 
authentication process, a statistical method is used to examine whether the five MSBs 
of each pixel are altered or not. This scheme can achieve a pixel-wise accuracy in 
locating the tampered pixels when the tampered area is not too extensive. However, it 
can not detect the alteration of the three least significant bits of each pixel. In addition, 
because the three LSB planes are completely replaced by the watermark, the quality of 
the watermarked image by this scheme is limited.  
Besides the fragile watermarking algorithms in the spatial domain, some transform 
domain fragile watermarking schemes have also been proposed, for example, in the 
Discrete Cosine Transform (DCT) domain [WL98] or in the Discrete Wavelet 
Transform (DWT) domain [XA98][SL04]. The advantages of using the transform 
domains mainly lie in the following aspects. One of them is that the watermarking 
system can get more compatible with the popular image compression standards, e.g. 
JPEG. The embedding can be integrated into the compression process or completed 
directly in the compressed representation of the image. Another advantage is that the 
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perceptual distortion caused by the watermark can be better controlled in the frequency 
domain than in the spatial domain. Therefore, the watermarked image quality could be 
improved. In addition, since the frequency components are taken into account in the 
watermarking process, it becomes possible for the tamper detection to be localized in 
both spatial and frequency regions. Nevertheless, because the watermark is embedded 
in the frequency domain instead of by directly modifying the pixels, some slight pixel 
modification may not be detected by the transform domain watermarking algorithms. 
Moreover, the tamper localization accuracy is also bounded by the size of the image 
unit that is used to calculate the frequency components, for example, the block size 
used in the block-based DCT schemes. Subsequently, the sensitivity and accuracy of 
tamper detection are both decreased. Therefore, the transform domain methods are 
more often used in the design of the semi-fragile watermarking schemes that we will 
introduce in the next section. 
2.2.2 Semi-fragile Watermarks 
Since fragile watermarks are easily corrupted by any image processing procedure, the 
incidental distortion by the common image post-processing will also impair the 
watermark and render the image inauthentic. Obviously, it is very desired that the 
authenticator can distinguish incidental and malicious manipulations. To fulfill this 
requirement, semi-fragile watermarking techniques were proposed. In contrast to the 
exact/hard authentication by fragile watermarks, semi-fragile watermarks provide a 
selective/soft authentication. Semi-fragile watermarks monitor the image content 
instead of its digital representation. They allow slight or moderate modifications caused 
by common image processing like mild lossy JPEG compression, filtering and contrast 
enhancement, but will detect the malicious content-changing manipulations, like object 
addition, deletion and replacement. The extent of robustness of a semi-fragile 
watermark against incidental distortions is usually customizable according to the 
particular application requirement. 
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Semi-fragile watermarks are usually embedded in transform domains instead of the 
spatial domain in order to achieve moderate robustness, good imperceptibility and 
compatibility with compression standards. DCT and DWT domains are the most often 
used transform domains in semi-fragile watermarking. Since DCT and DWT are used 
in the popular image compression standards JPEG and JPEG2000, embedding 
techniques in DCT and DWT domains can be easily designed to be resistant to JPEG 
and JPEG2000 compression to some customized extent. Furthermore, the previous 
studies on human visual models in these domains can be directly reused in adaptively 
controlling the watermark embedding strength to improve the watermark 
imperceptibility. In addition, the spatial-frequency property of the wavelet transform 
enables good tamper localization capability in the authentication process. 
Two embedding techniques are mainly used in the semi-fragile watermarking schemes. 
One is the spread spectrum method [F98a][LPD00], which was firstly proposed by Cox 
in [CKLS97]. The watermark message is first turned from a narrow band signal to a 
wide band signal and then embedded into the cover image additively or 
multiplicatively. The detection of a spread spectrum watermark is done by checking the 
correlation of the watermark signal and the watermarked image. Because a large 
amount of signal samples are necessary for good performance of the correlation 
detection, it is difficult for this embedding method to achieve a sufficient watermark 
payload in order to allow the tamper localization to fine scale. The other popular 
embedding method is the so-called quantization index modulation (QIM) method 
[CW01][LC00]. The watermark information is embedded by quantizing the selected 
frequency coefficients or some particular feature values to some pre-determined scales 
according to a look-up table or the simple odd-even mapping rule. By the QIM 
embedding, the embedding strength can be well controlled by the used quantization 
step, so that the watermark robustness can be customized quantitatively. 
In the literature, a variety of semi-fragile watermarking algorithms have been proposed 
in the last decade. We only focus on reviewing some representative semi-fragile 
watermarking techniques in the following. In [F98a][F98b], Fridrich proposed a 
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technique in which the image is divided into medium-size blocks and in each block a 
spread spectrum watermark is embedded into the middle 30% of DCT coefficients 
additively. To verify the image integrity, the receiver tries to detect the embedded 
watermark in every block. If watermarks are detected in all the blocks with high 
detector responses, one can be fairly confident that the image has not been significantly 
manipulated. If the detector responses become overall lower over all the blocks, it is 
very likely that some kind of image processing operation has been applied. If only in a 
few blocks the detector responses are fairly lower than those in other blocks, one can 
estimate the probability that a block has been tampered based on the detector response. 
Since a medium-size block, e.g. 64×64, is needed to embed the spread spectrum 
watermark, this method can not achieve good tamper localization accuracy but only can 
provide an estimation of the undergone manipulations. If a smaller block size is used, 
the performance of the spread spectrum watermark will be significantly decreased. 
Furthermore, because robust watermarking technique is used in this scheme, the 
authenticator can not be very sensitivity to some elaborate modifications while it is 
fairly robust to common image processing like brightness/contrast adjustment and 
sharpening. 
In [LC97][LC00][LC01], Lin et al. proposed a semi-fragile watermarking algorithm in 
DCT domain using the QIM embedding method. The proposed watermarking algorithm 
tolerates JPEG lossy compression to a pre-determined quality factor but is able to 
detect malicious manipulations. Two properties of DCT coefficients are used in the 
proposed authentication scheme. One is coefficient invariance that after quantizing a 
DCT coefficient to an integral multiple of the used quantization step, its value can be 
exactly recovered after JPEG compression with a smaller quantization step size. The 
other property is that the order relationship of DCT coefficient pair remains unchanged 
before and after JPEG compression. The second property is used to generate the 
authentication message and the first one to embed the message robustly against 
acceptable JPEG compression. In Lin’s scheme, the authentication message generation 
and embedding process are performed on a basis of non-overlapping 8×8 blocks, 
similar to the JPEG compression process. In the authentication process, the extracted 
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authentication bits are compared with the regenerated ones. The proposed authenticator 
can localize the tempered blocks and recover the corrupted blocks approximately, if the 
recovery bits are also embedded. Similar to the Friedrich’s scheme, the tamper 
localization accuracy of this method is also bounded by the used block size. 
Eggers et al. proposed a watermarking technique for image authentication in [EG01]. 
The scheme is based on their previous work, the so-called SCS (Scalar Costa Scheme) 
watermarking technique in [ESG00]. A random binary sequence is embedded with a 
secret dither sequence into the DCT coefficients of 8×8 blocks. A likelihood test is used 
to determine whether the correct watermark is embedded with the specific key so as to 
examine if the image has been severely manipulated or not. The authors pointed out a 
fundamental problem of image authentication by semi-fragile watermarks that it is very 
difficult to embed watermarks in the flat image regions with moderate robustness. This 
problem will lead to false watermark detection in such regions. 
In addition to the above-mentioned DCT domain techniques, some wavelet-based 
watermarking methods have also been proposed. In [KH99], Kundur et al. proposed a 
so-called telltale watermarking method, which embeds a random sequence independent 
of the image content into the wavelet coefficients. The image is first decomposed by a 
four-level wavelet transform using Haar bases. Then the watermark bits are embedded 
into the subbands of the four levels by the odd-even QIM embedding method. The 
decision to map the wavelet coefficients to odd or even is randomized by a secret key. 
The proposed authentication method is capable of characterizing the type of distortions 
based on the four levels of watermark extraction and verification. A similar wavelet-
based approach was proposed in [YLL01]. After a four-level DWT of the image is 
taken, the mean value of a set of wavelet coefficients, instead of a single coefficient in 
Kundur’s scheme, is used to embed a random sequence as the authentication data. The 
tampered area is estimated by using an information fusion procedure, which integrates 
the detection results obtained at multiple scales.  
In [WKBC02], Winne et al. proposed a wavelet domain watermarking algorithm for 
image authentication by modifying a robust watermark algorithm. After the wavelet 
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transform of the image, the watermark data that is a random sequence is embedded into 
the first wavelet level. A vector is constructed from the three coefficients that are at the 
same frequency location but in the three different orientations, i.e. LH, HL and HH. 
The value of the median coefficient is quantized based on the watermark bit by an 
adaptive quantization step. A pre-distortion step is used to improve the performance 
and efficiency of the proposed algorithm. In the image authentication process, high 
tamper localization accuracy is achieved, which can deliver information about the 
shape of the modified object. 
A new semi-fragile image authentication watermarking technique was proposed in 
[MSCS06], which improves the performance of the Lin’s methods proposed in [LC97] 
[LC00] and [LC01]. This technique is essentially a modified version of Lin’s scheme. 
Two possible solutions were presented to improve the tampering detection sensitivity: 
the random bias method and the non-uniform quantization method. Both methods 
reduce the probability that some types of manipulations remain undetectable, which 
cause only moderate changes of the feature values. In addition, the modified scheme 
extends the DCT-based watermarking technique to the wavelet domain and extends the 
acceptable image compression from JPEG to JPEG2000.  
2.2.3 Watermarking for Synthetic Image Authentication 
In addition to the classification based on the watermark fragility and according to the 
type of the targeted images, the authentication watermark techniques can be classified 
into two categories in another way: watermarking techniques for natural images and 
watermarking techniques for synthetic images. In the literature, most of the existing 
watermarking algorithms are designed for the natural images, which are usually true 
color or grayscale images. For example, most of the watermarking techniques 
introduced in the previous subsections are only applicable to true color and grayscale 
images, including both the fragile and semi-fragile watermarking schemes. These 
schemes achieve good watermark invisibility by taking advantage of an important 
property of natural images that they have continuous tone and their pixel values vary in 
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a wide range. Because of this property, slightly modifying a pixel value will not cause 
perceptible artifacts.  
For synthetic images, however, this property is not always true. The pixels of most 
synthetic images usually only take on very limited number of values, such as in simple 
line drawings, digital maps, etc. In binary text images, there are even less pixel values: 
only black and white. Figure 2-2 shows the difference of the histograms of natural and 
synthetic images. In addition, in synthetic images, there are usually large homogenous 
regions, in which there is only one uniform gray level or color. Hence arbitrarily 
changing the pixel values on a synthetic image will cause very visible artifacts. 
Furthermore, in practical applications, synthetic images are stored in different standard 
formats than natural images, which are usually palette-based and can only handle a 
limited number of colors. Due to these special characteristics of synthetic images, most 
of the existing watermarking algorithms for natural images can not be applied to the 
synthetic images straightforwardly. More detailed discussion about the special 
requirements of synthetic image watermarking will be addressed in Section 4.1.  
Due to the simplicity of synthetic images, invisibly embedding a certain amount of 
watermark information becomes a more challenging task. Comparing to the 
watermarking algorithms for natural images, only a limited number of watermarking 
schemes for synthetic images have been proposed in the literature 
(a) (b) 
Figure 2-2 Comparison of the histograms of natural and synthetic images: (a) 
Histogram of a natural image, (b) Histogram of a synthetic image. 
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[CWMA01][WL04][YK07], including watermarking techniques for formatted text 
images, drawings, digital maps, halftone images, generic simple images and so forth. A 
comprehensive review of the existing watermarking schemes for the synthetic images 
will be given in Section 4.2.  
2.3 Problems and Challenges  
From what has been addressed in the previous sections, we can see that most of the 
existing watermarking schemes do not satisfy all the requirements of an effective 
authentication system listed in Section 2.1. Especially, because some requirements are 
mutually competitive, a reasonable compromise is usually required in designing the 
authentication system. Therefore, the performance on one or more aspects will be 
inevitably and undesirably reduced. Furthermore, compared with natural images, 
studies on the synthetic image watermarking and authentication are still far from 
mature and satisfactory. Last but not least, selective watermarking and authentication 
according to the image content and the application requirement is also neglected by 
most of the existing techniques. 
Overall, the existing problems and challenges can be summarized as follows. 
- Tamper localization accuracy and image quality. As mentioned in previous 
sections, localizing the tampered regions is a very desirable feature in 
applications of image content authentication. In order to monitor every part of 
the image, a high watermark payload is subsequently required. However, 
embedding high volume of watermark information will introduce more data 
modification and therefore degrade the image quality. Hence, a desirable 
solution is to increase the tamper localization accuracy without increasing the 
watermark payload nor degrading the image quality more. 
- Security of the existing semi-fragile watermarking algorithms. In order to 
achieve the capability of tamper localization, many semi-fragile watermarks are 
embedded in a block-based way. Since the embedding is performed locally, 
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they are somehow vulnerable to some kinds of local attacks, such as the VQ 
attack, especially when the watermarking algorithm is known to the adversary. 
Another security problem lies in the embedding strategy. Quantization-based 
embedding method is most often used in the watermarking algorithms for 
authentication. When an adversary knows the embedding algorithm, he can 
change the embedded data at will though the modified data might not match the 
authentication code, which presents concerns of counterfeiting attacks [HM00] 
[W03]. 
- Synthetic image watermarking and authentication. Most of the existing 
watermarking techniques are designed for natural images and can not be 
directly applied to synthetic images. Few studies have been done with regard to 
synthetic image watermarking. Due to the simplicity of synthetic images, it is 
more challenging to watermark synthetic images with high transparency, 
especially for content authentication supporting the tamper localization feature, 
because in this case more watermark payload is usually required. Therefore, the 
challenge is how to achieve content authentication with the desirable tamper 
localization for synthetic images by efficiently making use of the limited 
watermark capacity. 
- Non-ubiquitous watermarking but ubiquitous authentication. In most of the 
existing watermark schemes for content authentication, no underlying semantic 
content is taken into account in the watermarking and authentication processes. 
The watermark information is usually embedded in a ubiquitous way over the 
whole image. In some applications, however, the fidelity requirement on some 
important image regions is differently specified. No slight image modification 
inside these regions is allowed. The integrity of these regions, however, is still 
of special importance and must be protected. So a new solution is needed that 
can provide an overall protection of the image, while being able to avoid 
modifying important image regions during the watermark embedding process. 
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More detailed specifications of the problems and challenges of the existing 
authentication watermarks will be given in each of the following chapters. Following 
the identified problems and challenges, we will propose corresponding solutions 
thereafter.
  29
Chapter 3 Semi-Fragile Watermarking for 
Image Authentication 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, compared with cryptography, one of the 
advantages of watermarking techniques in authentication applications is the tamper 
localization capability. For image content authentication, this property is a particularly 
desirable feature in most applications. Besides the general integrity examination of the 
image content, the position information where the tampering has occurred is also very 
useful in practice. With the help of this information, other untouched image parts can 
still remain trustworthy and useful when the original data is not available. It can also 
help to infer the attacker’s motives in many applications, such as in the case of forensic 
evidences. 
In order to achieve the capability of localizing the tampered regions, many existing 
watermarking schemes embed the watermark in a block-based way [ESA04][LC00] 
[WL98][WKBC02]. As illustrated in Figure 3-1, the image is divided into blocks and 
the watermarks are embedded into every block respectively. The authentication of each 
block is done by verifying whether the watermark can be successfully extracted from 
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the block. Hence, in the common block-based methods the maximal resolution of 
tampering detection is bounded to the block size that is used to embed the watermark. 
For example, in the algorithms proposed in [LC00] and [WL98], a block size of 8×8 is 
used and then the maximum detection resolution is limited to only 8×8 pixels. 
Moreover, because the block is the minimal unit that can contain at least one watermark 
bit, the maximal detection resolution is proportional to the watermark payload. In order 
to increase the detection resolution, a smaller block size must be used but this will lead 
to higher watermark payload. Subsequently, higher watermark payload will cause more 
artifacts and degrade the image quality. For example, in [WKBC02] the detection 
accuracy is improved to 2×2 pixels, but the watermark payload is also increased to 1 bit 
per 2×2 block. The challenge, therefore, is not only a good tradeoff between the two 
competitive factors, detection resolution and the watermark payload, but we also need 
to find a way to increase the detection resolution while embedding the same or even 
less watermark information.  
Furthermore, in order to protect the whole image by block-based schemes, the 
authentication data, i.e. the watermark, has to be embedded locally all over the whole 
In every block, there must 
be at least a watermark bit 
embedded to monitor the 
pixels inside. 
Figure 3-1 Illustration of the block-based watermarking for content authentication 
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image. However, as addressed in [EG01], it is very difficult to embed the data in 
smooth regions without causing noticeable artifacts [WL99], because the watermark 
capacity there is much lower than in other textured regions. Hence the watermark 
detection error rate will be significantly increased in such flat image regions. This 
problem will get even worse when embedding the watermarks into smaller blocks. In 
[WL99], the random shuffling is used to handle the uneven distribution of the 
watermark capacity in order to use the total watermark capacity of the image more 
efficiently. The goal in [WL99] is to utilize the available watermark capacity to hide as 
much as possible information. In this chapter, we will apply a similar idea not only to 
handle the uneven watermark capacity distribution, but more importantly, to enhance 
the tamper localization resolution with the same or less watermark payload. 
In addition, another problem of the block-based methods is their security vulnerability 
against all kinds of local attacks. Because the block-based schemes embed the 
watermark locally, they show their weakness against such local attacks as block copy 
and paste, vector quantization (VQ) attacks and so forth. The VQ attacks are also 
known as collage attacks, which swap blocks in the same image or across different 
watermarked images [F02][OE05]. Almost all block-based watermarking methods are 
somehow vulnerable to such kinds of local attacks, particularly in case the 
authentication data and the embedding process are block independent. Not only block-
DCT-based methods but also many DWT-based methods suffer from the VQ attacks 
due to the property of spatial-frequency localization of the wavelet transform. The 
threat of local attacks becomes even higher when the watermarking algorithm is known 
to the adversary.  
Last but not least, the security of the embedding strategy itself is also one of our 
concerns. In the existing watermarking techniques for image authentication, 
quantization-based embedding methods are most often used. When the embedding 
algorithm is known to an adversary, he/she can modify the embedded data at will. This 
security problem can be alleviated in three ways: combining with cryptographic 
mechanisms, providing security to feature extraction and improving the embedding 
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mechanism itself. For example, traditional cryptographic techniques like the hash 
functions can be used in the watermarking systems to enhance the system security. 
These techniques, however, usually involve multiple pixel samples or coefficients. 
Hence, the cryptography-based watermarking algorithms can not always allow the 
localization of tampered regions to fine scale. Feature-based schemes have a similar 
problem since a feature is usually defined as a certain property of a set of image 
samples. With regard to this problem, an improvement using look-up table (LUT) 
embedding method was proposed in [W03], in which the maximal allowable run of “0” 
and “1” may be customized. For example, a maximal run of “0” and “1” can be 
increased to 2 comparing to the simple odd-even embedding (which is equivalent to the 
LUT embedding with the run of “0” and “1” always being 1). The LUT method, 
however, will degrade the image quality more, because more distortions are introduced 
when embedding the watermark with a larger run. 
To solve the above-mentioned problems, in this chapter we propose a novel semi-
fragile watermarking scheme for image authentication which allows to detect and 
localize tampered regions. We apply a random permutation process in the wavelet 
domain to build up a random map among the image locations. The randomly grouped 
wavelet coefficients refer mutually to each other. When any member of a group is 
manipulated, the whole group will be deemed as unverified. The final tamper detection 
and localization is based on the density of the unverified coefficient distribution. With a 
larger group size, we can reduce the necessary watermark payload while still keeping a 
high tamper localization resolution all over the whole image. The watermark can either 
be embedded into only the most suitable coefficients in each group or be proportionally 
distributed into all the coefficients. The coefficients whose modification causes less 
perceptual artifacts will take on a larger modification portion. In this way, we avoid 
embedding watermarks into the flat image regions but still have these region protected. 
Furthermore, the random permutation procedure enhances the security of the whole 
system against local attacks and it also improves the security of the embedding 
mechanism itself. Without the knowledge of the random permutation, even if the 
algorithm is publicly known, an adversary can not modify the embedded data. 
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The chapter is organized as follows. Firstly, in Section 3.2 we introduce the proposed 
watermarking scheme, including the watermark embedding and retrieval processes. 
Then, the image authentication process is presented in Section 3.3. Afterwards, we 
analyze the performance of the proposed scheme in Section 3.4 and discuss the 
extension of multi-resolution authentication in Section 3.5. The experimental results are 
given in Section 3.6. Finally, we conclude the chapter in Section 3.7. 
3.2 Proposed Watermarking Scheme 
The block diagram of the proposed authentication scheme is shown in Figure 3-2. It 
consists of two parts: the watermark embedding process, the watermark retrieval and 
image authentication process. We will introduce the watermark embedding and 
retrieval processes in this section. The image authentication part will be presented in 
the next section. 
Original  
Image 
Inverse 
Permutation Grouping 
Watermarked 
Image DWT Permutation IDWT Embed 
Secret Key 
Watermark  
(a) 
Watermarked 
Image 
Secret Key Watermark  
Detection 
Inverse 
Permutation Filtering 
Tampering 
Localization 
Detection Sensitivity 
Comparison 
Unverified groups 
and positions 
DWT Permutation Grouping 
Extracted 
watermark 
Secret Key 
(b) 
Figure 3-2 Block diagrams of the proposed watermarking scheme: (a) watermark 
embedding (b) watermark retrieval and image authentication. 
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3.2.1 Watermark Embedding 
The embedding process consists of three steps. The first step is to choose the 
decomposition level where the watermark will be embedded and to permute the 
coefficients. The second step groups the permuted coefficients and modifies the 
coefficients in every group if necessary. The last step inversely permutes the 
coefficients and performs the inverse wavelet transform to construct the watermarked 
image.  
The proposed watermarking scheme can be applied to both gray level images and true 
color images. For simplicity, in the following sections, we introduce the proposed 
technique by embedding the watermark information in the luminance channel only. For 
true color images with red, green and blue channels, the luminance value of a pixel can 
be calculated by the formula I=0.299R+0.587G+0.114B, defined in the ITU-R BT.601 
(formerly CCIR 601) standard, where R, G and B denote the red, green and blue values. 
When required, however, the embedding process can also be applied to R, G and B 
channels respectively.  
Figure 3-3 Syntax illustration of the wavelet decomposition 
HL
LH HH
HL
LH HH
LL HL
LH HH
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3.2.1.1 Wavelet Coefficients Random Permutation 
The proposed scheme performs watermark embedding in the Discrete Wavelet 
Transform (DWT) domain. The first level of wavelet decomposition produces four 
subbands, termed LL, LH, HL and HH. LL is a low resolution version of the original 
image and LH, HL and HH are the detail sub-images in horizontal, vertical and 
diagonal directions. The LL band is iteratively decomposed to obtain R-level wavelet 
transform as shown in Figure 3-3. More introduction on the wavelet transform can be 
found in [C96][D92]. The wavelet coefficients of different subbands are denoted as 
"","" subbandlevelf .  
Depending on the application requirement, the subbands LH, HL and HH of one or 
more decomposition levels are used to embed the watermark. Embedding watermark in 
the high resolution level gives a higher capability of localizing the tampered regions but 
lowers the robustness to common image processing. On the contrary, embedding in the 
low resolution level will improve the watermark robustness while decreasing the 
accuracy of tempering localization. The performance of embedding in different levels 
will be discussed in the following sections. In the following part of this section, we 
suppose that the rth level is selected to embed the watermark and the resolution level 
variable r will be omitted from the text and equations because the embedding method is 
the same for other levels.  
Before permuting the wavelet coefficients, all coefficients of the three subbands LH, 
HL and HH are firstly concatenated into a single sequence S. Three coefficients with 
the same coordinate of the three subbands, which correspond to the same spatial 
location, are continuously adjacent in the new sequence. Let ),( nmfHL , ),( nmfLH , 
),( nmfHH  denote respectively the coefficients of the different subbands, where ),( nm  
represents the position of the coefficient in the corresponding subband. The coefficients 
are rearranged in the following way: 
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{ )0,0(HLf , )0,0(LHf , )0,0(HHf , )1,0(HLf , )1,0(LHf , )1,0(HHf , ...... , )1,1( −− NMfHL , 
)1,1( −− NMfLH , )1,1( −− NMfHH },  
where M and N are the horizontal and vertical size of the subband, respectively. Figure 
3-4 gives a visual illustration of the concatenation procedure when the first level 
decomposition is selected to embed the watermark.  
Then the concatenated coefficients, i.e. the sequence S, are randomly permuted, as 
shown in Figure 3-4, controlled by a secret key k. In the permutation process, a 
minimal distance d between any adjacent members in S is required in the new 
permutated sequence in order to ensure adjacent coefficients in S are separately 
distributed after permutation. In this way, the coefficients corresponding to the same 
spatial location will be separated with a minimal distance d since they are continuously 
concatenated in S. The new sequence containing the randomly permuted coefficients is 
denoted as S′ . Table 3-1 depicts a random permutation algorithm. 
Table 3-1 Depiction of a random permutation algorithm 
1. Initialization the variables.  
      Set l the length of the coefficient sequence S. 
Set index[l] the index of random permutation.  
Set i the index of index[] and initialize i to 1. 
Set d the required minimal distance. 
2. Generate a random number ir  between 1 and l.  
3. If ir  already exists in index[l], then go back to Step 2 to regenerate ir . 
3. If driindex i <−− ]1[ , then go back to Step 2 to regenerate ir . 
4. index[i]= ir  and i=i+1, if li ≥ , then stop; otherwise, go back to Step 2. 
 
 
After the random permutation, the sequence S′  is divided into groups with a fixed 
group size g, as shown in Figure 3-4. In every group, one watermark bit will be 
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embedded. The embedded bit will monitor all the members of this group. The members 
of each group correspond to various spatial locations, thanks to the random permutation 
process. The random permutation process also distributes the coefficients suitable for 
watermark embedding evenly over all the groups [WL99]. This property ensures that 
the embedding process makes no modifications in smooth image regions and therefore 
improves the fidelity of the watermark image.  
The group size g determines the watermark payload and the number of the mutual 
referred coefficients. Thereby it will affect the watermarked image’s quality and the 
maximal localizable tampered area. With a larger g, fewer watermark bits will be 
embedded, so a higher fidelity of the watermarked image will be achieved. But this will 
Figure 3-4 Wavelet coefficients concatenation and random permutation 
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not decrease the detection resolution, although it will reduce the size of the maximal 
localizable tampered area. We will discuss this aspect more in Section 3.3. 
3.2.1.2 Wavelet Coefficient Modification 
The watermark w consists of a binary random sequence, generated by the secret key, 
}1,0{∈w . The random sequence serves as an authentication code. This code is 
compared with the retrieved watermark in the authentication process. More details are 
given in Section 3.3. 
The embedding process is performed by quantizing the weighted mean of the wavelet 
coefficients. In every group of the random sequence S′ , the weighted mean of all the 
wavelet coefficients is defined as 
 ∑
=
⋅=
g
i
jij ifps
1
)( , (3-1) 
where )(if j  is the ith coefficient in the jth group and g is the group size. p  is a bipolar 
random sequence with uniform distribution, ∈ip {-1,1}.  
To embed the watermark, we then quantize js  by a quantization step Q as shown in the 
following equations: 
 ⎣ ⎦ jjj QQss Δ+⋅= / , (3-2) 
 ⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦⎩⎨
⎧
=
oddisQsif
evenisQsif
sQuan
j
j
j /1
/0
)( , (3-3) 
where ⎣ ⎦.  is the floor function and jΔ  is the quantization residue.  
The watermark bit )( jw  is embedded by modifying the weighted mean js  so that 
)( jsQuan  is equal to )( jw . As shown in Figure 3-5, the weighted mean js  is modified 
to the nearest 0 bin (the dashed line) or 1 bin (the solid line) according to )( jw . The 
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bins of 1 and 0 are located in the middle of the quantization interval. Specifically, the 
modification of js  is performed as 
 
⎣ ⎦
⎣ ⎦⎪⎩
⎪⎨⎧
≠+−⋅+
=++⋅+
=
jjj
jjj
j wQsQuanifQQQQs
wQsQuanifQQQQs
s
)2/(,2//)2/(
)2/(,2//)2/(
* , (3-4) 
where *js  is the expected weighted mean value of the jth group. 
The advantage of using weighted mean is that it preserves small variation when 
incidental distortions are encountered, because usually common image processing, e.g. 
JPEG compression, is applied to the entire image and causes similar distortions over 
the whole image area. For instance, if the magnitudes of all the )(if j  in the jth group 
are changed by Ω  due to some distortions, then 
 ∑∑∑
===
Ω⋅+⋅=Ω+⋅=
g
i
i
g
i
ji
g
i
jij pifpifps
111
' )())(( . (3-5) 
Since p  is uniformly distributed, the second part of the above equation is 
approximately equal to zero. Then the weighted mean becomes 
 j
g
i
jij sifps =⋅≈′ ∑
=1
)( . (3-6) 
Q 
... (2k+3)Q ... (2k-1)Q 
1 0 0
(2k+2)Q(2k+1)Q
1
2kQ
js  
Q/2 
Figure 3-5 Illustration of the quantization process 
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For simplicity, the weighting coefficient ip  can be replaced by 
i)1(−  and Equation 
(3-6) still holds. When the group size g is an even number, it becomes 
 j
g
i
j
i
g
i
i
g
i
j
i
g
i
j
i
j sifififs =−=Ω−+−=Ω+−= ∑∑∑∑
==== 1111
' )()1()1()()1())(()1( . (3-7) 
On the contrary, malicious manipulations commonly occur in local image regions and 
will only distort the wavelet coefficients corresponding to the tampered regions. 
Because the random permutation process spreads all those local coefficients in different 
groups, in every affected group only one or few individual coefficients are distorted. 
Therefore, these distortions will change the weighted mean and cause a larger variation. 
Consequently, the quantization result may shift. 
In order to modify the weighted mean js , we propose two methods to update the 
coefficients in every group as described respectively in the following. 
Method 1: 
One way is to modify the coefficient with the maximal magnitude in the group, because 
the modification of such coefficients with large magnitude causes less noticeable 
artifacts than other coefficients with small magnitude. Here we define the coefficients 
whose absolute magnitudes are large as large coefficients independent of its sign. Large 
coefficients indicate that the image has more textured contents at the corresponding 
spatial location, while small coefficients correspond to the smooth regions. As 
mentioned in Section 3.2.1.1, the random permutation process distributes the large 
coefficients evenly across all groups, which ensures that the probability of every group 
having at least one large coefficient is quite high.  
Let jδ  denote the difference between the expected weighted mean value and the 
original one: 
 jjj ss −=
*δ . (3-8) 
The largest coefficient is updated as follows: 
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 jjijj ifsignpifif δ⋅⋅+= ))(()()( max,max,*max, , (3-9) 
where )(max, if j  is the coefficient in the jth group with the maximal magnitude, 
sign(x)=1 if x ≥ 0 and sign(x)=-1 if x<0. If the sign of )(max, if j  is changed after 
applying Equation (3-9), then )(max, if j  is set to zero. In this case, the residue of the 
difference jδ  is ))()(( max,, ifsign jjjresiduej −= δδδ  after updating the largest 
coefficient. Then the second largest coefficient is updated by applying Equation (3-9) 
with residuej ,δ . If there is still a residue 0, >residuejδ , other coefficients are updated 
accordingly until 0, =residuejδ . Table 3-2 depicts the coefficient-updating algorithm in a 
single group. 
Table 3-2 Depiction of the coefficient-updating algorithm (Method 1) 
1. Initialize the variables: 
Set  g  the group size. 
Set  sortf[g]  the descending sorted (based on magnitude) coefficient sequence 
in group j. 
Set residuej ,δ = jδ , the residue of the difference jδ . 
Set  sign the sign of jδ , if 0>jδ  sign=1, otherwise sign=-1. 
Set  k  the index of sortf[] and initialize k to 0. 
Set  i[k] the original index of sortf[k] in the group j. 
2. Update the coefficients: 
do{ 
      if ( residuejkip ,][ δ⋅ <0  &&  residuejj ksortf ,)( δ< ){ 
residuej ,δ =sign·( )(, ksortf jresiduej −δ ); 
)(ksortf j =0; 
 k++; 
     } 
     else{ 
)(ksortf j  = )(ksortf j + residuejkip ,][ δ⋅ ·( 1:1?0)( −>ksortf j ); 
residuej ,δ =0; 
     } 
}while( 0, >residuejδ  &&  k<g  ); 
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Method 2: 
The second method is to assign the watermark energy to all the members of the group 
by updating every coefficient in the group. The whole modification amount of the 
weighted mean js  is not evenly distributed to every coefficient. The modification 
amount of every coefficient is determined by the proportion of its magnitude to the sum 
of the magnitudes of all the coefficients. Every coefficient is updated as 
 jijijj ifsignpifif δ⋅⋅+= ))(()()(* , (3-10) 
where jiδ  is the update amount of the ith coefficient in the jth group that is calculated 
as 
 jg
i
j
j
ji
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1
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)(
. (3-11) 
If the sign of )(if j  is changed after applying Equation (3-10), then )(
* if j  is set to zero. 
In this way, every coefficient will be modified and the larger coefficients will be 
changed more than the smaller ones, because the large coefficients can bear more 
distortion without causing perceptible artifacts. The correctness of the procedure can be 
seen as follows. 
From Equation (3-8), the expected weighted mean value of the jth group is jjj ss δ+=* , 
then 
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By imposing the constraint that if ))(())(( * ifsignifsign jj ≠ , then )(
* if j =0, we obtain 
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Thus, when )(if j  is updated to )(
* if j , the weighted mean value js  is updated to 
*
js  
accordingly. 
Theoretically, the two coefficient update methods will cause the same amount of image 
modification of jδ . However, when applied to the image data, these two methods will 
achieve different image quality and detection performance. Some comparisons and 
discussions will be given in Section 3.6.  
After all the watermark bits are embedded in all the groups of S′ , the sequence S′  is 
inversely permutated to reconstruct the order of coefficients as in the original sequence 
S. The wavelet coefficients are then put back to their original positions in the subbands. 
Finally, the inverse wavelet transform is performed to obtain the watermarked image. 
3.2.2 Watermark Retrieval  
The secret key k, the selected level r of wavelet decomposition and the group size g are 
conveyed to the watermark detector as side information. The watermarked image is 
firstly decomposed by r-level wavelet transform. Then the coefficients in the three 
subbands HL, LH and HH of the rth level are concatenated in the same way as in the 
embedding process.  Controlled by the secret key k, the same random permutation is 
performed to reconstruct the sequence S′ . 
The sequence S′  is then divided into groups with the group size g. The weighted mean 
of all the coefficients in every group is recalculated and the watermark bit is extracted 
by quantizing the weighted mean 
 )( '' jj sQuanw = , (3-14) 
where 'js  is the recalculated weighted mean of the jth group and 
'
jw  is the extracted 
watermark bit from the jth group. 
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3.3 Image Authentication Process 
Every extracted watermark bit 'jw  is compared with the embedded one that is generated 
by the secret key k. If all the extracted watermark bits match the original ones, the 
image is claimed authentic, otherwise it may be tampered. The following steps are 
taken to localize the tampered areas. A visual illustration of the authentication process 
is given in Figure 3-6.  
 
Figure 3-6 Illustration of the authentication process 
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Step 1: 
For every group, if the extracted watermark bit does not match the embedded one, the 
whole group is considered as an unverified group. All the coefficients in the group are 
potentially tampered. Since we do not know exactly in this stage which coefficient is 
manipulated, all the members of the group are marked as unverified coefficients 
whether they are tampered or not. The actually tampered coefficients will be identified 
in Step 4. 
Step 2: 
All the coefficients in the sequence S′ are mapped back to their original positions in the 
wavelet subbands by the inverse permutation. Since the coefficients in every unverified 
group come from various locations, all those unverified coefficients will randomly 
scatter over the three subbands as shown in Figure 3-6. At the location corresponding to 
the tampered region in every subband, the density of the unverified coefficients is 
distinctly much higher than in other portions, which is shown in Figure 3-6 as the gray 
areas. This is because all the unverified groups in S′  contain either one or more 
coefficients coming from the tampered region. After mapped back to the wavelet 
subbands, those unverified coefficients are clustered together again. The other isolated 
unverified coefficients come from those groups that the tampered coefficients belong 
to. Thanks to the random permutation, they are distributed over the subbands sparsely 
like random noises.  
Step 3: 
We construct a matrix V of the same size of the subband at level-r wavelet 
decomposition, i.e. r4/1  of the image size, in which every position corresponds to a 
rr 22 ×  pixel block of the image. For example, if r=1, namely, the watermark is 
embedded in the 1st level of the wavelet decomposition, the size of the matrix V is 
)2/()2/( HW × , where W and H denote the width and height of the image, 
respectively. We consider a position ),( nmV  in the matrix V as unverified when there 
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is an unverified coefficient at the same position in any subband of HL, LH, and HH. 
),( nmV  is set to 1 if it is an unverified position, otherwise it is set to 0: 
⎩⎨
⎧
=
.,0
),(),,(),,(,1
),( ,,,
otherwise
unverifiedisnmfnmfnmfofanyif
nmV HHrLHrHLr  (3-15) 
As shown in Figure 3-6, the isolated unverified coefficients in the subbands are still 
randomly distributed over the matrix V like random noises, while in the tampered 
region the density of the unverified coefficients becomes even higher than in every 
individual subband.  
Step 4: 
Based on the fact that the tampering commonly occurs in a continuous area of the 
image in the practical applications, only the region with the high density of the 
unverified coefficients corresponds to the actual manipulation. In Sept 1 we consider all 
the coefficients in an unverified group as unverified. Most coefficients, however, in an 
unverified group are in fact not manipulated. The isolated unverified coefficients in the 
subbands correspond to those unchanged coefficients in the unverified groups. We 
define those isolated unverified coefficients as noise dots. Other unverified coefficients, 
which are mapped back to adjacent positions, are identified as the actually tampered 
ones. 
In order to refine the authentication result and give an accurate tampering localization, 
a noise filter is applied to the matrix V to remove the noise dots, i.e. the noise-like 
unverified positions, so that the tampered region can be easily picked out. The filtering 
process is performed as 
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where d is the filter size, T is a preset threshold and F is (when the filter size d is set to 
5)  
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The filter size d and the threshold T determine the sensitivity of the tampering detector 
and can be set according to the application requirement.  
As shown in Figure 3-6, after filtering out the isolated unverified positions, the 
remaining unverified positions in V indicate the actually tampered location and are then 
mapped to the image spatial domain to locate the corresponding region. Since the size 
of the matrix V is r4/1  of the image size, the authentication process provides a 
maximum detection resolution of rr 22 ×  blocks in the image domain. The localization 
capability of the proposed scheme will be discussed in Section 3.4.2. 
3.4 Performance Analysis 
In this section we will evaluate the performance of the proposed authentication scheme 
with respect to the quality of the watermarked image, the localization capability, the 
sensitivity of tampering detection and the security of the watermarking scheme.  
3.4.1 Quality of Watermarked Image 
The quality of the watermarked image is one of the most important concerns of 
watermarking applications. High quality and fidelity of the watermarked image is 
commonly desired. The Peak Signal-to-Noise Ratio (PSNR) is usually used to measure 
the quality of the watermarked image, which is defined as  
 )255(log20 10 MSE
PSNR = , (3-18) 
where MSE denotes the mean squared error (MSE) 
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'I  is the watermarked image and I  is the original one. W and H denote the width and 
height of the image respectively. Although it is known that PSNR can not always 
provide a good estimate of the true image fidelity [CMB01], the PSNR value gives an 
objective overall evaluation of the watermarked image quality and is the most often 
used measurement to evaluate the watermarking algorithms in related works. 
In the proposed authentication scheme, the image distortion is caused by modifications 
of the wavelet coefficients in the watermark embedding process. Obviously, the 
quantization step Q used in Equation (3-4) will affect how much the quality of the 
watermarked image degrades. A larger quantization step will incur more modification 
to the wavelet coefficients, consequently resulting in more degradation of the 
watermarked image. The mean squared error incurred by the quantization can be 
derived as follows. In both the following two cases, we assume that the original 
wavelet coefficients are uniformly distributed over the range of ])1(,[ QkkQ +=ψ . 
First, we consider the case that the quantization result of the original coefficient 
weighted mean js  matches the watermark bit )( jw . In this case, the weighted mean js  
in the range of ψ  is rounded to Qk )21( +  and the mean squared error caused by the 
quantization is   
 .
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2
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Next we consider the other case that quantization result does not match the watermark 
bit )( jw . The weighted mean js  is modified to Qk )21( −  or Qk )23( +  determined 
by which one is nearest to js , incurring the mean squared error 
 .
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Assuming that with the probability of 1/2 the quantization result of js  matches the 
watermark bit, the overall mean squared error caused by the quantization is  
 .
312
7
2
1
122
1 222
21
QQQMSEMSEMSE =⋅+⋅=+= ψψψ  (3-22) 
Equation (3-22) gives us the average distortion caused by embedding one watermark 
bit. If the watermark payload is p, namely, totally p watermark bits are embedded in the 
whole image, the mean squared error of the whole wavelet domain is 
 .
3
2
WH
pQMSE domainwavelet =  (3-23) 
In the proposed embedding scheme, one watermark bit is embedded in every group of 
the permuted sequence S′ , so the watermark payload is determined by the length of the 
sequence S′  and the group size g. The length of the sequence S′  depends on the image 
size and the selected wavelet decomposition level r used to embed the watermark. 
Therefore, for an image of fixed size, the group size g and the level r will determine the 
number of the groups, i.e., the number of watermark bits that will be embedded. So 
Equation (3-23) can be rewritten as the follows. 
Given an image of the size HW × , the length of the sequence S′  is 
rrr
WHWHl
4
3
22
3
=⋅
×
= , the watermark payload is glp = , and the mean squared 
error of the whole wavelet domain can be derived as  
 .
4
2
g
QMSE rdomainwavelet =  (3-24) 
According to the Parseval’s Theorem, the mean squared error of the whole image is 
equal to its counterpart in the wavelet domain, domainwaveletdomainimage MSEMSE = . 
Therefore, the PSNR of the watermarked image is 
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Equation (3-25) reveals that generally the quality of the watermarked image is 
determined by the quantization step and the total watermark payload. Specifically, in 
the proposed scheme the quality of the watermarked image is determined by the group 
size and selected wavelet level when the quantization step Q is fixed. With r=1, Figure 
3-7 plots the PSNR of the watermarked image versus the quantization step Q and the 
group size g. We will demonstrate that the analytic results conform to the experimental 
results very well in Section 3.6.1. 
It is also indicated in Equation (3-25) that embedding watermark in a higher 
decomposition level will improve the quality of the watermarked image. However, this 
Figure 3-7 PSNR of the watermarked image for different quantization steps Q and 
group sizes g, where the watermark is embedded in the first wavelet level (r=1). 
3.4 Performance Analysis 
 51
is achieved at the cost of decreasing the resolution of tampering localization. We will 
discuss this aspect in the next section. 
3.4.2 Localization Capability and Probability of False Alarm 
In the proposed scheme, the content of the image is monitored by the watermark 
embedded in the wavelet domain. Every position is verified by the watermark bit 
embedded in the corresponding wavelet coefficients, thanks to the spatial-frequency 
localization of the wavelet transform. Since every coefficient in the rth level wavelet 
decomposition corresponds to a rr 22 ×  block in the image domain, the maximal 
tampering detection resolution is limited to rr 22 × . In the proposed watermarking 
scheme, changing any single coefficient may result in a mismatch between the detected 
watermark bit and the embedded one. Therefore, the proposed scheme can detect the 
change of a single coefficient and achieve the maximal tampering detection resolution 
of rr 22 ×  in the image domain. Obviously, embedding watermark in a higher wavelet 
decomposition level will decrease the tampering detection resolution.  
Note that the maximal detection resolution is independent of the watermark payload. 
And as mentioned in the previous section, the watermark payload is determined by the 
group size g. This implies that increasing the group size will not decrease the tampering 
detection resolution while it decreases the watermark payload. In other words, we can 
embed less watermark bits while keeping the same tampering detection resolution. This 
advantage is achieved by the random permutation process. The inverse random 
permutation distributes the unverified coefficients sparsely over the subbands while the 
actually changed ones are clustered together at the tampered location. As long as the 
density of the unverified coefficients at the tampered location is distinguishable from 
the other regions, the tampered region can be localized. Compared with the traditional 
block-based algorithms, by using random permutation the proposed scheme 
significantly reduces the watermark payload while keeping the same detection 
resolution. Consequently it improves the quality of the watermarked image. For 
example, in order to achieve a maximal detection resolution of 4×4 pixels, the 
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traditional algorithms have to embed at least one watermark bit in every 4×4 blocks, 
namely, the embedding rate is 0.0625 bit/pixel. To achieve the same detection 
resolution, the proposed watermarking scheme, however, embeds only one bit in every 
group of the coefficient sequence obtained from the second level of wavelet 
decomposition. The embedding rate is decreased to 0.0625*3/g=0.1875/g bit/pixel. 
When the group size is set to 3, the watermark payload is equal to the block-based 
algorithms. Figure 3-8 plots the quality comparison when applying variable group 
sizes. 
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Figure 3-8 Watermarked image quality comparison between the classical block-based 
technique and the proposed scheme with tamper localization resolution of 4×4 pixels. 
Nevertheless, increasing the group size will increase the false alarm rate and decrease 
the maximum tampered area that can be localized. Since changing one single 
coefficient may render a complete group unverified and all the coefficients in the group 
are deemed as potential unverified coefficients, when those potential unverified 
coefficients that come from unaltered area casually form a connected region of a certain 
size, a tampered area will be falsely detected, i.e. false alarm will be aroused. Let eN  
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be the number of wrongly detected watermark bits, i.e. the number of unverified 
groups, then the total number of potential unverified coefficients will be gNN eu = . 
Thus, the bit error rate of watermark detection is 
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where TN  is the total number of groups.  
When all unverified coefficient positions are mapped to the matrix V, some of them 
might overlap each other. Let oP  be the probability of coefficient overlapping, then the 
probability that a position in matrix V is a potential unverified position will be 
 BERorr
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= . (3-27) 
Then the probability that there are at least t unverified positions in a 3×3 neighborhood 
is 
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where t ∈ {0,1,2,···,8}. Figure 3-9 plots the probability 1faP  versus the number of 
unverified positions t for different uP . When uP =0.1, i.e. the number of unverified 
positions in matrix V takes on 10% of the total positions, the probability that there are 4 
unverified positions in the 3×3 neighborhood is 5×10-3. When the number of unverified 
positions go down to 5%, this probability drops to 3.7×10-4. With totally 10% of 
unverified positions, i.e. uP =0.1, the probability of casually forming a 3×3 unverified 
region is as low as 3.7×10-8. With smaller uP , this probability becomes even smaller. 
Figure 3-10 plots the probability 1faP  versus uP  for different t. When the proportion of 
unverified positions rises to 50%, the probability of at least 5 unverified positions in the 
3×3 neighborhood increases to 0.36. 
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Equation (3-28) reveals that high probability of being unverified position, i.e. large 
amount of unverified positions, will render a high probability of wrongly detecting 
unverified region. From Equation (3-26), we can see that with a certain amount of 
watermark detection errors the amount of unverified coefficients is determined by the 
group size. A larger group size g will cause more potential unverified coefficients 
outside the actually tampered region (defined as noise dots in Section 3.3), namely, it 
will increase the density of the noise dots. When a very large area is tampered, the 
density of the noise dots will become so high that it is very difficult or even impossible 
to distinguish the correct tampered region from the noise dots in the matrix V. In this 
case, the tampered region can be localized and the whole image will be deemed as 
unverified.  
Figure 3-9 1faP  versus the number of unverified positions t in the 3×3 neighborhood 
for different probabilities of being unverified position uP . 
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3.4.3 Tampering Detection Sensitivity  
The tampering detection sensitivity of the proposed scheme is basically determined by 
the quantization step Q in Equation (3-4). Based on the fact that image tampering 
usually occurs in local regions, such image manipulation can be considered as burst 
errors with large variance that will affect the local frequency property and render a set 
of frequency coefficients to be changed. These changed coefficients will be distributed 
into different groups. When the weighted mean of any group is shifted in any direction 
by the amount ]2/,2/( QnQQnQ +−∈Δ  where n is odd, the quantization result will 
be changed and tampering alarm will be raised. When the tampered area is of a 
reasonable size, the number of changed coefficients will be large as well as the number 
of affected groups. So the probability of keeping the weighted means of all the affected 
groups will be very small.  
Figure 3-10 1faP  versus the probability of being unverified position uP  for different 
numbers of unverified positions t in the 3×3 neighborhood. 
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There are two cases in which the tampering will not be detected. One is that in the 
practical applications the tampered area may contain some pixels that happen to be very 
similar to or even the same as the original ones. So the frequency at the corresponding 
location may remain unchanged. The other case is when the changed amount of the 
weighted mean of a group ]2/,2/( QnQQnQ +−∈Δ  where n is even, the extracted 
watermark bit will still match the original one. This will also lead to the failure of 
detecting the tampering in the group. In these two cases, some positions inside the 
tampered region may remain verified. In other words, there will be some holes in the 
detection result. Those errors can be compensated by applying the noise filter in 
Equation (3-16). The holes will be filled by averaging with their neighbors. 
Moreover, as the weighted mean is composed of frequencies in selected wavelet levels 
that correspond to certain frequency bands, if the image manipulation does not change 
the frequencies of that band, it can not be detected. For instance, manipulating a smooth 
region to another smooth one is difficult to detect by checking certain frequency 
change. For this reason, multi-level embedding can be used to increase the sensitivity to 
all kinds of manipulations. We shall introduce multi-level embedding and 
authentication in Section 3.5. Another solution to improve the sensitivity is to use 
content-based features, such as the most significant bit of the mean of a macro-block. 
Using the intensity-involved content features can monitor such kind of tampering that 
does not modify high and middle frequencies. In addition, if only the luminance value 
of pixels is used for watermark embedding, color manipulations can not be detected. 
Therefore, according to the application requirement, certain color channels can be used 
to embed the watermark respectively in order to ensure the protection of corresponding 
colors. 
Instead of malicious tampering, the watermark detection may also be impaired by 
incidental distortions introduced by common image processing. However, comparing to 
malicious tampering, the variance of incidental distortions is much smaller. If we 
assume that the weighted mean is distorted by additive noise that follows i.i.d. 
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Gaussian distribution with zero mean and variance 2σ , the probability of false alarm in 
a group can be calculated as follows: 
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where erfc(·) is the traditional complementary error function given by [AS72] 
 dtexerfxerfc
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Because the tail of Gaussian distribution decays quickly, the probability that the 
weighted mean is shifted by the noise far away from the original value is small. Hence 
the probability of false alarm can be approximated by the first several i’s in Equation 
(3-29) as follows: 
 )
22
5()
22
3()
22
(2
σσσ
QerfcQerfcQerfcPfa +−≈ . (3-31) 
Finally, the sensitivity of tampering detection can be adjusted by choosing different 
filtering sizes and the threshold in Equation (3-16). If the threshold is preset to d/2, i.e. 
the half filter size, the larger is the filter size, the lower the sensitivity will be. Based on 
different application requirements, by presetting the filter dimension, the authenticator 
can identify tampering of various sizes, bypassing the smaller incidental distortions but 
detecting the bigger ones. When a high level of security is specified, no filtering is 
applied and this will provide the highest sensitivity to tampering. In this case, any pixel 
change that affects the quantization result will be identified as tampering and render the 
image unauthenticated.   
3.4.4 Security 
In this section, we discuss some security considerations of the proposed scheme. First, 
we focus on the security of the authentication system, especially in the case that the 
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authenticator is publicly available. Second, the security of the proposed scheme against 
local attacks is addressed. 
3.4.4.1 Security of the Authentication System 
Security of the proposed authentication system is ensured by using a secret key that 
controls the way of random permutation and authentication code generation. Even if the 
algorithm is publicly available, without the knowledge of the secret key, it is very 
difficult for an adversary to construct the correct coefficient mapping or get the 
authentication code when the image size and the code length are reasonably large. 
Therefore, the probability of successfully forging an authentic image is very small.  
However, it should be noted that if the authenticator is publicly available, i.e. an 
adversary has unlimited access to the authenticator, the noise-dots filtering is not an 
optional step any more. It becomes mandatory for security reason. If the filter can be 
set off, an adversary can use the authenticator output to estimate the random 
permutation by manipulating the image pixel by pixel. Every time one single image 
location is tampered, the authenticator will output isolated unverified positions that 
come from the corresponding coefficient group. By recording and comparing these 
outputs, after sufficient attempts the random permutation may be reconstructed. After 
knowing the random mapping of locations, an adversary can design an affective attack 
system that manipulates the image by adjusting all the corresponding positions in a 
permutated group so that the weighted mean of the group keeps unchanged or remains 
mapping to the embedded watermark bit value. If the used parameters, such as the 
quantization step Q, are known as well, the used authentication code may also be 
revealed. Consequently, the attacker can either tamper a protected image in an 
undetectable way or embed a valid authentication code into other images. Therefore, 
when the authenticator can be accessed unlimitedly by an adversary, in order to ensure 
the system security a noise-dots filter with reasonable size must be always present.  
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3.4.4.2 Security against Local Attacks 
Since the watermark is not embedded in a local way, the proposed scheme is 
intrinsically secure to local attacks that are usually mounted in a block-based way, such 
as copy and paste and block swapping. The most successful local attack is the vector 
quantization (VQ) attack, also known as collage attack [CMB01], which is to construct 
a counterfeit image by choosing authentic blocks from different watermarked images. 
The premise of successfully mounting a VQ attack is that an adversary has access to a 
set of images that are watermarked using the same secret key. The adversary replaces 
each block of the unwatermarked image with the most similar block selected from the 
set of watermarked images. In this way, a counterfeit of authentic image can be 
constructed. VQ attack is particularly applicable to block-wise independent embedding 
approaches [HM00], in which the authentication of each block depends only on the 
content of the block itself. The proposed scheme in this chapter is immune to VQ 
attacks, because the coefficients of a group are selected randomly over the whole 
image. Without the knowledge of the way of random permutation, it is very difficult for 
the adversary to reveal the relationship among the coefficients and therefore the 
replacement of similar pixels/blocks can not be performed. Any local pixel replacement 
will cause the weighted means of a number of groups changed, which will render some 
of these affected groups unverified. Due to the variation among these groups, it’s very 
hard to find a way to perform a local manipulation with the caused changes in all the 
affected groups undetected. 
3.5 Multi-Resolution Authentication 
As mentioned in Section 3.4.3, various modifications will cause changes of different 
frequency bands. For example, some edge manipulations will change high frequencies 
of the image, while other kinds of tampering may modify only middle or low 
frequencies. Hence, checking all the frequency bands will certainly decrease the miss 
probability of tamper detection.  
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Based on the proposed watermarking scheme, a multi-resolution authentication scheme 
can be designed. Independent authentication codes can be embedded in each wavelet 
decomposition level of the image. Each embedded code can achieve integrity 
verification with the corresponding resolution. The watermark in the high 
decomposition has better robustness against image distortions but lower localization 
capability of content tampering. On the contrary, the watermark in the low 
decomposition level is able to localize the tampering with higher resolution but easier 
to be impaired by the incidental distortions caused by common image processing. Note 
that by embedding multiple watermarks in all the wavelet levels, the watermarked 
image’s quality will be more degraded because more modifications are introduced. The 
final image quality can be evaluated by the total modification amount that can be 
obtained by applying Equation (3-24) to every wavelet level embedding respectively. 
3.6 Experimental Results 
To evaluate the proposed watermarking scheme, 1086 images are used in our tests that 
are of various sizes and most of them are taken by three different digital cameras. Some 
standard test images that are commonly used in image processing, such as Gold Hill, 
Lena and Peppers, are also included in the test set. The used test images have different 
content properties such as high textured, few textured and mixed. A variety of sample 
images are shown in Figure 3-11. We evaluate the proposed scheme in aspects of image 
quality after watermarking embedding, tamper localization capability and robustness 
against incidental distortions. We shall represent these experimental results in the 
following subsections respectively. 
3.6.1 Image Quality Test 
First, we use the image “Gold Hill” of 720×576 as an example to test the watermarked 
image quality. The original and the watermarked images are shown in Figure 3-12. The 
watermark is embedded in the first level of wavelet decomposition and we set the 
quantization step Q=6 and group size g=12. In the embedding process, Equation (3-9), 
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i.e. the first coefficient-updating method, is used to update the wavelet coefficients. 
From Figure 3-12 (b), we can see the embedded watermark is completely 
imperceptible. The PSNR of the watermarked image is as high as 49.05dB. This value 
is very close to the expected theoretical value 49.38dB calculated by Equation (3-25).  
Second, we test the image quality with all the images in the test set. In the following 
tests, if not specified, Equation (3-9) is used to update the wavelet coefficients in the 
embedding process. Table 3-3 lists the PSNR values of the sample test images shown in 
Figure 3-11 for different embedding parameters. As shown in Table 3-3, with the same 
embedding parameters the quality results of different images are very close to the 
image “Gold Hill”. For most embedding parameter sets, the watermarks embedded in 
all the images are imperceptible to human observers under normal viewing condition, 
except “r=1, Q=16, g=3” and “r=2, Q=16, g=3”. In these two cases, the watermark 
embedded in less textured images like “Benz” becomes slightly noticeable.  
Gold Hill Peppers Lena Airplane 
Bonn Benz Test Box 
Figure 3-11 Sample images from the image test set 
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(a) 
(b) 
Figure 3-12 Original and watermarked images: (a) Original image of “Gold Hill” of 
size 720×576, (b) Watermarked image with r=1, Q=6 and g=12, PSNR=49.05dB. 
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Table 3-3 Quality of different watermarked images in PSNR (dB) 
Image Name 
Gold 
Hill 
Peppers Lena Airplane Bonn Benz Test Box 
Image Size 720×576 512×512 512×512 512×512 720×576 640×480 1024×1024
r=1,Q=6,g=3 43.52 43.57 44.78 44.02 43.80 43.95 44.02 
r=1,Q=6,g=12 49.05 49.06 50.07 49.22 49.20 49.22 49.18 
r=1,Q=16,g=3 36.19 36.45 36.38 36.41 35.95 36.04 36.26 
r=1,Q=16,g=12 41.18 41.44 42.74 41.60 41.09 41.43 41.36 
r=2,Q=6,g=3 49.13 49.36 49.51 49.38 49.21 49.51 49.33 
r=2,Q=6,g=12 54.97 55.03 54.89 54.92 54.95 54.72 54.97 
r=2,Q=16,g=3 41.45 42.01 42.00 41.67 41.39 41.83 41.60 
r=2,Q=16,g=12 46.99 47.17 47.15 46.90 46.89 47.02 46.98 
 
To evaluate the analysis of image quality, we compare the experimental results with the 
analytic results calculated by Equation (3-25) for different embedding parameters. 
Figure 3-13 plots both the analytic PSNR values of watermarked images and the 
experimental values. Each experimental value is the average of the PSNR values of the 
total 1086 test images. The watermark is respectively embedded in the first (r=1) and 
second (r=2) wavelet levels with different quantization steps Q. As can be seen from 
Figure 3-13, the analytic and experimental results conform very well. Figure 3-13 also 
indicates that a larger quantization step Q will degrade the watermarked image quality 
more. In addition, with the same g and Q embedding the watermark into the higher 
wavelet level will render better quality of watermarked images.  
Chapter 3 Semi-Fragile Watermarking for Image Authentication 
 64
 
As mentioned in Section 3.4.1, the group size g will also affect the quality of the 
watermarked image since it determines the watermark payload. To test the effect of 
group size, we embed the watermark in the same wavelet level with different group 
sizes. Figure 3-14 plots the PSNR values of watermarked images, in which the 
watermark is embedded in the first wavelet level (r=1) with various group sizes. Each 
value is the average of the PSNR values of the total 1086 test images. The test results 
demonstrate the analytic conclusion that a larger g renders better image quality because 
it decreases the watermark payload. 
Finally, we compare the quality of watermarked images by different coefficient update 
methods by embedding the same watermark into all the test images using Method 1 and 
Method 2 respectively. Table 3-4 lists the results of PSNR and BER (Bit Error Rate) of 
watermark detection of two less textured images “Peppers” and “Benz” for different 
embedding parameters. As can be seen, the quality of watermarked images by Method2 
is overall better than that by Method1. This quality improvement is obtained by more 
Figure 3-13 Theoretical and experimental results of watermarked image quality for 
different embedding parameters. The experimental PSNR values are the average of 
the 1086 test images. 
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unsuccessful or incomplete embeddings, in which case the magnitudes of some small 
coefficients can not bear the assigned portion of the modification amount. Therefore, in 
these cases the corresponding weighted mean values are not updated to the expected 
value. Such incomplete embedding happens more often in less textured images, 
because less textured images contain less middle and high frequency components. This 
also explains why the PSNRs of watermarked images by Method 2 are larger than the 
analytic values. As a result, due to the unsuccessful embeddings, more watermark 
detection errors occur in the detection process. As shown in Table 3-4, the BERs of 
Method2 are overall higher than those of Method1. 
In addition to the results listed in Table 3-4, we also compare the PSNR and BER 
results of the two methods by using the total 1086 test images. Figure 3-15 plots the 
PSNR values of the images that are watermarked by using Method 1 and Method 2 
respectively for different embedding parameters. All the PSNR values are the average 
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Figure 3-14 Watermarked image quality versus quantization step Q for different 
group size g. The watermark is embedded in the first wavelet level (r=1). The PSNR 
values are the average of the 1086 test images. 
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of the results of all the 1086 test images. As can be seen, the PSNR values of the 
images watermarked by Method 2 are overall higher than both Method 1 and the 
analytic results. Figure 3-16 plots the corresponding BER distribution of the two 
methods over the whole test image set. For Method 2, when the quantization step is 
reduced to 6, the BER will be significantly increased, which reveals that small 
embedding strength will cause more unsuccessful embeddings. Therefore, when a small 
quantization step is specified, Method 1 is more suitable for the proposed watermarking 
scheme. 
Table 3-4 Comparison of image quality and BER for the different wavelet coefficient 
update methods in the embedding process 
Image Name 
Peppers Benz 
Mehod1 BER Method2 BER Mehod1 BER Method2 BER 
r=1,Q=6,g=3 43.57 2.9×10-4 46.32 3.8×10-3 43.95 1.6×10-3 45.83 0.14 
r=1,Q=6,g=12 49.06 1.0×10-3 56.75 1.5×10-2 49.22 4.0×10-3 52.54 7.9×10-3 
r=1,Q=16,g=3 36.45 4.6×10-5 39.36 1.1×10-2 36.04 1.1×10-3 38.66 0.16 
r=1,Q=16,g=12 41.44 6.1×10-5 48.10 0 41.43 2.4×10-3 44.83 1.1×10-2 
r=2,Q=6,g=3 49.36 2.4×10-4 51.77 2.7×10-3 49.51 9.9×10-4 51.00 8.8×10-2 
r=2,Q=6,g=12 55.03 1.5×10-3 62.56 0.17 54.72 2.7×10-3 58.56 9.0×10-3 
r=2,Q=16,g=3 42.01 0 44.42 5.7×10-3 41.83 6.3×10-4 43.76 0.10 
r=2,Q=16,g=12 47.17 2.4×10-4 53.31 0 47.02 1.9×10-3 50.66 2.1×10-3 
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Figure 3-16 Comparison of BER distribution of two coefficient update methods for 
different embedding parameters. 
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Figure 3-15 Comparison of PSNR of watermarked images by two coefficient update 
methods for different embedding parameters. The PSNR values are the average of 
the 1086 test images. 
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3.6.2 Tamper Localization Capability Test 
In the following experiments, we test the localization capability of the proposed 
watermarking scheme. First, we set r=1, Q=6 and g=12 in the watermark embedding 
process. Figure 3-17 shows a tampered image of “Gold Hill”, in which the man on the 
street is removed. The yellow ellipse indicates the tampering position. Figure 3-18 
gives the authentication results. In Figure 3-18 (a), the authentication result is depicted 
by white dots. Every dot corresponds to a potential unverified position in the matrix V, 
which are from the unverified groups in the randomly permutated sequence S′ . Though 
those white dots randomly scatter over the whole image, we can clearly see that the 
density of the white dots in the tampered region is much higher than that in other 
regions where the dots are actually isolated. Therefore, the tampered region can be 
easily recognized. The authentication result not only localizes the position of the 
tampered region but also depicts the tampered region’s size and shape. Since the 
watermark is embedded in the first wavelet level (r=1), the size of a white dot is 2×2 
pixels, namely, the maximal detection resolution is 2×2 pixels.  
Then we refine the authentication result by filtering out the noise dots using Equation 
(3-16). The filter size d and the threshold T are set to 5 and 4 respectively. The refined 
authentication result is shown in Figure 3-18 (b). The localized tampered regions are 
depicted in white color. In the refined result, all the noise dots are removed and the 
holes in the tampered regions are also filled by the filtering process. As can be seen in 
Figure 3-18 (b), the localized tampered region clearly reveals the size and shape of the 
tampering. 
Second, we set r=2, Q=6 and g=12 and embed the watermark into the original image 
again with the new parameters. Then the same manipulation is done on the 
watermarked image as in the first test. The authentication result is shown in Figure 
3-19, in which the tampered region is correctly localized, depicted in white color. Since 
in this case the watermark is embedded in the second wavelet level (r=2), as shown in 
Figure 3-19 (a), the size of a white dot is 4×4 pixels. Therefore, the maximal detection 
resolution decreases to 4×4 pixels accordingly. The refined result is shown in Figure 
3.6 Experimental Results 
 69
3-19 (b). As can be seen, the tampering position and shape are depicted by the white 
dots in a coarser way than that in the first test. This result demonstrates what we 
discussed in the previous sections, i.e. embedding in the higher wavelet levels will 
lower the detection resolution. However, by sacrificing the accuracy of the tamper 
localization, we can obtain better image quality as already demonstrated in the previous 
test results, and more robustness against incidental distortions like lossy compression, 
which we will present in the following tests. 
 
 
Figure 3-17 A tampered image: the man on the street is removed. The altered position 
is indicated by an ellipse.  
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Figure 3-18 Image authentication results with r=1: (a) Authentication result with the 
noise dots (in white), (b) Refined authentication result (after filtering out the noise-
dots). 
(a) 
(b) 
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Figure 3-19 Image authentication results with r=2: (a) Authentication result with the 
noise dots (in white), (b) Refined authentication result (after filtering out the noise-
dots). 
(a) 
(b) 
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3.6.3 Robustness against JPEG Compression 
JPEG compression is the most frequent processing in many applications due to the 
popularity of the JPEG storage format. In this subsection, we test the watermark 
robustness against incidental distortions caused by the JPEG compression. The 
robustness of the embedded watermark depends on the three embedding parameters: 
the wavelet level r, the group size g and the quantization step Q. For different 
embedding parameters, the performance of the watermark detector after JPEG 
compression is shown in Figure 3-20, Figure 3-21 and Figure 3-22. The watermark is 
embedded into the original image “Gold Hill” with different parameters respectively. 
And then the watermarked images are compressed with different JPEG quality factors, 
varying from 10 to 100. Since JPEG is performs lossy compression, even with the 
quality factor 100 it still causes image quality degradation.  
As expected, embedding the watermark in a higher wavelet level achieves higher 
robustness against JPEG compression than in lower levels, because higher wavelet 
levels contain the middle and low frequency parts of the image which are less 
influenced by the JPEG compression. As shown in Figure 3-20, the watermark 
embedded in the first wavelet level is only robust to JPEG compression with quality 
factor 100. When embedded in the second or third level, the watermark becomes much 
more robust as can be seen in Figure 3-21 and Figure 3-22, which can be robust against 
JPEG compression with quality factor 80 or even as low as 50.  
In addition, the quantization step determines the watermark embedding strength and a 
larger Q makes the watermark more tolerant to distortions. As can be seen from the 
figures, for every wavelet level, a larger Q achieves a lower watermark detector error 
rate. However, a larger Q will also introduce more image modifications in the 
embedding. Furthermore, a small group size g also increases the watermark robustness. 
This is because the JPEG compression introduces distortions to every wavelet 
coefficient; fewer group members accumulate fewer errors. However, this robustness 
improvement is achieved at the cost of a higher watermark payload, which will lower 
the watermarked image’s quality.  
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Overall, as can be seen from Figure 3-20, Figure 3-21 and Figure 3-22, higher wavelet 
level r, larger quantization step Q and smaller group size g will enhance the watermark 
robustness against the distortions caused by JPEG compression while they will 
decrease the resolution of tampering localization or degrade the watermarked image’s 
quality. 
 
 
 
Figure 3-20 Watermark detector performance after JPEG compression for different 
quantization steps and group sizes. The watermark is embedded in the first wavelet 
level (r=1). 
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Figure 3-21 Watermark detector performance after JPEG compression for different 
quantization steps and group sizes. The watermark is embedded in the second wavelet 
level (r=2). 
 
Figure 3-22 Watermark detector performance after JPEG compression for different 
quantization steps and group sizes. The watermark is embedded in the third wavelet 
level (r=3). 
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3.7 Conclusion 
In this chapter, we first addressed the existing problems and challenges in digital 
watermarking for image authentication, and then we proposed a novel semi-fragile 
watermarking scheme which can detect and localize the tampered regions in the image. 
The proposed scheme significantly improves the resolution of tampering detection with 
low watermark payload by introducing a random permutation procedure in the wavelet 
domain. The proposed watermarking scheme utilizes every watermark bit to monitor 
random image positions instead of a local image block. Thanks to the random wavelet 
coefficient grouping, the scheme is intrinsically secure to local attacks. Because the 
embedded watermark is randomly distributed into the suitable embedding coefficients, 
the security of the embedding mechanism is also improved. With different embedding 
parameters, the embedded watermarks can survive moderate JPEG compression to 
some extent. Scalable sensitivity of tampering detection is enabled in the authentication 
process by presetting the noise filter size. 
 

  77
Chapter 4 Synthetic Image Authentication 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Besides images taken from the natural world, there are also lots of synthetic images 
widely used in various applications, such as digital maps, document images, 
engineering drawings, computer generated graphics, scanned documents and 
handwritten signatures, and so forth. For example, digital maps are now widely used in 
different Geographic Information Systems (GIS) on the Internet and handheld devices. 
In addition, all kinds of important documents, such as legal documents, financial 
instruments, certificates and insurance information, have been digitalized and stored. 
Due to the wide popularity, the authentication of synthetic images against tampering 
and forgery is becoming a great concern. 
In order to differentiate from graphics, the term synthetic image in this thesis refers to 
all the simple images that are represented by a few number of color/gray values. The 
extreme case is binary images that contain only two colors: black and white. Compared 
with continuous-tone natural images, synthetic images have much fewer colors and no 
complex texture variation. Unlike natural images, in which pixel values vary in a wide 
range, the pixels in the synthetic images only take on a limited number of values. 
Moreover, in synthetic images, the color and brightness usually change abruptly from 
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one value to another without any transition, which results in sharp edges. In addition, 
there are usually large homogenous regions in synthetic images. In these regions, there 
is only one uniform gray level or color. Hence arbitrarily changing pixels on a synthetic 
image will cause very visible artifacts. Table 4-1 lists major differences between 
natural images and synthetic images.  
Table 4-1 Comparison of the natural and synthetic images 
Characteristics Natural Images Synthetic Images 
Color Continuous-tone, plenty of colors (True-color) 
A few of colors, limited 
number of pixel  values 
Texture Complex texture variation Simple texture, plenty of flat regions 
Edge 
Mild edges with gradual 
brightness and color 
transition 
Sharp edges with abrupt 
brightness and color change 
Storage 
Format 
True-color formats, e.g. 
JPEG, TIFF, BMP 
Indexed color or binary 
formats, e.g. GIF, PNG, 
TIFF 
 
Figure 4-1 and Figure 4-2 give two examples of synthetic images. Figure 4-1 shows a 
text image that is a typical kind of synthetic image. The sample image is a binary 
bitmap that contains only black and white colors and has large blank margins.  
When stored in an indexed color format, the color palette will contain only two entries. 
In addition, because the pixels take on only two possible values, a binary image is also 
commonly stored as a bitmap with a color depth of 2. Figure 4-2 presents a digital map 
as an example of a color synthetic image. The sample map does not look like a very 
simple image as it contains many lines, curves and symbols in different colors. In this 
map, however, there are actually only seven distinct colors, as shown in the color 
palette on the right. Furthermore, lots of regions in the map are filled with uniform 
colors and contain no texture at all. One magnified smooth part is shown below in 
Figure 4-2, in which most of the area is filled with pure white color. Note that synthetic 
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images, such as digital maps, can also be stored in vector image formats. In this 
chapter, we only consider synthetic images stored as bitmap images. 
Because of its unique property, invisibly embedding data in a synthetic image becomes 
a more challenging task. On the other hand, unfortunately, due to the simplicity of the 
content, it is much easier for an adversary to manipulate a synthetic image than a 
continuous-tone natural image. An adversary even does not need any powerful image-
editing software like Adobe Photoshop because a simple image modification tool is 
enough to make a perfect forgery without leaving any noticeable traces on the original 
synthetic image.  
Although a variety of watermarking schemes for image authentication have been 
proposed, most of them are developed for color and grayscale natural images and can 
 
Close view of the binary text image 
Figure 4-1 Synthetic image example A: binary text image 
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not be applied to the synthetic images directly. In those schemes, the watermark 
information is commonly embedded by changing the least significant bits (LSB) of the 
pixel values [W98][FGB00][F02] or slightly modifying the transform coefficients 
[WL98][F99][WKBC02]. Since synthetic images contain plenty of sharp edges and 
smooth areas, such kinds of modifications will either introduce visible artifacts or 
significantly decrease the reliability of the embedded watermark because of the weak 
embedding strength. 
Another problem caused by common watermarking schemes for natural images is that 
new colors will be introduced into the cover image. As synthetic images only contain a 
limited number of colors, they are usually stored in indexed color formats (e.g. GIF, 
Graphics Interchange Format) instead of true the color formats (e.g. JPEG). The 
indexed color formats use a color palette to indicate different used colors. The number 
of colors that an indexed color format can store is usually limited and depends on the 
size of the used color palette. For example, the GIF format uses a color palette that can 
Smooth area 
example 
Color palette (7 colors) 
Color digital map  
Figure 4-2 Synthetic image example B: color digital map 
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contain 256 distinct colors. The classical watermarking approaches for natural images 
embed the watermark by slightly changing the pixel values, which will inevitably 
introduce new pixel values, i.e. new colors. It becomes even worse for the approaches 
that embed data in the transform domains by modifying the frequency coefficients, e.g. 
in DCT or DWT domains, because in this case it is very hard to predict and control the 
number of the introduced new colors. Because the introduction of the new colors will 
change the entries of the original image palette, from the compatibility point of view, it 
is very undesirable to introduce additional pixel values to the synthetic images in most 
of the applications. Moreover, when so many additional colors are introduced that the 
total number of the colors exceeds the palette’s capacity, it becomes impossible to store 
the watermarked image in the original format.  
Therefore, for synthetic image authentication, specific watermarking schemes must be 
designed to handle the above-mentioned requirements. Generally speaking, a 
watermarking scheme for synthetic image authentication should satisfy the following 
listed requirements: 
1. Watermark transparency: no noticeable artifacts should be introduced, i.e. high 
image quality must be achieved after watermark embedding. 
2. Format compatibility: no additional color should be introduced in the 
watermarked image in order to keep the color palette intact. 
3. Tamper localization capability: the authenticator should be able to localize the 
tampered region with a resolution as high as possible. 
4. Recovery capability: it is a very desirable feature that the authenticator is able to 
recover the original content in tampered regions. 
5. Blind detection: the embedded watermark can be extracted without referring to 
the original image. 
In this chapter, we propose a novel watermarking scheme to authenticate the content 
integrity of synthetic images. In the proposed scheme, stricter rules of modifying pixels 
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are specified compared to the other existing schemes so that the quality of the 
watermark image gets improved. Moreover, in the embedding process, no additional 
pixel value will be introduced. A random permutation process is applied to the whole 
image before embedding the watermark bits. The watermark information is embedded 
in the permuted image domain and every embedded watermark bit is utilized to monitor 
a group of pixels so that all pixels of the image instead of blocks are identified by much 
less watermark bits. Combining random permutation and statistical tamper detection, 
the proposed scheme achieves pixel-wise tamper localization capability. We present a 
new embedding strategy that enables the recovery capability of the authentication 
system. Hence, in the authentication process, not only can the proposed scheme localize 
the tampered area but it also can recover the removed content and identify the forged 
parts. Experimental results demonstrate the capability of the proposed scheme to 
localize and recover tampered areas in watermarked images. The proposed scheme can 
be applied to various kinds of synthetic images, including binary images or images with 
few colors. 
The organization of this chapter is as follows. Firstly, in Section 4.2, we retrospect the 
previous work related to the authentication and data hiding for the synthetic images and 
address the unsolved problems and challenges of synthetic image authentication. Then, 
in Section 4.3, we introduce the proposed watermarking scheme, including the 
watermark embedding and retrieval processes. The authentication process is presented 
in Section 4.4. Afterwards, we analyze the proposed scheme’s performance and 
security issues in Section 4.5. Experimental results are given in Section 4.6. In Section 
4.7, we discuss the possible extension of the proposed embedding strategy. Finally, we 
conclude the chapter in Section 4.8.  
4.2 Previous Work 
In the literature, a variety of digital watermarking and data hiding techniques have been 
proposed for embedding data in synthetic images, especially in binary images 
[CWMA01]. Basically, most of the proposed schemes can be classified into two 
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categories according to the way of modifying the cover image to embed the watermark 
information.  
1. The first category includes algorithms that embed the watermark information by 
modifying certain characteristics of some pixel groups, such as the position of 
the text line or word, the spacing of words or characters, the thickness of stokes, 
etc.  
2. The second category contains techniques that embed the watermark information 
by modifying individual pixels to certain desired values according to the data to 
be embedded. Those pixels can be chosen either randomly or according to some 
visual impact measures. 
Some early works of text document watermarking fall into the first category. In 
[ML97][LMB95][LM98][LML98], the watermark bit is embedded by slightly shifting 
the relative position of the text lines or word spacing or the combination. For example, 
a text line can be moved up to encode a “1” or down to encode a “0”. Similarly a word 
can be moved horizontally to change the spacing to encode the watermark bit. Some 
varieties of this embedding method were also proposed. In [BG96], Brassil proposed to 
embed data by modifying the height of a bounding box that encloses a group of words. 
This approach achieves a higher watermark capacity than the text line or word shifting 
method. Instead of using inter-word spacing, Chotikakamthorn [C98][C99] employed 
character-to-character spacing to embed data in, so that it can be applied to text 
documents in non-English languages that do not have spaces to separate words such as 
Chinese, Japanese and Thai. In [HY01], the inter-word spaces are slightly modified so 
that the spaces across different lines of a text act as sampling points of sine waves. The 
watermark is then embedded into these sine waves. By embedding the watermark 
information in both horizontal and vertical directions, the proposed approach achieves 
high robustness against interference. Another embedding method in this category is to 
modify the thickness of character stokes. In [AM99], the average width of the 
horizontal stokes of characters is used as a feature to embed the information. Two 
operations “make fat” and “make thin” are applied according to the desired watermark 
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bit, which increases or decreases the selected stoke widths. In general, all of the above-
mentioned algorithms are only applicable to document images with formatted text, and 
are not suited for other generic binary or synthetic images such as drawings, maps, etc. 
Furthermore, all of these approaches were proposed for data hiding or copyright 
protection and can not be directly applied for authentication purposes.  
In the second category, some watermarking algorithms modify individual pixels 
randomly without taking into account the visual impact of such modification. In 
[FA00a], Fu et al. proposed a simple embedding method called DHST (Data Hiding by 
Self-Toggling). A set of random locations in the image are selected to embed the data. 
At one of the selected locations, the pixel is forced to be black or white according to the 
data to be embedded. The basic DHST technique was subsequently improved by the 
techniques DHPT (Data Hiding by Pair Toggling) and DHSPT (Data Hiding by Smart 
Pair Toggling) proposed by the same author in [FA00a] and [FA00b]. In [FA01], an 
algorithm called IS (Intensity Selection) was proposed to select the best embedding 
locations so that the visual quality of the watermarked image was significantly 
enhanced. In [KA03] and [KA04], an authentication watermarking scheme was 
proposed by using the DHST embedding technique. The scheme was claimed to be also 
applicable to generic binary images, provided that the number of embedded bits is far 
fewer than the number of pixels in the host image. However, when applied to text 
documents, annoying salt-and-pepper noise will be introduced, which is not acceptable 
in most of the applications. In [PCT00] and [TCP02], Tseng et al. proposed a block-
wise data hiding technique that modifies at most two pixels in a block with m pixels to 
embed ⎣ ⎦)1(log2 +m  bits. This technique was improved by Chang et al. in [CTL05] to 
embed the same amount of bits by modifying only one pixel at most. In these 
techniques, although the number of the pixels to be modified is constrained in each 
block, there is no control on the quality of the image after the modification because the 
pixels to be modified are selected randomly. In summary, since the above-mentioned 
techniques do not take into account the visual impact of pixel toggling, visible 
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distortions will appear when they are directly applied to generic binary or other 
synthetic images.  
In order to improve the quality of watermarked images, some other algorithms have 
been proposed to embed the data by selectively modifying pixels according to the 
visual impact instead of randomly toggling pixels. The above-mentioned embedding 
techniques proposed in [PCT00][TCP02] were improved with respect to visual quality 
in [TP01] by imposing a constraint that every pixel to be modified must be on the 
boundary. With the improved visual quality, the data hiding capacity was decreased to 
embed ⎣ ⎦ 1)1(log2 −+m  bits in a block with m pixels. This improvement, however, did 
not give further analysis and comparison on the various visual impacts among different 
types of boundary pixels. In order to identify the pixels that cause the least noticeable 
artifacts, template ranking has been widely used in many papers. The method proposed 
in [MWM01] uses the outer boundary of a character to embed data. A set of pairs of 
five-pixel long boundary patterns are identified and used to embed data. Every pair of 
patterns has the duality property that changing the center pixel of one pattern would 
result in the other pattern. This property allows easy extraction of the hidden data 
without referring to the original image. In [PWP02], Pan et al. proposed a data hiding 
method for few-color images using prioritized pattern matching. In order to increase the 
data hiding capacity, the concept of “Supblock”, which can be decomposed into several 
overlapping subblocks, was used to increase the number of the embeddable blocks. 
However, flipping the central pixels in some used patterns may cause visible distortions 
such as a hole in a straight line. Kim et al. [KQ04] proposed a cryptography-based 
authentication technique for binary images, which can be applied to generic binary 
images with good visual quality and can be used in conjunction with secret-key or 
public/private-key ciphers. A variation of the proposed algorithm was also presented 
that can locate the tampering even with image cropping. However, the public-key 
scheme is not secure against the parity attack [K05]. This problem was solved by the 
technique proposed in [K05], named AWTC (Authentication Watermarking by 
Template ranking with symmetrical Central pixel) that is immune to the parity attack.  
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In [WTL00] and [WL04], Wu et al. proposed a quantitative analysis method of visual 
distortion. The term “flippability score” is used to indicate the visual impact of flipping 
a pixel, which is computed by analyzing the smoothness and connectivity of a 3×3 
block centered at the pixel. Pixels with large scores will be flipped with high priority in 
the embedding process because they will cause less noticeable artifacts. In Wu’s 
approach, odd-even embedding method was applied. The cover image is divided into 
blocks and one bit is inserted in every block by forcing the number of the black pixels 
in the block to be odd or even. If the block has the desired parity, it is left intact. 
Otherwise, the pixel with the highest “flippability score” will be flipped. Random 
shuffling technique is employed to equalize the uneven watermark capacity over the 
image. In the recent work [YK07], Yang et al. proposed another criterion to assess the 
pixel flippability called “connectivity-preserving criterion”. Based on this criterion, the 
center pixel in a 3×3 block is considered as flippable if the connectivity between pixels 
in the block will not change before and after flipping. Moreover, the flippability of a 
pixel will not be changed by the embedding process, so it can be identified again in the 
detection process without referring to the original image. To increase the watermark 
capacity, interlaced block partitions may be used and the uneven watermark capacity 
problem is handled by embedding the data only in those “embeddable” blocks. 
In addition, a few other methods have also been proposed to hide data in simple images 
while keeping good image quality. In [LWKS02], Lu et al. proposed a Distance-
Reciprocal Distortion Measure (DRDM) to assess the quality of binary document 
images, which has much better correlation with the human visual perception than 
PSNR (Peak Signal-to-Noise Ratio). Subsequently, the DRDM technique was applied 
to data hiding and the authentication of binary document images in [LKC03]. When 
necessary, the pixels with lowest DRDM value in every block will be flipped to embed 
the desired bit. 2-D shifting is employed before odd-even embedding process to provide 
security against tampering. A denoise-pattern based embedding method was proposed 
in [YK04], in which eight denoise-patterns were identified to select suitable pixels for 
flipping. The embedding process will smooth out the original image, so the quality of 
watermarked image may be enhanced. One main drawback of this method is that the 
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watermark detector needs the location map of the embedding to extract the embedded 
bits. 
Among the above-mentioned schemes, most of them are targeted only for data hiding 
instead of authentication except those proposed in [KA03][KA04][K05][KQ04] 
[LKC03][WL04] and [YK07]. The primary concern of data hiding is to increase the 
embedding capacity, while for image authentication tamper detection and security are 
of most concerns. On the contrary, for image authentication, when the image integrity 
gets already ensured, low embedding capacity is more desirable because embedding 
more data will degrade the image fidelity. In addition, tamper localization and recovery 
capability are very important features in the applications of image content 
authentication. However, most of the proposed authentication schemes can neither 
localize the tampered area nor recover the original image content. In the schemes 
proposed in [KA03][KA04][WL04] and [YK07], a binary logo is used as a visual 
authentication watermark. The image authenticity is determined based on the integrity 
of the extracted logo image. If the extracted logo is identical to the original version, the 
image is considered as authentic. Once the image is manipulated, the extracted logo 
will be destroyed and become a random pattern. In all of these schemes, only a binary 
output can be provided and none of them can localize the position of tampered regions. 
The secret-key authentication scheme proposed in [KQ04] is designed to be able to 
localize the tampered area, but the localization resolution is bounded by the sub-image 
size and therefore the localization result is quite rough. It can identify the unverified 
regions only with a resolution as low as 128×128. Hence, no accurate tampered 
position can be provided. The scheme proposed in [LKC03] may achieve more accurate 
tamper localization results, but it depends on the way of 2-D shifting and the 
localization capability was not explicitly addressed in the paper. Furthermore, none of 
the previously proposed schemes in the literature has achieved the capability of 
recovering the original content in synthetic image authentication. In other words, the 
authenticators of those schemes can only verify whether (and where in a few cases) the 
image content has been manipulated or not but are not able to estimate or even recover 
the original version of the manipulated parts. 
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4.3 Proposed Scheme 
In our proposed scheme, we follow the approach of the second category to embed the 
watermark. Suitable individual pixels are selected to be modified to embed the desired 
watermark bits. Stricter rules are imposed on choosing flippable pixels in order to 
improve the quality of watermarked image. In our scheme, we focus on solving three 
main issues for synthetic image authentication: (1) how to achieve high fidelity of the 
watermarked image, (2) how to achieve a high resolution tamper localization while 
keeping the watermark payload reasonably low, i.e. how to efficiently use every 
embedded watermark bit to monitor as many as possible pixels, (3) how to recover the 
original pixel value from the tampered image regions.  
As illustrated in Figure 4-3, the proposed watermarking system consists of two parts. 
The first part includes the pixel classification, random permutation and the watermark 
embedding process that embeds the authentication information into the image to 
identify all the pixels. The second part consists of the watermark retrieval and the 
image authentication processes. A secret key is applied in both the watermark 
embedding and retrieval processes to ensure the security of the whole system. If the 
image is tampered and becomes unverified, the authenticator will localize the tempered 
positions and recover the original image content.  
4.3.1 Pixel Classification 
As mentioned in the previous section, due to the simplicity of a synthetic image, most 
pixels in such an image can not be changed; otherwise visible artifacts can easily be 
introduced. To guarantee the watermark’s transparency, the watermark embedding 
positions must be carefully chosen. Therefore, before embedding the watermark 
information into a synthetic image, it should be determined which pixels can be 
changed causing least noticeable artifacts. We classify all the pixels in an image into 
two categories. One category contains the so-called flippable pixels, and the other non-
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flippable pixels. Flippable pixels can be changed to embed the watermark without 
causing noticeable artifacts. 
For simplicity, we start with binary images to identify the flippable pixels. For instance, 
Figure 4-3 shows a part of the binary document image of Figure 4-1 and gives 
examples of flippable pixels and non-flippable pixels. The dotted lines indicate the 
flipping of the blue pixels and the dashed lines indicate the red ones. It can be easily 
observed that after flipping the blue and red pixels in the left image the caused artifacts 
in the right image are quite different. The flipping of the two red pixels causes distinct 
noticeable discontinuousness while the flipping of blue pixels doesn’t. So the blue 
pixels are identified as flippable pixels whose change will cause less noticeable 
artifacts and we should avoid changing the red pixels in order to keep the image 
quality. 
Figure 4-3  Diagram of the proposed authentication watermark system 
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In a binary image, the flippability of a pixel can be determined by analyzing the local 
property in its neighborhood, for example in an n×n block. This is not a complex 
problem if the used block is small, such as in a 3×3 block. In [WL04], a flippability 
score, which indicates the pixel’s flippability, is given to each pixel by analyzing the 
smoothness and connectivity of the neighborhood around it in a 3×3 window. The 
smoothness is measured by the total number of the pixel transitions in horizontal, 
vertical, diagonal and anti-diagonal directions and the connectivity by the number of 
the black and white pixel clusters. A higher flippability score indicates that changing 
the pixel will cause less noticeable artifacts. Based on the similar idea, Yang and Kot 
proposed a new flippability criterion in [YK07]. According to this criterion, the 
flipping of a pixel should preserve the pixel connectivity in its 3×3 neighborhood. 
These two methods achieve similar results. Figure 4-5 lists the 3×3 patterns in which 
the change of the center pixel is less noticeable. All of the listed patterns have a 
flippability score larger than 0.25. The patterns (a)-(b) and (i)-(l) comply with the 
connectivity-preserving criterion in [YK07].  
However, although the patterns listed in Figure 4-5 are relatively suitable for changing 
among all the possible patterns, some of them will still cause noticeable artifacts to 
some extent. In our watermarking scheme, we propose a statistical detection strategy 
that allows watermark embedding and detection errors to exist up to a reasonable rate. 
Thus, we can reduce the watermark payload by bearing some unsuccessful embeddings 
when the watermark capacity of the whole image is less than what is required. In 
Figure 4-4 Examples of flippable and non-flippable pixels 
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addition, this strategy enables us to utilize every embedded watermark bit to monitor 
more image pixels, which will further reduce the watermark payload. Therefore, in the 
proposed watermarking scheme, the required number of flippable pixels is reduced. To 
further reduce the impact of the watermark embedding on the image fidelity, we 
formulate a new set of rules to determine the flippable pixels as follows, which is 
simpler but much stricter. Because the rules to determine the flippable pixels are 
simplified, the computation cost is consequently reduced. Hence in our scheme neither 
offline computation nor storage of a look-up table of flippable patterns is needed. All 
flippable pixels can be identified online quickly. 
In a 3×3 neighborhood, the center pixel will be considered as flippable when the 
following three rules hold. 
1. Both the horizontal and the vertical transition of the center pixel must be equal 
to one, 
2. Both the diagonal and the anti-diagonal transition of the center pixel must be 
equal to one and 
3. There must be at least one row or column whose transition is equal to zero. 
The transition of the center pixel ),( jip  is calculated as follows: 
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where ][⋅D  is a differential operator. D[a,b]=1 if a ≠ b and D[a,b]=0 if a=b. 
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Rule 1 ensures that the center pixel is not in a straight line and there is one and only one 
pixel in both directions having the same color as the center pixel, which means the 
center pixel is an edge pixel. Rule 2 ensures that the center pixel is not a corner pixel. 
Rule 3 guarantees that the center pixel is along a straight line and not surrounded by 
pixels with different colors. According to these three rules, among the patterns listed in 
Figure 4-5, only the patterns (a) and (b) can be considered as flippable. In [WL04] 
these two patterns have the largest flippability score of 0.625. They also comply with 
the connectivity-preserving criterion proposed in [YK07]. If we unleash Rule 3, the 
patterns (c) and (d) will become flippable while other patterns (e)-(l) still remain non-
flippable. Therefore, Rule 3 can be deemed as optional when a higher watermark 
capacity is required. 
If the targeted synthetic image is not binary but has a limited number of colors, a pixel 
classification process is performed before identifying the flippable pixels. All pixels are 
classified into two sets of colors, c1 and c2, corresponding to the black and white color 
in binary images. Every set contains one or more colors. This pixel classification is 
similar to the image binarization problem, but because we consider only the synthetic 
images with a limited number of colors, the problem becomes much simpler. Such 
(a)
(j) (l)(k)(i)(h)(g)
(f)(e)(d)(c)(b)
Figure 4-5 List of the patterns in which the center pixel is suitable for flipping, 
excluding the symmetric cases of rotation, mirroring and complement. 
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synthetic color images usually have a discrete histogram distribution, so it is easy to 
find a suitable threshold to classify the pixels into two sets.  
The threshold can be fixed or be chosen adaptively depending on the image content. 
The middle value of all the possible pixel values, i.e. 128, is a suitable threshold for 
most images with moderate brightness/color distribution. For example, Figure 4-6 plots 
the luminance histogram of the color map image shown in Figure 4-2. The two highest 
peaks are the two background colors, green and white. Therefore, a threshold of 128 
can separate the foreground pixels from the background. The background pixels are 
classified to set c2 and the foreground pixels to c1.  
Nevertheless, if most pixels of the whole image are very light or dark, with this middle 
value we can not get enough distinct pixels to embed the watermark. In this case, the 
mean value can be used as the threshold to classify the pixels. Furthermore, according 
to the cover image’s property, this classification may be determined by the pixel 
luminance or hue or both. In most cases, the pixels can be classified based on the 
difference of the luminance. However, for special images in which the pixels have the 
same luminance and differ only in colors, the classification should depend on the 
histogram of the hue.  
Figure 4-6 Histogram of the color map image 
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4.3.2 Pixel Permutation 
Across an image of any kind, the watermark capacity always differs from one region to 
another. For synthetic images, this problem becomes more obvious due to the fewer 
colors and more large plain areas. In the smooth areas of a single color, no watermark 
can be embedded without introducing visible artifacts. All the flippable pixels appear 
on the boundary of text and drawing. Even in the non-smooth area, however, the 
watermark capacity is also quite limited. Therefore, compared with a true-color natural 
image, the total watermark capacity in a synthetic image is much lower. However, as 
mentioned in the previous section the requirement for synthetic image authentication is 
the same or even higher as it is much easier to manipulate. Every part of the image 
must be protected. Therefore, the limited watermark capacity has to be utilized more 
efficiently. Every embedded watermark bit must be used to protect as many pixels as 
possible while keeping a high tamper detection resolution. 
Because no watermark can be embedded in the plain areas of a single color, the pixels 
in such areas have to be protected by the watermark embedded in other image parts. In 
order to achieve this goal, a reference relationship among these pixels is required. 
Therefore, before embedding the watermark, we perform a random permutation of the 
whole image as follows: 
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where ),( yx  is the pixel coordinate in the original image oI  and  ),( pp yx  the 
coordinate in the randomly permuted image pI . K is a secret key that controls the 
permutation process. Similarly as in Section 3.2.1.1, to guarantee adjacent pixels in the 
original image oI  to be distributed separately in pI  after permutation, the distance 
between any adjacent pixels in the original image must be larger than a minimum d in 
the permuted image. 
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The random permutation distributes the flippable pixels evenly, i.e. it equalizes the 
uneven watermark capacity [WTL00]. It also enhances security since the secret key K 
is needed to recover the permutation in order to embed/extract the watermark correctly. 
More importantly, the random mapping obtained by the permutation process enables 
statistical tamper detection that achieves a pixel-wise localization resolution. We will 
present the tamper localization capability in the following sections. In a practical 
implementation, the image will not be actually permutated while only the permutation 
indices are stored. All the embedding operations are done directly on the original 
image. Hence there is no need to do a reverse permutation after embedding. 
4.3.3 Watermark Embedding 
After permuting the pixels, we group them in the permuted image. One possible way to 
group pixels is to divide the permuted image into blocks of size b. In every block, we 
shall embed one watermark bit by enforcing a certain feature of the block to conform to 
a pre-defined relationship with the watermark bit. An essential requirement of the 
feature is that any single pixel manipulation in the block will change the feature of the 
block. One possible feature is the total number of the black pixels in one block. Any 
pixel flipping, whether from white to black or inversely, will change this number. For 
color synthetic images, the total number of the pixels belonging to category c1 can be 
used accordingly. Thus, a mutual reference relationship is established among all the 
pixels in the same block. Every embedded watermark bit is used to monitor a set of 
pixels in one block. Note that the unit that is used to embed one watermark bit does not 
have to be square block. The permuted image can be divided into groups in any way. 
One possible way to embed the watermark bit is to apply the odd-even embedding 
method [WL03], also known as dither modulation embedding [CW01]. This method 
embeds a “0” by quantizing the total number of the black pixels in a block to 2kQ, and 
to (2k+1)Q to embed a “1”, where Q is a quantization step and Ζ∈k . The modification 
is achieved by flipping the flippable pixels in the block when the quantization result of 
the original number of black pixels does not map to the desired bit value. Actually, the 
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odd-even embedding method is a special case of the look-up table approach with both 
the maximal runs of “0” and “1” equal to one [YM97][WL98][W03]. Both methods are 
illustrated in Figure 4-7. The look-up table embedding improves the security and 
watermark robustness when the maximal runs of “0” and “1” are bigger than one. 
When the quantization result is changed to an adjacent entry of the original one by 
noise or attacks, the extracted watermark may not be affected if this adjacent entry has 
the same mapping bit value. For example, as shown in Figure 4-7, when the 
quantization result is changed from 2kQ to (2k+1)Q, the mapping bit value is changed 
from “0” to “1” in the odd-even embedding case but keeping unchanged in the lookup 
table embedding case. The enhanced robustness, however, might conceal some pixel 
manipulations and render tampering of these pixels undetectable.  
 
Figure 4-7  Illustration of different watermark embedding approaches 
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Furthermore, both the odd-even embedding and lookup table embedding approaches 
can only give a binary result whether the extracted watermark bit matches the original 
one or not, but can not provide accurate information about how the feature value is 
changed. In other words, no original feature value can be estimated. As shown in 
Figure 4-7, these approaches can not determine whether the changed quantization result 
is dragged from the left entry to the right one or from the right one to the left one. For 
example, when the detected watermark bit is “0” and the original bit is “1”, both 
approaches can not tell if the original bit corresponds to the left 1-entry of the detected 
0-entry or the right 1-entry, namely, if the number of the black pixels in a block is 
increased by Q or decreased by Q. Nevertheless, the capability of estimating the 
original feature value is very desirable in the authentication applications because it can 
help to recover the original image content. Therefore, we propose a new embedding 
strategy to embed the watermark. 
The proposed embedding approach is illustrated in Figure 4-8. A dummy quantization 
entry, the entry “2” as shown in Figure 4-8, is introduced. We name the entry “2” a 
dummy entry because none of the feature values will be enforced to the values 
corresponding to this dummy entry during the embedding process. The watermark bit 
only takes on the values “0” and “1”. The watermark sequence w(n), used as an 
authentication code, is generated under the control of the secret key K, w(n)=G(n, K), 
where w(n) ∈ {0,1}. Nevertheless, the introduction of the dummy entry makes it 
possible to estimate how the feature value is changed. Thereby it enables a recovery 
capability in the authentication process. A binary version of the tampered region can be 
recovered based on a statistical clustering of the potential tampered pixels. The 
recovery capability will be addressed in detail in Section 4.4.  
For every block, the embedding mechanism is as follows. Let jM  be the number of the 
black pixels in the jth block of the permuted binary image. In the color image, jM  is 
the number of the pixels in the jth block that belong to the set c1 accordingly. jM  is 
then quantized by the quantization step Q: 
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where ⎣ ⎦.  is the floor function and jΔ  is the quantization residue. 
The watermark bit w(j) is embedded by enforcing jM  to be [3k+ w(j)]Q. To minimize 
the modification, jM  is enforced to the nearest entry that maps to w(j). As shown in 
Figure 4-8, the jM  mapping to “2” is forced to its neighbors of the entry “0” or “1” 
and the jM  mapping to “0” or “1” is switched to each other according the desired 
watermark bit value w(j). The following equation describes this process. 
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where *jM  is the number of the black pixel in the jth block after watermark embedding. 
The update from jM  to 
*
jM  is achieved by modifying the flippable pixels in the jth 
block. If the cover image is a color image, the feature value update is performed by 
modifying the proper flippable pixels to the nearest colors in the neighborhood that 
belong to the different category. In this way, the watermark visibility is minimized.  
Larger Q will increase the robustness of the watermark because any perturbation 
smaller than Q/2 caused by noise will not affect the accuracy of watermark detection, 
which is a desirable feature in data hiding or robust watermarking applications. In 
authentication applications, larger Q can provide more accuracy of the estimation of 
pixel manipulations. As all the feature values are enforced to kQ in the embedding 
process, any mismatch can be detected even if the extracted watermark bit might still 
be correct. In the particular case of synthetic images where the number of pixels is used 
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as feature value, when the number of the tampered pixels in a block is larger than one, 
larger Q can provide better estimation of the number of the modified pixel than smaller 
Q by detecting how far the feature value is away from the previously enforced value. 
However, using a larger Q will lead to more pixel modification during watermark 
embedding and this will subsequently degrade the image quality. 
4.3.4 Watermark Retrieval 
Watermark retrieval is done by performing the same permutation and quantization 
processes in the targeted image as in watermark embedding. The secret K and the block 
size b are conveyed to the watermark detector as side information. The targeted image 
*
oˆI  is first randomly permuted under the control of the secret key K. Then the permuted 
image *sˆI  is divided into blocks with the size b. Let 
*ˆ
jM  be the number of the black 
pixels in the jth block of the permuted binary image. Every watermark bit value is 
retrieved as follows: 
 )2/ˆ()(ˆ * QMQuanjw j += , (4-6) 
where )(ˆ jw  is the extracted watermark from the jth block. Note that the extracted 
watermark )(ˆ jw  may take on three values of “0”, “1” and “2” unlike the original 
watermark sequence ∈)( jw {0,1}. Obviously, all the extracted watermarks with the 
value “2” do not match the corresponding original watermark bits and therefore are 
detection errors. In the following authentication process, these detection errors will be 
used to estimate the original pixel value. 
4.4 Authentication and Pixel Recovery 
In this section we present the image authentication, tamper localization and pixel 
recovery processes. For clear description, we first introduce the authentication and 
tamper localization processes in Section 4.4.1 without taking into account pixel 
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recovery. Afterwards, we present the strategy of recovering tampered pixels in Section 
4.4.2. 
4.4.1 Image Authentication and Tamper Localization 
The authentication process is similar to the one proposed in Section 3.3, which consists 
of three steps as illustrated in Figure 4-9. First, with the knowledge of the secret key K, 
the original watermark sequence w  can be regenerated. After obtaining the extracted 
watermark )(ˆ jw  for the jth block, the verification can be done by comparing it with the 
original watermark bit )( jw . For every block, if the extracted watermark bit does not 
match the original one, the block will be considered as an unverified block. All the 
pixels in an unverified block are marked as potential unverified pixels. As shown in 
Figure 4-9 (a), the gray block indicates the unverified blocks in the permuted image. 
Second, the image is inversely permuted and all the pixels are moved back to their 
original position in oI . The potential unverified pixels marked in step 1 will be 
randomly distributed over the whole image. Because the mismatches of extracted 
watermark bits are caused by the pixel manipulation, every unverified block must 
contain at least one altered pixel from the tampered regions. Therefore, after the inverse 
permutation, all the altered pixels in every unverified block will be moved back to the 
tampered region. Consequently, in the tampered region, the unverified pixels will be 
clustered together and have a much higher density than other areas. Furthermore, the 
clusters of the unverified pixels will form the shape of the original content in the 
tampered region in a pixel-wise resolution. Outside the tampered regions, the other 
potentially unverified pixels will scatter over the whole image sparsely. All these 
isolated unverified pixels will be considered as noise dots and be filtered out in the next 
step. As shown in Figure 4-9 (b), the gray dots and areas indicate potential unverified 
pixels in the original image domain. The gray rectangle block denotes the actually 
tampered region with high density of unverified pixels. 
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Finally, the authentication result is refined by a noise filter, e.g. a median filter, to 
remove the noise-like isolated unverified pixels. The filter in described in Equation 
(3-16) can also be applied here. Thus, the tampered region will be easily picked out, as 
shown in Figure 4-9 (c).  
 
 
 
Figure 4-9 Illustration of the image authentication process: (a) unverified blocks in the 
permuted image,  (b) potential unverified pixels (scattering over the image like noises) 
and the altered area (with high density of unverified pixels),  (c) altered area after noise 
filter (isolated noise-like unverified pixels removed). 
(c)
(a) (b) 
altered area Noise Filter 
unverified blocks
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permutation 
altered area
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Figure 4-10 Illustration of watermark verification process 
Table 4-2 Possible mismatch cases between the extracted and the original watermarks 
Case )( jw  )(ˆ jw  
1 0 1 
2 0 2 
3 1 0 
4 1 2 
 
4.4.2 Recovery of Tampered Pixels 
In this section, we present how the altered pixels in the tampered regions can be 
recovered. As illustrated in Figure 4-10, if the extracted watermark )(ˆ jw  does not 
match the original watermark bit )( jw , there are four different cases how the 
watermark might be changed. Table 4-2 lists the four possible mismatch cases between 
the extracted and the original watermark bits. 
The watermark mismatch is incurred by the change of the feature value, either by 
increasing or decreasing. Due to the introduction of the dummy entries “2”, in order to 
get the watermark change in each case listed in Table 4-2, the amount of increasing or 
decreasing the feature value is different. For example, Case 2 where the watermark is 
changed from “0” to “2” might be caused by a decrease of the feature value of 
[Q/2, 3Q/2] or an increase of [3/2Q, 5/2Q]. If we assume that the modification of the 
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feature value of a block is smaller than 3/2Q, the feature value can only be moved to its 
neighborhood. In practice, this assumption is reasonable because when the size of 
manipulated regions is far smaller than the image size, the total amount of pixel 
manipulation will be evenly distributed into quite a few blocks in the permuted image. 
Hence, the amount of pixel modification in every single block will be quite limited. If 
the size of manipulated regions is relatively very large, the tampered area can not be 
localized any more due to the overwhelming noise-like potential unverified pixels in 
the authentication process. The limit of the manipulated region size that can be 
localized will be discussed in the next section. 
Under this assumption, we can determine whether the feature value is shifted to the left 
or the right entry by the pixel manipulation, namely, whether it is increased or 
decreased. When Q=1, this means that only one pixel in a block is altered. Based on the 
shift direction of the feature value, we can determine what kind of pixel is changed in 
the block. In case the feature value is the number of black pixels or the pixels belonging 
to category 1c  in color image, the original pixel can be recovered as listed in Table 4-3. 
For example, in Case 2 where the extracted watermark )(ˆ jw  is “2” and the original one 
)( jw  is “0”, it means the number of the black value is increased by one, namely, one of 
the white pixels in the jth block is modified to black. Therefore, the original pixel 
),( yxIo  should be white. At this step, we can not exactly determine which white pixel 
in the block is changed, so we consider all the white pixels in the block as potential 
unverified pixels. Note that we can also mark all the pixels in the unverified blocks as 
potential unverified pixels instead of only white pixels. It will compensate the errors 
caused by the blocks in which not only one white pixel is changed and will therefore 
increase the density of the unverified pixels in the tampered region after the inverse 
permutation. In the other 3 cases, the original pixel color can be similarly deduced.  
Based on the mismatch of the extracted watermark and the original one, we classify the 
unverified pixels into two categories. If the watermark change falls into Case 1 and 3, 
all the unverified pixels in the jth block are classified into category u1. If the watermark 
change falls into Case 2 and 4, all the unverified pixels in the jth block are classified 
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into category u2. Thus, we obtain two different kinds of unverified pixels. After the 
inverse permutation in the second step of authentication process, the two categories of 
unverified pixels will be clustered in separate tampered regions according to the way of 
the pixel manipulation and form the shape of the removed original content or the added 
parts. When all pixels in unverified blocks are considered as unverified, there will be 
some mixture of unverified pixels of two categories in some tampered regions. In each 
tampered region, however, the unverified pixels of one category will be overwhelming 
majority. Therefore, the original pixel values of each tampered region can be easily 
estimated and recovered. After filtering the isolated noise-like unverified pixels in the 
third step of the authentication process, together with the reconstruction of the shape of 
the original content and the added part, the manipulated image content can be recovered 
accordingly. Note that for color synthetic images only the original category of the pixel 
can be recovered instead of the actual pixel color in binary images. 
Since there are two categories of unverified pixels, the noise filter can be applied to 
every category separately. A properly designed noise filter can not only filter out the 
noise-like pixels, but also can compensate for detection errors. If the number of altered 
pixels in one block is larger than one, the filter can be used to smooth out the wrong 
points. For example, if only white or black pixels are modified in a block and the 
number of the modified pixels is a multiple of 3, the output of the quantization function 
will change from kQ to (k+3), which have the same mapping value and therefore the 
pixel modification will not be detected. Another possible case occurs if a certain 
number of black pixels are modified to white in a block, while the same amount of 
white pixels are modified to black in the same block: the feature value, i.e. the number 
of the black pixels, will keep the same and such modification can not be detected. Such 
tamper detection errors will result in some holes in the area of converged unverified 
pixels, the noise filter will fill these holes by checking their neighbor pixels. 
Furthermore, the size of the applied noise filter can be scaled differently to detect 
manipulations at various scales according to the requirement of particular applications.  
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Table 4-3 Original pixel recovery based on the watermark comparison 
Case )( jw  )(ˆ jw  ),( yxIo  
1 0 1 white/c2 
2 0 2 black/c1 
3 1 2 white/c2 
4 1 0 black/c1 
 
4.5 Analysis and Discussion 
4.5.1 Quality of Watermarked Image 
In this section we shall discuss the quality of the watermarked image of the proposed 
embedding method and compare it with the odd-even embedding and look-up table 
embedding approaches. In the odd-even embedding method, every entry has two 
neighbors with the different mapping value. Hence, when the feature value needs to be 
forced to a desired mapping bit value, it can be modified in both directions by choosing 
a nearer one to minimize the artifact caused by embedding. For example, when the 
quantization step Q=1, in the odd-even embedding case the maximal number of pixels 
that need to be flipped in a block is bounded to one. In the look-up table embedding 
case, however, with the maximum run of “0” and “1” larger than one, some mapping 
entries have one or both neighbors with the same mapping value. So if the original 
feature value does not map to the desired watermark bit value, in order to minimize the 
amount of modification, the update of the feature value can only be made in the 
direction that has a shorter distance to the next entry with different mapping value. 
When Q=1, the maximal flipping number may be larger than one when the maximal 
run of “0” or “1” exceeds two. In this case, more flippable pixels are required to fulfill 
the watermark embedding and the image quality will be degraded due to more pixel 
modifications. 
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The proposed embedding method resembles the look-up table embedding case with 
maximum run of 2. When the quantization step Q=1, the maximal number of pixels that 
need to be modified in a block is still bounded to one. When the desired watermark bit 
value is “0” or “1”, as illustrated in Figure 4-8, whether the original feature value maps 
to “0”, “1” or “2”, only one step change is necessary to map the feature value to the 
desired bit value. However, compared with the odd-even embedding, the direction of 
the one-step change is constrained. For example, when the feature value maps to “0” 
while the watermark bit is “1”, the feature value must be increased in order to fulfill the 
embedding by only modifying the feature value by Q. Otherwise, a 2Q decrease has to 
be made to map the feature value to “1”. In this case, therefore, a white flippable pixel, 
or a flippable pixel belonging to color set c2 in the case of color images, is required to 
be modified. If there is no white flippable pixels in the block, two black flippable pixels 
have to be changed to get the same mapping value. As we mentioned in the previous 
section, in the proposed watermarking scheme, thanks to the statistical tampering 
detection mechanics, embedding errors are allowed to some extent. Hence, in this 
example if there is no white flippable pixel in the block, all the pixels in the block will 
be kept intact in order to keep the image fidelity high. As a tradeoff, this will result in a 
detection error. When the image quality is not a key requirement in some particular 
applications, this constraint can be released. 
 
Figure 4-11 Illustration of the modification of the feature value in the case that the 
quantized feature value does not map to the desired watermark bit value. 
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Although the maximal number of pixels that need to be modified can be bounded by 
one in every block, the proposed embedding will introduce more modifications in the 
whole image than the look-up table embedding with maximum run of 2. The reason lies 
in two aspects. First, in the look-up table embedding case there is still the possibility 
that some entries have both neighbors mapping to the other different bit value like in 
the odd-even embedding case. But in the proposed embedding method every entry has 
two neighbor entries mapping to the other two different bit values. Second, due to the 
existence of the dummy entry, in the proposed embedding method there are three 
different mapping values, “0”, “1” and “2”, instead of two values in the look-up table 
embedding case. Therefore, the probability that the mapping value of the quantized 
feature value kQ matches the desired watermark bit decreases from 1/2 to 1/3. In other 
words, with probability of 2/3 the feature value has to be shifted to its neighbor entry 
that maps to the desired watermark bit.  
In the following we shall calculate the introduced distortion by the proposed 
embedding method quantitatively. If we assume that the original feature value is 
uniformly distributed over the range of ])2/1(,)2/1[( QkQk +−=ψ , in the case that the 
mapping value corresponding to the quantized feature value matches the watermark bit, 
the feature value is rounded to kQ and the mean squared error caused by the embedding 
is  
 .
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Note that Equation (4-7) is the same as Equation (3-20) that describes the case of odd-
even embedding. This means that in this case the MSE caused by the proposed method 
is the same as the odd-even embedding. 
Now we consider the case that the quantized feature value does not map to the desired 
watermark bit value. In this situation, the feature value has to be modified to the nearest 
neighbor entry (k-1)Q or (k+1)Q that maps to the desired bit value in order to embed 
the watermark bit. As mentioned above, in the proposed method, only one direction can 
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be chosen to shift the feature value in order to minimize the amount of modification. 
Figure 4-11 illustrates the process of modifying the feature value in this case. As shown 
in Figure 4-11, for all the four cases of shifting, i.e. “0”→ “1”, “1” → “0”, “2” → “0” 
and “2” → “1”, the minimal and the maximal shift distances are 1/2Q and 3/2Q 
respectively. Thereby the mean squared error incurred by the embedding in this case is 
 .
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Thus, the overall MSE incurred by watermark embedding is 
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Compared with Equation (3-22), we can see that using the same quantization step Q the 
proposed embedding method introduces MSE distortion of 3/4 2Q , which is larger than 
MSE distortion of 1/3 2Q  caused by the odd-even embedding. It is also larger than the 
MSE distortion of 1/2 2Q  caused by the look-up table embedding [W03]. Therefore, the 
quantitative analysis result conforms to what we analyzed above. The degradation of 
the image quality is the cost of the capability of estimation of the original pixel value, 
which enables the tamper recovery. 
4.5.2 Sensitivity to Pixel Manipulations 
For binary images, by using the number of black pixels in a block as the feature value, 
the watermark detector is very sensitive to any single pixel manipulation because any 
pixel flipping may cause the feature value of the block changed. Even one single pixel 
modification will make the extracted bit from the corresponding block mismatch the 
original one and raise tampering alarm. Although one single unverified block will only 
cause a few unverified pixels (coming from the unverified block) that scatter over the 
whole image and the actually manipulated pixel is indistinguishable, a tampering as 
small as 2 pixels or bigger will become distinguishable and can be easily picked out 
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from other isolated unverified pixels. Thus, the position of tampering can be precisely 
localized. 
Nevertheless, when more than one pixel is subject to be modified in one single block, it 
might occur that the quantization result of modified feature value maps to the same 
value as the original bit. Subsequently, such false bit-matching will result in undetected 
manipulated pixels. Let bn  be the number of the changed black pixels and wn  the 
number of the changed white pixels and Q=1. In the case of the odd-even embedding, 
when the total number of the changed pixels, k= bn + wn , is even, the watermark bit 
extracted from this block will not be changed, namely, still matching to the original bit. 
If there are totally n pixels in one block and each pixel change is independent from 
other pixels with probability p, the probability that the embedded bit can still be 
successfully extracted from a modified block is 
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In the case of the proposed embedding method, whether the extracted bit matches the 
original one or not depends on the number of the changed pixels. The extracted bit will 
match the original one only when the difference of the numbers of the changed black 
pixels and white pixels is equal to the multiples of three, i.e. inn wb 3=− , where 
0Ni ∈ . If we assume that in the block there is the same number of black pixels as white 
pixels, the probability in Equation (4-10) becomes 
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Since the number of the changed pixels is constrained by the condition inn wb 3=− , 
the binomial coefficient in Equation (4-11) becomes much smaller than that in 
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Equation (4-10). Therefore, with the proposed embedding approach, the miss 
probability of pixel manipulation is significantly decreased. 
For color synthetic images, the sensitivity to pixel manipulation depends on the used 
feature value. For example, in the case that all the pixels are divided into two categories 
as introduced in Section 4.3.1 and the feature value is defined as the number of pixels 
that belongs to color set c1, if the pixel manipulation does not change the category that 
the pixel belongs to, it can not be detected as it will not affect the used feature value. 
This problem can be compensated by utilizing a more complicated feature value that 
involves all the possible pixel colors explicitly, which will be changed by any kind of 
pixel value modification. In Section 4.7, Equation (4-17) gives an example of feature 
value that can identify and recover three kinds of colors. If the recovery capacity is not 
of concern, it becomes easier to design a feature value to identify multiple pixel values. 
Similarly as discussed in Section 3.4.3, the final sensitivity of the proposed 
authentication system can be adjusted by the noise filter size and threshold in the 
authentication process. By applying noise filters of various sizes and different 
thresholds, the authenticator can bypass possible incidental noises that may be 
introduced in the targeted application so that the false alarm rate can be decreased. 
When no noise filter is applied in the authentication process, the highest sensitivity of 
the scheme will be achieved. 
4.5.3 Localization and Recovery Capabilities 
As we presented in Section 4.4, the tamper regions are localized by the clustering of 
identified unverified pixels after mapping back to the original image domain. 
According to the sensitivity analysis in the previous section, as long as the number of 
modified pixels in one block doesn’t conform to the condition inn wb 3=− , a 
watermark bit mismatch will occur and this will render the block unverified. All the 
pixels in unverified blocks, including both the actually altered or unaltered pixels, will 
subsequently be identified as potential unverified pixels. In this way, almost every 
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single altered pixel will be identified. Therefore, after mapping all the potential 
unverified pixels back to the original image domain, the authenticator achieves a pixel-
wise resolution of tamper detection and localization based on the distribution density of 
unverified pixels. Under the assumption that one single block in the permuted domain 
will contain at most one modified pixel, the original values of altered pixel(s) can be 
estimated. After all altered pixel values are estimated, the estimation result is refined 
based on the distribution density of each kind of unverified pixels.  
Because the same random permutation technique is applied as in Chapter 3, the 
proposed scheme has the similar advantage and limitation with respect to tamper 
localization. As discussed in Section 3.4.2, the tamper localization resolution is 
independent of the watermark payload that is determined by the used block size. This 
implies that a reasonably large block size can be used to reduce the watermark payload 
without decreasing the resolution of tamper localization. Larger block size, however, 
will increase the probability of false alarm and decrease the maximal size of altered 
area that can be accurately localized. The analysis of the probability that the potentially 
unverified pixels casually form a connected area can be similarly deduced as in Section 
3.4.2. In the case of synthetic image authentication, Equation (3-26) becomes 
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In this case the probability that a pixel is a potentially unverified pixel is equal to the 
watermark detection error rate 
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Then the probability that there are at least t unverified pixels in the 3×3 neighborhood 
of an unverified pixel can be obtained by Equation (3-28) as follows: 
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Similarly as discussed in Section 3.4.2, given a block size b, the authenticator can only 
provide accurate tamper localization and recover the altered pixels when the amount of 
altered pixels is bound to a certain limit. If a large amount of pixels is altered, the 
tampered area may not be localized because too many blocks are marked as unverified 
and then the unverified pixels become overwhelming after mapping back to their 
original positions. Hence, it is very difficult or even impossible to distinguish the 
actually tampered area from other noise-like unverified pixels. In such a case, the 
manipulation will render the whole image unauthentic.  
If the random permutation distributes all the pixels evenly over the image, when the 
number of altered pixels reaches  
 2b
WHLw
×
= , (4-15) 
where wL  is the length of the watermark sequence, all the blocks will contain one 
altered pixel. Therefore, all the pixels will be marked as unverified. After mapping 
back to the original image domain, the image will be full of randomly distributed 
unverified pixels. In this case, neither tamper localization nor pixel recovery is possible 
any more. 
Equation (4-15) reveals that smaller block sizes will increase the limit of maximal 
localizable area, because every embedded watermark bit monitors fewer pixels and the 
number of potential unverified pixels introduced by every altered pixel will decrease. 
However, using a smaller block size will increase the length of watermark sequence, 
i.e. higher watermark payload. Embedding more watermark bits will cause more pixel 
modifications and therefore degrade the image quality. On the other hand, the number 
of embeddable watermark bits is bounded by the number of flippable pixels, i.e. the 
total watermark capacity. Therefore, the minimal block size depends on the number of 
flippable pixels and the cover image size. Given a quantization step Q, according to 
Equation (4-9), the average amount of pixel modification is Q23 . Thus, for a cover 
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image of size H×W, in order to ensure successful embedding in each block, the minimal 
block size is limited to  
 Q
N
WHb
f 2
3
min
×
= , (4-16) 
where fN  is the total number of flippable pixels in the cover image.  
In addition, the recovery capability of the proposed scheme is limited to a binary pixel 
recovery, which can only recover two kinds of pixel values. In the proposed embedding 
method, there are three different mapping entries instead of two entries in the classical 
look-up table embedding. Thanks to the dummy entry, we can estimate the original 
feature value when the extracted watermark does not match the original one. In the 
pixel recovery process, we make an important assumption that the amount of 
modification of the feature value in one single block is smaller than 3/2Q, namely, one 
of its neighbor entries that maps to the original watermark bit will be considered as the 
original enforced feature value in the watermark embedding. Since there exists only 
one dummy entry between “0” and “1”, we can only distinguish the modification with 
one hop from the original mapping entry to its neighbor entries, i.e. whether the 
quantized feature value is increased or decreased by Q. Any modification that causes 
two or more hops will cause an estimation error. This means only one kind of 
modification amount fΔ  can be distinguished. Since the pixel recovery process is 
based on the estimation of the change of feature value, we can only recover the 
modified pixels into two categories as we mentioned in Section 4.4. Therefore, for 
color images, the original brightness and color information may be lost. We shall 
present a possible extension of the proposed scheme in Section 4.7 that can recover 
three different pixel values. 
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4.5.4 Security 
The security issues can be analyzed similarly as in Section 3.4.4. In the applications of 
image content authentication, the main objective of an adversary is to forge an 
authentic image that can pass the authenticator test. Therefore, it is important to study 
the following two kinds of problems [CMB01][WL04][YK07]: (1) the possibility of 
manipulating the image content without changing the embedded authentication code, 
and (2) the possibility for an adversary to embed a valid authentication code into an 
image. In both problems, we assume that an adversary knows the algorithm but has no 
knowledge of the secret key. For the first problem, according to the sensitivity analysis 
in Section 4.5.2, whether the number of altered pixels is small or large, the probability 
of missing to detect the alteration is always very small as long as the number of blocks, 
i.e. the authentication code length, is reasonably large. 
For the second problem, when multiple watermarked image copies of the same cover 
image with different data embedded by the same key are available to an adversary, it 
may be possible for an adversary to estimate which pixel conveys what data by 
comparing those copies, so that he can compose an image with his own data embedded 
[WL04][YK07]. In the proposed scheme, since the embedded watermark, i.e. the 
authentication code, is generated by the secret key, with the same key the same code 
will always be embedded into all the cover images. Hence, there will never be multiple 
copies in the proposed scheme. Without the availability of multiple copies, it is 
extremely hard for an adversary to embed specific data into the image due to the 
secrecy of random permutation, even if he knows the algorithm. Furthermore, without 
the knowledge of the key it is also very hard for an adversary to get the correct 
authentication code. The length of the code wL  is equal to the number of the blocks, so 
the probability of getting a correct code is wL−2 . When wL  is reasonably large, this 
probability will be very small. For example, given an image of 512×512 pixels, when 
the block size is set to 16, this probability is as small as 10242− . 
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If the authenticator is unlimitedly accessible to an adversary, the security problem 
discussed in Section 3.4.4 also exists in the proposed scheme in this chapter. In this 
case, filtering of isolated unverified pixels must be a mandatory step. Otherwise, since 
the proposed embedding method in this chapter is based on pixel-wise features and 
flipping, every time an adversary alters an individual pixel, the pixels belonging to the 
same block will be output as unverified pixels by the authenticator. Thus, the 
composition of one block is exactly revealed. In this way, an adversary can alter the 
image pixel by pixel and record the authentication outputs. After sufficient attempts, 
the whole pixel mapping built by random permutation will be precisely discovered. 
Once the pixel permutation is known, the adversary can easily mount a successful 
attack by manipulating a preferable image part at will and then altering the other 
corresponding pixels to keep feature values of each affected blocks unchanged. 
Therefore, in order to counteract such kind of attacks, the authentication result must be 
refined by a noise filter with reasonable size so that the pixel alteration of small size 
such as pepper-and-salt noises will be neglected. The smallest detectable alteration size 
depends on the applied filter size and the threshold. 
4.6 Experimental Results 
To evaluate the proposed scheme, we use an image set that includes 508 synthetic 
images of different kinds and different sizes. The test image set consists of binary text 
images, line drawings (e.g. comic images) and color digital maps. The text images are 
obtained from different types of scanners and screenshots, including both typed and 
handwritten documents. These documents are not only written in Latin letters (in 
English and German) but also in Chinese characters. The used test maps consist of city 
maps and topographic charts. Figure 4-12 shows some examples from the synthetic 
image test set.  
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Figure 4-12 Sample images from the synthetic image test set 
In the following tests, if not specified, the parameters are set as below:  
1. Quantization step Q=1 (i.e. no quantization), 
2. Block size b=16, 
3. Only patterns (a) and (b) in Figure 4-5 are considered as flippable pixels, 
4. At most one pixel is flipped in each block. 
5. Noise filter size d=5 and the threshold T=4. 
For color images, the mean luminance value of the whole image is used as the 
threshold to classify the two color sets. Figure 4-13 plots the histogram of the detection 
error rate (BER) of all the images in the test set.  
Because of the condition 4 above, in some blocks the desirable watermark bit can not 
be successfully embedded by only modifying one flippable pixel. This constraint 
ensures the high fidelity of the watermarked image but it also introduces detection 
errors even if the image is not tampered. From Figure 4-13, we can see that all images 
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have a detection error rate lower than 0.167 and for most test images the detection error 
rate is lower than 0.10. Higher detection rates occur in such images that contain plenty 
of white plain regions or straight drawing lines such as tables. In these image parts, 
there are no or only very few flippable pixels. Therefore, the whole watermark capacity 
of those images is significantly decreased. Nevertheless, these errors are allowable 
since they introduce only isolated detection errors that can be easily distinguished from 
the actually tampered areas. Figure 4-13 also plots the corresponding probability faP  
that there are at least five unverified pixels in a 3×3 neighborhood. We can see that this 
probability is always kept very low. Even with the highest BER of 0.167 in the test set, 
the corresponding probability is only 4.53×10-3. Therefore, with a reasonable detection 
error rate, the embedded watermark can still achieve a good tampering detection, 
localization and pixel recovery performance, which will be presented in the following 
tests.  
 
Figure 4-13 Distribution of the detection BER of the whole synthetic image test set 
(508 images in total) and the corresponding probability that there are at least five 
unverified positions in a 3×3 neighborhood, i.e. t=5. 
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To compare the probability faP  with different parameters and evaluate the analysis 
result in Section 4.5.3, more test results are presented in Figure 4-14. The experimental 
results in Figure 4-14 are obtained from the whole synthetic image test set (508 images 
in total). Every 3×3 pixel neighborhood in each test image is involved to calculate the 
probability faP  corresponding to the obtained BER value from the image. The 
analytical results are calculated by Equation (4-14) using the BER values obtained from 
all the test images in the experiments. Figure 4-14 plots three groups of curves for 
different parameter t, i.e. for t=4, t=5 and t=7 respectively. From these groups of curves 
in Figure 4-14, we can see that the experimental results and the analytical results 
conform to each other very well for all the parameter t values. 
 
 
Figure 4-14 Analytical and experimental results of the probability that there are at least 
t unverified pixels in a 3×3 neighborhood. The experimental results are obtained from 
the whole synthetic image test set (508 images in total). 
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Table 4-4 Watermark Embedding Information of Various Sample Images 
Test Image Image Size Block # Non-matched Percentage 
Flipped 
Pixels # 
Unsuccessful 
Embedding # 
Typed Text 856×575 1890 64.3% 1176 39 
Handwritten 
Text 1755×1275 8611 66.3% 5026 687 
Digital Map 1202×876 4050 66.5% 2561 133 
 
In the rest of this section, we present more test results to evaluate the tampering 
detection and recovery capabilities of the proposed scheme by taking a variety of 
images from the test set as examples. These example images include a binary typed text 
image, a binary handwritten text image and a color digital map, as shown in Figure 
4-16, Figure 4-19 and Figure 4-20. The original handwritten text image is shown in 
Figure 4-1. Table 4-4 lists the watermark embedding information of these three 
different kinds of images. Note that for the handwritten text image, due to the large 
white margins and plain areas, the unsuccessful embedding rate reaches nearly 8%.  
4.6.1 Binary Text Images 
Two kinds of binary text images are taken as examples, one handwritten text image and 
one typed text image, which are both typical synthetic images and widely used in many 
applications. Figure 4-15 gives a closer view of a part of the original and the 
watermarked handwritten text image. As shown in Figure 4-15 (a) and (b), the original 
and watermarked images look nearly identical to human observers, i.e. the watermark 
embedding process does not introduce noticeable artifacts. The difference between the 
original and the watermarked images is shown in Figure 4-15 (c). The flipped pixels are 
shown in black. 
Figure 4-16 and Figure 4-17 present different kinds of manipulation tests and 
authentication results of a handwritten text image. In Figure 4-16, two kinds of 
manipulations, content addition and content deletion, were made on the watermarked 
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image respectively. First, the watermarked image was tampered by adding two zeroes 
at the end of the number “€500” to change it to “€50000”. Second, the text “Leo 
€50000” was erased from the watermarked image. The third test is to combine the first 
and second alterations together. All these manipulations were done in Photoshop by 
simple copy, cut and paste operations. The altered versions look perfect and no 
noticeable trace is left on the image. The authentication and recovery result of every 
test is shown below the altered version. Two different kinds of manipulations are 
indicated in different colors: the deleted parts are indicated in red and the added ones in 
blue. From the result images, we can see that all the alterations are successfully 
detected and precisely localized. The deleted content is correctly recovered. Note that 
there are some blue dots in the red deleted parts and vice versa. These wrong color dots 
are caused by the unverified blocks that contain more than one altered pixels as we 
discussed in Section 4.4. 
Another kind of manipulation, content replacement, is shown in Figure 4-17. The name 
“Markus” was removed and replaced by “Stefan”. In this case, the added and deleted 
content are partly overlapped. The authentication and recovery result distinguishes the 
deleted name and the forged name successfully. The deleted name “Markus” is 
recovered in red color and the forged name “Stefan” is indicated in blue. It can be seen 
that in other areas there are still some noise-like red and blue dots that are not removed 
by the noise filter, but these noise dots do not affect the authentication result. 
As we discussed in the previous sections, without noise filter the authenticator will give 
the highest sensitivity to any pixel manipulation. Figure 4-18 shows the above-
mentioned four authentication results without noise filtering. All the red unverified 
pixels denote possible modifications from black to white, i.e. content deletion, while 
the blue unverified pixels denote possible modifications from white to black, i.e. 
content addition. As shown in Figure 4-18, without any noise filtering, it is still very 
easy to distinguish different kinds of content manipulation. The altered content parts 
are successfully localized and recovered with higher sensitivity. For example, in Figure 
4-18 (a), the deleted comma is partly overlapped with the added zero, so the actually 
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changed part is very small because the overlapped part remains in black. Despite the 
overlapping and small alternation, the authenticator gives a very accurate localization 
and recovery result as shown in Figure 4-18 (a). The overlapping part is shown in 
black, which means no modification, while the protruding parts of the deleted comma 
are shown in red to reveal the deletion. The added comma can also be recognized in 
blue color. 
Besides the handwritten text image, Figure 4-19 presents an example of the typed text 
images, which is a part of typical electronic archive copy from the library. As shown in 
Figure 4-19 (a) and (b), the watermarked image achieves a very good visual quality and 
there is no noticeable difference between the original text image and the watermarked 
one. Figure 4-19 (c) gives a close view of a part of the watermarked image. In Figure 
4-19 (d), the last word “way” is deleted and the period position is also shifted to left 
accordingly. The manipulation can be easily distinguished by comparing Figure 4-19 
(c) and (d). However, without knowledge of the original version and only from the 
tempered version Figure 4-19 (d), the manipulation is very successful and completely 
unnoticeable. The authentication and recovery result is shown in Figure 4-19 (e), the 
deleted word “way” and the period are recovered in red color, while the faked period is 
also marked out in blue color. 
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Figure 4-15 Close view of a part of watermarked image: (a) Original image, (b) 
Watermarked image, (c) Difference image, flipped pixels are shown in black. 
 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
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Figure 4-16 Handwritten text image test: content removal and addition. Left: 
watermarked image; Right: original version, different tampered versions and 
authentication results. Two zeros “00” is added at the end of “€500” and the text “Leo 
€5000” is deleted respectively. The detected result indicates the manipulations in 
different color: blue for addition and red for removal. 
 
Authentication and recovery result 
Content deletion 
Authentication result 
Content addition 
 
Original version 
Addition and deletion 
Authentication and recovery result Blue color indicates added 
characters, and red color 
indicates deleted ones. 
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Figure 4-17 Handwritten text image test: content replacement. Left: watermarked 
image; Right: original version, tampered version and authentication result. The name 
“Markus” is replaced by “Stefan”. The authentication result indicates the deleted 
“Markus” in red color while the forged “Stefan” in blue color. 
 
Original version 
Content replacement 
Authentication and recovery result 
Blue color indicates added characters, 
and red color indicates deleted ones. 
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Figure 4-18 Authentication results without noise filter. (a) Content addition, (b) 
Content deletion, (c) Combination of content addition and deletion, (d) Content 
replacement. The red unverified pixels denote possible modifications from black to 
white, i.e. content deletion, and the blue pixels denote possible modifications from 
white to black, i.e. content addition. 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
(d) 
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Figure 4-19 Binary typed text image test: content removal and addition. (a) Original 
text image, (b) Watermarked text image, (c) Part of the watermarked map,  (d) 
Tampered version: the last word “way” is deleted and the period is then shifted to left. 
(e) Authentication and recovery result: the deleted word “way” and period are indicated 
in red color and the added period in blue color.  
 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) (d) (e) 
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4.6.2 Color Digital Map 
For color synthetic images, we take a digital map from the Media@Komm1 project as 
example to present the experimental results. As shown in Figure 4-2, the example map 
contains seven distinct colors in total and is stored in palette image format. During 
watermark embedding, two background colors, white and green, are classified into the 
set c2, while the other five foreground colors are classified into the set c1. The number 
of foreground pixels in each block is used as the feature value in the watermark 
embedding process. Figure 4-20 (a) and (b) show the original digital map and the 
watermarked version respectively. Visually comparing these two maps, we can see that 
no annoying artifact is introduced by the embedding process. Figure 4-20 (c) shows a 
close view of part of the watermarked image. Deletion and addition manipulations are 
then made on the watermarked map. As shown in Figure 4-20 (d), one curve is deleted 
from the watermarked map, which is a modification from foreground color to 
background color, while another forged curve is added on the opposite side, which is a 
modification from background color to foreground color. After the image 
authentication process, both manipulations are precisely localized as shown in Figure 
4-20 (e). The deleted curve is successfully recovered and is indicated in red color, and 
the forged curve is also revealed in blue color. As mentioned in Section 4.5.3, for color 
images, the authenticator can only recover the altered pixels to their original sets, but is 
not able to recover their original colors. In Figure 4-20 (e), red pixels indicate that their 
original color(s) belongs to the set c1, while blue pixels denote that their original 
color(s) belong to the set c2. 
                                                 
1 http://www.mediakomm.net/. 
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Figure 4-20 Color digital map test. (a) Original map, (b) Watermarked map, (c) Part of 
watermarked map, (d) Altered version: one curve was deleted and another one was 
added in a mirrored way, (e) Authentication and recovery result: the deleted curve is 
indicated in red color and the forged one in blue color. 
alter verify& 
recover
(b)
(c) (d) (e) 
(a)
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Figure 4-21 Illustration of the generalization of the proposed embedding method 
4.7 Extension of the Proposed Embedding Method 
In order to increase the pixel categories that can be distinguished in the recovery 
process, more dummy entries should be inserted between the possible watermark bit 
values “0” and “1”. As illustrated in Figure 4-21, the proposed embedding method is 
generalized by modifying the period of the quantization entry from 3 to n. Thus, 
between the two “0” entries nkQ and (nk+n)Q there are (n-2) dummy entries. Hence, 
we can identify (n-1) kinds of fΔ  under the assumption that the mapping value is only 
changed by the minimum possible pixel modification. Note that if n is an even number, 
the entry “0” or “1” has the same distance to every dummy entry in both directions. In 
this case, we can not distinguish the direction of the modification. Hence, n has to be an 
odd number. Furthermore, in order to identify m categories of pixels in the recovery 
process, the feature value is required to be a certain characteristic of the block that takes 
into account all the m pixel categories. Modifying a pixel of any category should render 
the feature value changed. In addition, modifying pixels in different categories must 
cause different kinds of change of the feature value.  
We take the case of m=3 as an example, in which three different pixel categories need 
to be identified. We denote these three category as a, b and c. Between the categories a, 
b and c, there are totally 6 possible kinds of pixel modifications: a→b and b→a, a→c 
and c→a, b→c and c→b. We therefore need (n-1)=6 kinds of fΔ  to identify all these 
…… …… 
embed
0n-1
… 0 
… … 
(nk-1)Q nkQ (nk+1)Q
21 0
(nk+2)Q (nk+n)Q (nk+n+1)Q 
1
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possible pixel modifications, i.e. n=7. Based on the above-mentioned requirements, 
with n=7 and Q=1, a possible feature value can be defined as  
 jjjj NcNbNaf 42 ++=  (4-17) 
where jf  is the feature value in the jth block and jNa , jNb , jNc  denotes the number 
of pixels that belong to the category a, b and c in the jth block respectively. With the 
feature value jf , any kind of pixel modification among the category a, b and c will 
cause different fΔ . Under the assumption that only one pixel at most may be modified 
in a block, all the possible cases are listed in Table 4-5. 
Table 4-5 List of the possible feature value changes and pixel modification 
Case )( jw  )(ˆ jw  fΔ  Pixel change ),( yxIo  
1 0 1 +1 a→b a 
2 0 2 +2 b→c b 
3 0 3 +3 a→c a 
4 0 4 -3 c→a c 
5 0 5 -2 c→b c 
6 0 6 -1 b→a b 
7 1 0 -1 b→a b 
8 1 6 -2 c→b c 
9 1 5 -3 c→a c 
10 1 2 +1 a→b a 
11 1 3 +2 b→c b 
12 1 4 +3 a→c a 
 
It should be noted that using a bigger n will cause more pixel modifications during the 
watermark embedding process. In every single block, one proper pixel modification can 
enforce any feature value to the desired mapping value. With n=7, for example, the 
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maximal possible amount of feature value modification is 3 and a pixel flipping from 
category c to a can fulfill this maximal modification. Hence, the maximal number of 
pixels that need to be modified in a block is still bounded to one. Nevertheless, the total 
amount of pixel modification in the whole image will still be raised because the 
probability that the original feature value jf  maps to the desired watermark bit value is 
decreased from 1/3 to 1/n, even though we impose the constraint that only one pixel 
can be flipped in a block. Furthermore, since only one pixel is allowed to be modified 
in a block, in order to fulfill a successful embedding different kinds of flippable pixels 
are needed. For example, if the original feature value maps to “3” while the desired 
watermark bit is “1”, a flippable pixel that can be flipped from category c to a is 
required. Therefore, the requirement of different kinds of flippable pixels is 
significantly raised.  
4.8 Conclusion 
Due to the simplicity of the content, it is more challenging to hide data invisibly in 
synthetic images. However, the same reason also renders them much easier to be 
manipulated. Most of the existing watermarking algorithms are only targeted for color 
or grayscale natural images and are not applicable for synthetic images. The capability 
of existing watermark techniques for synthetic image authentication is limited in 
tamper localization and none of them has the capability of recovering the altered 
original content. 
In this chapter, after addressing the necessity and challenges of synthetic image 
authentication and reviewing the existing watermarking techniques for simple images, 
we propose a novel watermarking scheme to solve the problem. Random permutation is 
applied to establish random reference relationships among image pixels and it also 
equalizes the uneven watermark capacity over the whole image. A new embedding 
strategy is proposed to replace the classical odd-even embedding or look-up table 
embedding approaches. The new embedding method enables the recovery capability of 
original pixels in the image authentication process. Based on the distribution and 
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density of potential unverified pixels, the proposed scheme achieves pixel-wise tamper 
localization capability. Furthermore, the altered pixels can be recovered to their original 
values or color sets. A variety of experimental results demonstrate the effectiveness of 
the proposed scheme for synthetic image authentication. An extension of the proposed 
embedding method is also discussed. 
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5.1 Introduction and Prior Work 
Digital watermarking verifies the image content by embedding additional information, 
referred to as the watermark, into the host image data. The watermark is embedded by 
slightly modifying the original data. Therefore, it is inevitable to change the host data 
in some way. Although the modification of the original content is strictly controlled to 
be so slight that it is commonly imperceptible to human eyes, most of the watermarking 
algorithms will still cause a certain amount of permanent loss of content fidelity during 
the embedding process. The quality loss is usually proportional to the amount of the 
embedded watermark information. As mentioned in the prior chapters, a high 
watermark payload is usually required for content authentication, so the quality 
degradation caused by the authentication watermark is consequently increased. In 
addition, as the integrity of every image part needs to be ensured, most of the existing 
watermarking schemes embed the watermark ubiquitously over the entire image area. 
As a result, the quality degradation also exists ubiquitously over the whole image. 
Since such degradation for the human observer is masked and minimized by using 
perceptual models, it may be accepted in many applications. 
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In some applications, however, the fidelity of the original image is of special 
importance, such as medical images, satellite images and military images. In these 
applications, even slight modifications are not acceptable, especially in some important 
image regions. The slight quality degradation caused by the watermark embedding 
becomes intolerable. For example, the reliability of the data, i.e. the integrity of the 
records, is an important issue for medical images, because any manipulation or quality 
compromise could result in serious misdiagnosis of the patient’s disease 
[PM05][GPK06]. Thereby, in the most important parts of medical images, any slight 
modification is not allowed. In addition, satellite images also require high image 
fidelity. Slight quality loss might result in the deterioration of their commercial value, 
rendering it unfit for reuse or further distribution [CGM02]. 
On the other hand, in some other applications, only one or more particular regions in 
the image are suitable for watermark embedding, while the remaining parts have little 
or no watermark capacity, in which if a watermark is enforced to embed, severe quality 
loss will be rendered. For example, in the applications of identification, a Photo-ID 
card as a whole is considered as one picture. When there is no background image on the 
card, an ID card only includes a photo and a few lines of text and many margins. The 
text is printed on the card with very high resolution and can hardly be modified without 
introducing any artifacts. Therefore, only the region of the photo is suitable for 
watermark embedding. Technically, the above-mentioned two cases are the same, 
which are just inverse definition of special regions in different applications. Thereby 
they can be handled by the same solution. 
Obviously, the common watermarking strategies, which embed the watermark 
ubiquitously in the whole image, can not satisfy such special applications. They can not 
process special image regions separately. One solution to satisfy the aforementioned 
special requirements is to use the so-called invertible watermarking technique. An 
invertible watermark can be removed from the image content after the extraction so that 
the original image data can be precisely recovered [FGD01][NSAS06][A03]. In 
invertible watermark techniques, some portions of the host signals, e.g. some pixels or 
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frequency coefficients, are compressed to provide additional space to store the net 
watermark payload and the original signal information [AK03][CSTS02]. Hence the 
total payload is usually high. Due to the high required payload, the drawback of many 
invertible watermarking algorithms is that the quality in the marked state is lower than 
that in most traditional watermarking algorithms. This means that only the owners of 
the fitting key can benefit from the invertible strategy, the rest of the users will suffer 
even more quality loss. Furthermore, the invertible watermarking solution can only be 
used in cases in which the image can be converted back to the original state. Usually 
this condition is true only in the digital world. For example, the invertible watermark is 
not feasible for the above-mentioned ID card application, because the picture of an ID 
card is rendered in an analog way, i.e. printed on the card. The quality loss will remain 
on the card permanently and the watermark can not be removed thereafter.  
The other alternative solution is a watermarking technique that supports regions of 
interest (ROI). In the literature, some watermarking algorithms have been proposed 
combined with the concept of region of interest (ROI). In [LHLH03], Lie proposed a 
dual watermarking scheme for JPEG2000 images. One fragile watermark is embedded 
into the first wavelet level of the ROI and the other robust watermark is embedded into 
the third wavelet level of the ROB (region of backgrounds). By combining the dual 
watermarks, the scheme can distinguish malicious attacks from allowable image 
processing. In [CGM02], Chauhan et al. proposed a pixel-domain watermarking 
algorithm based on a look-up table method. A visually meaningful binary logo is 
embedded in original satellite images as the watermark while avoiding distorting 
certain vital regions. Two spatial-domain watermarking schemes for medical images 
were proposed in [W02] and [CWC05], in which the proposed schemes embed the 
signature information of the ROI into other non-ROI image parts so as to avoid 
distorting the image data inside the ROI. In [CWC05], the same watermarking 
technique was applied in the wavelet-domain and the watermark was embedded only 
into the non-ROI wavelet coefficients. Nevertheless, all these above-mentioned 
algorithms are either limited to a specific image format [LHLH03], or they need precise 
location information of the ROI in order to successfully extract the embedded 
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watermark [CGM02][W02][CWC05]. These requirements significantly decrease the 
practicability and the portability of these ROI-based watermarking schemes, because in 
the practical applications the ROI information may be often unavailable at the 
watermark detector side. 
In this chapter, we first propose a framework for ROI-supporting watermarking 
systems. The framework extends the watermarking schemes proposed in Chapter 3 and 
Chapter 4 by introducing the concept of a Region of Interest. The proposed framework 
can also be applied to other different watermark embedding schemes as long as the 
watermark is embedded into the subsets of the image separately. Based on the 
framework, we modify our wavelet-based watermarking scheme in Chapter 3 so as to 
support regions of interest masking. The content inside the preferred ROI(s) is kept 
intact during the watermark embedding process, while its integrity is still ensured by 
the embedded watermark in the other parts of the image. No ROI information is 
required in the watermark extraction and image authentication processes. Experimental 
results demonstrate that the proposed solution can detect and localize the manipulations 
both inside and outside the ROI(s) with the same resolution. We also evaluate the 
effectiveness of the proposed strategy for extending the synthetic image watermarking 
scheme in Chapter 4 to support the ROI concept. 
This chapter is organized as follows. Firstly, in Section 5.2, we give out the detailed 
definition of a region of interest. Then in Section 5.3, we introduce the proposed 
framework for watermarking with Region of Interest masking. The ROI-based 
watermarking scheme and the authentication processes are presented in Section 5.4. 
The performance of proposed scheme is discussed in Section 5.5 and experimental 
results are given in Section 5.6. In Section 5.7, we evaluate the effectiveness of the 
proposed framework for the watermarking scheme for synthetic image authentication. 
Finally, we conclude the chapter in Section 5.8. 
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5.2 Definition of Region of Interest (ROI) 
The concept of Region of Interest (ROI) is widely used in various application fields, 
such as medical and biomedical applications, visual communication applications with 
limited available bandwidth, client/server communication for image browsing with 
preview functionality, camera-based applications for automatic object capture (e.g. in a 
seminar, class-room, or in a teleconference), and content-based image retrieval (CBIR). 
However, in different applications, ROI has slightly different meanings and definitions. 
Depending on the context, a ROI can be defined either simply as a rectangular subset of 
data, or as any combination of irregular shapes as shown in Figure 5-1, which contains 
the important parts of the data based on the targeted application. The common purpose 
of defining regions of interest is to enable special processing in these sub-regions that is 
not applied to the whole image area. For example, a formalization of the ROI concept is 
included in the JPEG2000 standard [J00], which represents the state of the art of the 
still image coding standards. JPEG2000 supports different progressive decoding modes, 
one of which is related to the ROI functionality of this format. In this context, a ROI is 
a part of the image with arbitrary shape, which is supposed to have a better quality at 
any decoding bit-rate than the rest of the image.  
Figure 5-1 Examples of Region of Interest 
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In our work the ROI concept is not limited to that in JPEG2000 images or any other 
specific application, so our proposed scheme can be applied to different kinds of 
applications. We use the general definition of the region of interest (ROI), by which a 
ROI is a part of the image with arbitrary shape and size as shown in Figure 5-1, which 
has special requirements in the specific application. In our work, no additional 
information of the defined ROI(s) needs to be stored along with the image, such as 
region boundary chain code or binary mask used in JPEG2000. Furthermore, specifying 
multiple regions of interest in one image is allowed. The defined ROI(s) will be treated 
differently during the watermarking process. For example, the data inside the ROI(s) 
will not be modified during watermark embedding. Nonetheless, the content of the 
ROI(s) is still protected like other image regions. In practical applications, the ROI(s) 
can be either predefined kind of objects like chromosomes in cytogenetic images, or 
areas with arbitrary shape that are interactively specified by the user before the 
watermark embedding. 
5.3 Proposed Framework of Watermarking with Region 
of Interest 
Figure 5-2 shows the proposed framework for ROI-supporting image watermarking. 
This framework shares the same idea of random permutation that is used in the 
Original Image ROI(s) Selection 
Random 
Permutation 
Grouping 
Secret Key 
Authentication code 
Marked Image 
Inverse 
Permutation 
Watermark 
Embedding 
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Unchangeable 
Watermark Detection and 
Image Authentication Secret Key 
Random 
Permutation 
Figure 5-2  General Framework of ROI-supporting Image Watermarking 
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proposed watermarking schemes in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4. Nevertheless, this 
framework can be applied not only to the watermarking schemes that we proposed in 
the previous chapters, but also to other watermarking algorithms designed in both the 
spatial and transform domains as long as they embed the watermarks into separable 
image units, such as in a block-based way. Compared with the classical watermarking 
model, the proposed framework includes three additional steps before the embedding 
process: ROI(s) selection and presetting, random permutation and grouping. 
5.3.1 ROI Selection and Presetting 
Before performing the watermark embedding process, one or multiple preferred regions 
of interest are specified on the image. We denote the set of ROI(s) as roiR and preset it 
as unchangeable so that the data inside roiR , for example the pixels or the corresponding 
transform coefficients, can not be modified during the watermark embedding process. 
The locations of the ROI(s) are input to the watermark embedder as parameters. Then 
the classical watermark embedder is modified to  
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5.3.2 Random Permutation and Grouping 
These two steps, random permutation and grouping, are used to establish a mutual 
reference relationship among all the locations of the image. Because the ROI is defined 
unchangeable, no watermark can be embedded in the ROI. The authentication of the 
ROI(s) must be achieved by the embedded watermarks in the others parts of the image. 
Therefore, how the ROI(s) and other image parts are linked together becomes an 
essential issue for the authentication process.  
In the proposed framework, we first utilize a random permutation process to obtain a 
random mapping of all the image locations. The random permutation is performed 
before the watermark embedding in the corresponding domain where the watermark 
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will be embedded. The units that are used to embed the watermark, e.g. single pixel, 
transform coefficient or image block, are randomly permuted under the control of a 
secret key.  
The permutated units are then divided into groups with a group size g. A group can be 
defined as any kind of combination of image locations, such as rectangle blocks, 1-D 
row or column vector, etc. This grouping step determines the subsets in which the 
locations refer to each other. Due to the random permutation process, the members of 
every group come from different random locations. Likewise, all the locations inside 
ROI(s) are also randomly distributed into different groups, mutually referred to other 
locations in the same group. During the watermark detection and image authentication 
procedure, the reference relationship is recovered by applying the same random 
permutation using the same secret key. Therefore, no location information of the 
ROI(s) needs to be stored or transfered. 
5.4 Watermarking and Authentication Processes 
5.4.1 Watermark Embedding and Detection 
We first adopt the watermarking scheme of Chapter 3 to the proposed framework. 
Since the watermark is embedded in the wavelet domain, the specified ROI(s) locations 
have to be first mapped from the spatial domain to the wavelet domain. Thanks to the 
spatial-frequency localization of the wavelet transform, this mapping can be easily 
accomplished. Let ),( tl yx  and ),( br yx  be the coordinates of the top-left and bottom-
right corners of a ROI, then the corresponding coordinates of the ROI’s top-left corner 
in each wavelet decomposition level can be calculated as 
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where r is the wavelet decomposition level. W and H denote the image width and 
height respectively. The coordinates of the right-bottom corner of the ROI can be 
calculated likewise. All the wavelet coefficients inside the ROI(s) are set to be 
unchangeable and will be skipped by the embedder later.  
All the wavelet coefficients in the selected decomposition level r, including the ROI(s) 
coefficients, are firstly concatenated into a single string and then randomly permuted in 
the same way as described in Chapter 3, controlled by the secret key. Finally the 
rearranged coefficients are divided into groups of size g. Since the ROI coefficients are 
also permuted together with other non-ROI coefficients, they will be evenly distributed 
into all the groups. As a result, some groups will contain a mixture of both kinds of 
coefficients. We name the groups containing at least one ROI coefficient ROI-group 
and others non-ROI-group. The weighted mean value js  of every group is obtained and 
quantized according to Equation (3-1)-(3-4) to embed the corresponding watermark bit. 
In the coefficient update process, Equation (3-9) is modified to 
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Equation (5-3) ensures that the coefficients inside ROI(s) will not be changed. All the 
necessary modifications for watermark embedding are made on the non-ROI 
coefficients in the group.   
Likewise, if the second coefficient update method is adopted, Equation (3-10) should 
be modified similarly as follows: 
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By applying either Equation (5-3) or (5-4), if the sign of )(if j  is changed after the 
update, )(if j  is set to zero in order to avoid severe image distortions. 
The watermark detection process is performed in the same way as non-ROI 
watermarking. The ROI information is not required by the watermark detector. After 
the recovery of the random permutation of the selected wavelet coefficients, the 
watermark bit in every group is extracted by Equation (3-14). Note that the ROI(s) 
coefficients contribute to the weighted mean in both the embedding and detection 
processes, although they are not modified to embed the watermark. Therefore, 
tampering the ROI(s) will cause the weighted mean to change and subsequently change 
the quantization result, leading to a mismatch between the extracted watermark bit and 
the embedded one. Therefore, the tampering inside the ROI(s) can be detected by the 
watermark. 
5.4.2 Image Authentication 
The image authentication process for the non-ROI watermarking in Chapter 3 can still 
be used here. By comparing the extracted watermark bit with the original one, we find 
out all the unverified groups where mismatches occur. All the coefficients in the 
unverified group are marked as unverified coefficients regardless of whether they are 
from inside or outside ROI. If the tampering occurs inside the ROI(s), as we discussed 
in the previous section the corresponding ROI-groups will be detected as unverified. 
Consequently, the ROI coefficients belonging to these groups are identified as 
unverified as well as the non-ROI coefficients. After all these coefficients are mapped 
back to their original positions, the unverified ROI coefficients will be clustered in the 
tampered area inside the ROI, while the other non-ROI coefficients will scatter over the 
other regions sparsely. Thus, the tampering can be localized based on the density of the 
unverified coefficients and can be easily filtered out in the same way as we discussed in 
Chapter 3. On the contrary, if the tampering occurs outside the ROI(s), the involvement 
of ROI(s) will not affect the authentication process and it will be the same as the non-
ROI watermarking case we discussed in Chapter 3. Note that the same localization 
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resolution can be achieved for both the tampering inside and outside the ROI(s). For 
example, if the watermark is embedded in the rth decomposition level, the localization 
resolution will be rr 22 ×  regardless of where the tampering occurs. 
Note that the authenticator does not need to know the existence of the ROI(s). The 
authentication process can be performed in the same way as the non-ROI watermarking 
case without any knowledge of ROI(s). The involvement of ROI(s) will not affect the 
tamper localization resolution for the whole image. 
5.5 Performance Analysis 
5.5.1 Quality of Watermarked Image 
From Equation (5-3) and (5-4), we can see that the maximal modification of the 
wavelet coefficients in one group is still bounded to jδ , the same as in Equation (3-9) 
and (3-10). This reveals that, compared to the non-ROI watermarking case, the 
involvement of ROI(s) does not introduce more modifications during the watermark 
embedding. Therefore, the overall image quality, measured by PSNR, will not be more 
degraded than that with non-ROI watermarking. 
The involvement of the ROI(s), however, will decrease the reliability of the embedded 
watermark. Because all the data inside the ROI(s) are enforced to be unchangeable, the 
total watermark capacity of the image is decreased accordingly, while the required 
watermark payload still remains the same when applying the same group size. 
Therefore, when the remaining watermark capacity is lower than the required 
watermark payload, some watermark bits can not be embedded completely as required 
by Equation (3-4). This problem will happen when all the embeddable coefficients in a 
group can not bear the required modifications of the weighted mean js . As a result, the 
value of the weighted mean js  can not be moved to the corresponding middle position 
of the quantization intervals as shown in Figure 3-5. 
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In Equation (5-3) or (5-4), due to the constraint that if the sign of )(if j  is changed after 
the modification )(if j  is set to zero, the actual modification amount applied to a non-
ROI coefficient )(if j  is bounded to 
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where )(ijδ  denotes the proportion of the total modification that is assigned to the 
coefficient )(if j . Therefore, in the case of 0)( <⋅ ji signp δ , if )()( ifi jj >δ , then the 
watermark can not be completely embedded. Such an incomplete embedding will lower 
the watermark robustness against minor distortions and even lead to a detection failure. 
When an incomplete watermark embedding occurs, the overall image quality might 
become better in that fewer modifications are made to the image.  
Figure 5-3 plots the simulation result of the watermarked image quality for different 
ROI sizes. The test image set of Section 3.6, including 1086 images of various kinds, is 
used in the simulation. The PSNR values plotted in Figure 5-3 are the average results of 
all these 1086 watermarked images for different ROI sizes. In the simulation, the first 
wavelet decomposition level is selected to embed the watermark and the quantization 
step Q and the group size g is set to 6 and 12 respectively. The specified ROI size 
varies from 0% to 92% of the original image size. The ROI area is always selected in 
the center of the image. From Figure 5-3, we can see that the ROI size has little effect 
on the PSNR of the watermarked image. The PSNR becomes a little bit higher when 
the ROI takes up 60% of the image size or more, especially after the ROI size is bigger 
than 80%. As analyzed above, this is because with increasing the ROI size the 
remaining area at the sides of the image becomes smaller and smaller and accordingly 
fewer and fewer modifications can be made to the image, namely, the incomplete 
embedding occurs more and more frequently. With the incomplete embedding 
increasing, the watermark reliability will accordingly decrease.  
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Figure 5-3 Watermarked image quality for different ROI sizes. The PSNR values are 
the average of the 1086 test images. 
 
To illustrate the effect of incomplete and unsuccessful embeddings, Figure 5-4 plots the 
curve of the bit error rate (BER) of the watermark detection versus different ROI sizes. 
All the BER values in Figure 5-4 are the average results of all the 1086 test images for 
different ROI sizes. From Figure 5-4 we can see that when the ROI(s) area takes up a 
percentage of the image size as high as 60% and more, the watermark detection error 
rate rises significantly. When the ROI size is larger than 80%, the slope of the curve 
becomes bigger, i.e. the BER rises even more rapidly. These results conform to the 
image quality discussion above very well and explain the image quality improvement 
in Figure 5-3 for large ROI sizes. They also reveal that, due to the limit of the 
watermark capacity of the image, the ROI size must be restricted in order to ensure a 
specific rate of successful embedding. In the next section, we will discuss the maximal 
size of the ROI(s) area with a given BER threshold. 
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Figure 5-4 Watermark detection error rate for different ROI sizes. The BER values are 
the average of the 1086 test images. 
 
Note that the visual quality of the non-ROI regions might be degraded, though the total 
modification of the cover image doesn’t change. This is because the introduction of 
ROI(s) decreases the selectivity of the coefficients to be modified. As we mentioned in 
Chapter 3, thanks to the random permutation, the coefficients that are most suitable for 
embedding watermark is distributed evenly into all the groups. The modification of 
these coefficients will cause less visible artifacts on the image. In the ROI-groups, 
however, the most suitable coefficients of the group for modification might belong to 
the selected ROI(s) area and have been preset as unchangeable. In this case, other 
coefficients in the group have to be used to carry the modification. As a result of such 
suboptimal embedding, the visibility of the watermark will be increased. 
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5.5.2 Limit of ROI Size 
As discussed in the previous section, with increasing the size of ROI(s), incomplete 
embeddings will happen more frequently and the watermark detection error rate will 
subsequently increase. In the extreme case, the ROI(s) takes up such a large image area 
that the remaining region has a too low watermark capacity to perform the embedding 
successfully. In other words, the total amount of the modifications applied to the non-
ROI coefficient in a group is still not enough to move the weighted mean js  to the 
correct quantization interval as depicted in Figure 3-5, so the watermark embedding 
fails. The same problem will also happen when the ROI(s) area takes up most of the 
regions that contribute the most watermark capacity of the image, such as the textured 
areas, though its area is not that large. It is well known that the textured image area has 
much higher watermark capacity than the smooth area with the same watermark 
invisibility and robustness. Hence if the remaining regions include only smooth areas it 
also might have no enough capacity to carry the necessary watermark payload. 
According to what we discussed above, the remaining non-ROI must have enough 
watermark capacity in order to ensure the watermark to be embedded successfully. 
Theoretically, at least one non-ROI coefficient in every group must be guaranteed in 
order to have the least space to carry the modification for the watermark bit embedding. 
If we assume that the random permutation ideally distributes the non-ROI coefficient 
evenly into all the groups and every non-ROI coefficient is large enough to carry the 
necessary modification for embedding, the theoretical maximal ROI(s) area, which can 
be specified on an image of size W×H, can be calculated as 
 WH
g
gLroi
1−
= . (5-6) 
Equation (5-6) reveals that the group size g determines maximal limit of the ROI size. 
A larger ROI area can be specified with a bigger group size. Nevertheless, Equation 
(5-6) only describes the ideal case. With a ROI area of size roiL  specified, every group 
is assigned just one non-ROI coefficient and (g-1) ROI coefficients. In this ideal case, 
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we assume not only the random permutation can ideally distribute the non-ROI 
coefficients evenly into every group but also every single non-ROI coefficient can bear 
the total modification that the watermark bit of the group requires in Equation (5-3) or 
Equation (5-4). Only when these two assumptions hold at the same time, can we ensure 
that all the watermark bits can be successfully embedded. The second assumption 
depends strongly on the characteristics of the image content and is rarely true in most 
images. Even if the non-ROI area is full of textures, it still can not be guaranteed that 
the magnitude of every non-ROI coefficient is large enough to take the total 
modification. Therefore, the actual maximal size limit of ROI(s) is usually quite 
smaller than the value roiL  obtained from Equation (5-6).  
In Figure 5-5 we plot the theoretical ROI size limits obtained by Equation (5-6) and the 
simulation results from the image test set. All the experimental values in Figure 5-5 are 
the average results of all the 1086 test images for different group size. The same 
parameters are used as in the simulation of image quality. The first wavelet level is 
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Figure 5-5 Comparison of theoretical and experimental results of ROI size limit. The 
experimental values are the average of the 1086 test images. 
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selected to embed the watermark and the quantization step is set to 6. In the simulation, 
we obtain the maximal ROI sizes with the watermark BER below 0.01 and 0.001 
respectively. The group sizes vary from 1 to 20. When the group size is 1, every 
wavelet coefficient has to be modified to carry one watermark bit. Therefore no ROI 
can be specified in this case. The maximal ROI size increases rapidly when the group 
size increases from 1 to 10. For example, it rises from 0 to 61% when the BER is lower 
than 0.01. And thereafter the slope of the curve becomes smaller and the ROI size limit 
rises slowly with the increase of the group size. This is because for relatively large ROI 
sizes the watermark capacity of the remaining area is rather limited and has fewer 
capacity surpluses for more ROI area. Figure 5-5 shows that with the group size of 12 
that we apply in the previous simulations, we can specify ROI(s) areas nearly as large 
as the half of the image size while keeping the BER below 0.001. From Figure 5-5, we 
can see that the curves of the simulation results are always below the theoretical one, 
coinciding with the analysis conclusion above. With higher watermark reliability 
(BER<0.001), the maximal ROI size is further decreased. As shown in Figure 5-4, 
when the ROI size takes up 92% of the image size, the theoretical maximal limit 
according to Equation (5-6), the watermark detection error rate rises to 0.2369. Such a 
high error rate is not acceptable in practice because it will cause a too high false alarm 
rate of tampering detection. 
5.6 Experimental Results 
In this section, we first evaluate the watermark embedding performance with ROI 
masking. Second, the tamper localization capability of the proposed ROI watermarking 
scheme is tested. In the following experiments, the same test image set as in Section 
3.6, which includes 1086 images of various kinds, is used. The watermark is embedded 
in the first level of wavelet decomposition, i.e. r=1, and the quantization step Q and the 
group size g is set to 6 and 12 respectively. In the watermark embedding process, 
Equation (5-3) is adopted to update the wavelet coefficients.  
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First, we embed the watermarks into all the 1086 images in the test set respectively, 
with a ROI that takes 20% of the cover image size. The ROI areas are always specified 
in the center of the images. Figure 5-6 plots the distribution of the quality of the 1086 
watermarked test images in PSNR values and Figure 5-7 plots the distribution of the 
BER of the watermark detection. As can be seen from Figure 5-6, the PSNR values of 
the watermarked images distribute tightly around the peak that corresponds to the 
PSNR value of 49.13dB, very near to the average value of all the images 49.17dB. 
Similarly, in Figure 5-7 most of the BER values distribute near to zero and the number 
of images sharply decreases near to zero when the BER is higher than 1.0×10-3. In total, 
in 16 images the BER values are higher than 1.0×10-3 and only in 2 images the BER 
values are higher than 2.35×10-3. The average BER of all test images is 1.20×10-4. 
 
 
Figure 5-6 Image quality distribution (PSNR values) of the 1086 watermarked test 
images with ROI masking of 20% of the cover image size. 
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Figure 5-7 BER Distribution of the watermark detection from the 1086 watermarked 
test images with ROI masking of 20% of the cover image size. 
Second, to evaluate the tamper localization capability of the proposed ROI 
watermarking scheme, we take the image “Gold hill” of 576x720 pixels as an example 
as shown in Figure 5-8 (a) to give the detailed experimental results. We specify one 
ROI of size 165×180 pixels starting from the coordinate of (260,300) and ending at the 
coordinate of (425,480), indicated by a red dashed rectangle in Figure 5-8 (a). The 
PSNR of the watermarked image is as high as 49.1dB. The embedded watermark is 
completely imperceptible under the normal viewing condition. The difference of the 
original and watermarked images is shown in Figure 5-8 (b). For the display purpose, 
the difference is magnified 30 times and the contrast is enhanced. It can be clearly seen 
that in the corresponding ROI area there is no modification caused by the watermark 
embedding. 
After obtaining the watermarked image, we test the proposed scheme’s tamper 
localization capability by deleting two objects inside and outside the ROI respectively. 
We first remove the person on the street that locates inside the ROI, as shown in Figure 
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5-9 (a). The yellow ellipse indicates the tampered position. The authentication result is 
shown in Figure 5-9 (b). The removed person is successfully detected and precisely 
localized, depicted in white color. Then we manipulate a non-ROI area on the 
watermarked image. As shown in Figure 5-10 (a), one window of the house, which is 
outside the ROI, is replaced by the wall around. Figure 5-10 (b) shows the 
authentication result. The tampered part is also correctly detected and localized. Both 
tampered areas are localized with the same resolution of 2×2 pixels because the 
watermark is embedded in the first level of the wavelet decomposition. We also apply 
these two manipulations on the image at the same time. Figure 5-11 shows the 
tampered image and the authentication result. It demonstrates when both the ROI and 
non-ROI areas are simultaneously tampered the proposed scheme can still correctly 
detect and localize the manipulations.  
 
 
(b) (a) 
Figure 5-8 ROI-based watermarking result. (a) Watermarked image (PSNR=49.1dB, 
the red dashed rectangle indicates the specified ROI position), (b) Different image 
(magnified 30 times and contrast enhanced for the display purpose). 
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(b) (a) 
Figure 5-9 Authentication result when the ROI area is tampered. (a) Tampered 
image. Inside the ROI, the person on the street is deleted, indicated by the yellow 
ellipse, (b) Authentication result of (a), the localized tampered area is indicated in 
white color. 
(b) (a) 
Figure 5-10 Authentication result when the non-ROI area is tampered. (a) Tampered 
image. Outside the ROI, one window of the house is removed, (b) Authentication 
result of (c), the localized tampered area is indicated in white color. 
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5.7 Synthetic Image Authentication with ROI 
As mentioned in Section 5.3, the proposed framework can be applied to all 
watermarking schemes, as long as they embed the watermark into separable units. 
Hence, besides the wavelet-based algorithm we introduced above, the proposed 
framework can also be applied to the watermark scheme for synthetic image 
authentication that we proposed in Chapter 4. In this section, we introduce and evaluate 
the synthetic image watermarking scheme with ROI support. 
Extending the watermarking algorithm in Chapter 4 to support ROI is straightforward 
as follows. In the step of pixel classification, all the pixels inside the specified ROI 
areas are deemed as non-flippable pixels regardless of their properties of smoothness 
and connectivity in local neighborhood. This step ensures that all the ROI pixels will 
not be modified in the embedding process. After randomly permuting all the pixels and 
dividing them into blocks, we name those blocks that contain at least one ROI pixel 
ROI-block and others non-ROI-block. In each ROI-block, the block feature, i.e. the 
(b) (a) 
Figure 5-11 Authentication result when both the ROI and non-ROI areas are 
simultaneously tampered. (a) Manipulations both inside and outside the ROI, (b) 
authentication result of (a), the localized tampered area is indicated in white color. 
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number of black pixels or pixels belong to color set c1 for color images, is obtained by 
counting all the pixels in the block, including both the ROI pixels and non-ROI pixels. 
Thus, any manipulation of either ROI pixels or non-ROI pixels will change the block 
feature.  
The watermark detector does not require any ROI information. The retrieval process 
remains the same as in Section 4.3.4 and the watermark bits can be extracted from each 
block by applying Equation (4-6). After extracting all the watermark bits, the image 
authentication and pixel recovery processes in Section 4.4 can be applied to localize the 
tampered regions and recover the manipulated pixels, which do not need any 
knowledge of ROI(s) either. Both tampering inside and outside ROI(s) can be detected 
and localized with the same resolution as in non-ROI watermarking. 
Similarly as we discussed in Section 5.5, although the involvement of ROI(s) does not 
affect the image quality, the size of ROI(s) is limited by the watermark capacity of the 
non-ROI image portion. In the case of synthetic image watermarking, this capacity 
refers to the total number of flippable pixels in the non-ROI region. When the ROI area 
becomes larger, the number of flippable pixels will decrease so that the bit error rate 
(BER) of watermark detection will rise due to the increasing unsuccessful embedding 
rate.  
Figure 5-12 shows the experimental results of ROI-based watermarking and 
authentication results for synthetic images. As shown in Figure 5-12 (a) a ROI is 
specified in the middle of the text image, which is indicated by the red dashed 
rectangle. Two lines of text are inside the ROI. Figure 5-12 (b) displays the difference 
image between the original image and the watermarked image. For display purposes, 
the different is magnified 30 times and the contrast is enhanced. It can be clearly seen 
that the ROI area keeps intact after watermark embedding. Text manipulations inside 
and outside the ROI area are shown in Figure 5-13 (a) and (c) respectively. Inside the 
ROI the text “Leo €5000” is deleted and outside the ROI the name “Markus” is 
replaced by “Stefan”. Authentication results are given in Figure 5-13 (b) and (d). As 
can be seen, the authentication results are as good as in non-ROI watermarking case. 
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Both the text deletion and replacement are correctly localized and recovered. In the 
authentication results, the deleted text is indicated in red color and the forged text in 
blue color. 
5.8 Conclusion 
Image fidelity is of essential importance in some special applications, so the slight 
modification caused by watermark embedding becomes not desired or even 
unacceptable, especially in some important image regions. Therefore, a non-ubiquitous 
watermarking solution is required to preserve the image quality in important regions. In 
this chapter, we proposed a watermarking framework for image authentication with 
(a) (b) 
Figure 5-12 ROI-based watermarking result of the text image. (a) Watermarked 
image with ROI, the red dashed rectangle indicates the specified ROI position, (b) 
Different image (magnified 30 times and contrast enhanced for the display purpose).  
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region of interest (ROI) masking. The watermark embedding is accomplished by only 
modifying the image content outside ROI(s). Therefore, the selected ROI(s) area is kept 
intact during the watermark embedding process so that it can satisfy the requirement of 
high fidelity of these important image areas in some special applications like medical 
and satellite images. Although no watermark is embedded inside, the integrity of 
ROI(s) is still protected. The proposed framework is evaluated by the watermarking 
scheme proposed in the previous chapters. Experimental results demonstrate that the 
proposed image authentication scheme with ROI is able to detect and localize the 
manipulations both inside and outside the ROI areas with the same resolution. Besides 
the presented watermarking schemes, the framework can also be applied to other 
watermarking schemes that embed the watermark bits in separate units, such as in a 
block-based way. 
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(a) 
(c) 
(d) 
(b) 
Figure 5-13 Authentication results for manipulations inside and outside the ROI area 
in the text image. (a) Manipulation inside the ROI, the text “Leo €5000” is deleted, 
(b) Authentication result of (a), (c) Manipulation outside the ROI, the name 
“Markus” is replaced by “Stefan”, (d) Authentication result of (c). The 
authentication results indicate the deleted text in red color and the forged text in 
blue. 
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6.1 Conclusion 
In this thesis, we have addressed the challenges of the digital watermarking techniques 
for image content authentication and successfully developed several novel 
watermarking solutions. In our solutions, we have concentrated on reducing the 
necessary watermark payload to improve the image quality and also enhancing the 
tamper detection capability of the authentication system. 
For natural images, we have proposed a novel semi-fragile watermarking scheme for 
content authentication. The proposed scheme embeds the watermark in the wavelet 
domain. By introducing the random permutation strategy, the required watermark 
payload is reduced and the tamper localization accuracy is significantly increased. 
Because less image modifications are needed during the embedding, the image quality 
also gets improved. Furthermore, thanks to the embedding among the random 
distributed wavelet coefficients, the proposed algorithm is intrinsically secure to local 
attacks. The statistical tamper detection method enables scalable levels of detection 
sensitivity. 
For synthetic images, we have discussed their unique characteristics and special 
requirements for the watermarking algorithm. Due to the simplicity of the content, the 
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common watermarking algorithms designed for natural images are not applicable to 
synthetic images. Based on our study, we have developed a novel watermarking 
scheme for synthetic image authentication. A new embedding strategy is introduced to 
replace the classical odd-even embedding method, which enables the capability of 
recovering the altered pixels. Based on a statistical analysis of the potential unverified 
pixels, the proposed scheme can achieve a pixel-wise tamper localization resolution. 
The proposed algorithm can be applied to different kinds of synthetic images, like 
binary documents, digital maps, line drawings, and so on. 
In addition, we have also addressed the challenges that arise in some special 
applications, where the image fidelity is of essential importance, especially in the 
important regions where no modification is allowed. In this case, the common 
watermarking schemes can not fulfill the requirements. To solve this problem, we have 
proposed a non-ubiquitous watermarking framework for the image content 
authentication by introducing the concept of region of interest (ROI) masking. Under 
this framework, we have modified the proposed watermarking algorithms for natural 
and synthetic images to embed the watermark only by modifying the image content 
outside the specified regions of interest. Although no watermark is embedded in these 
ROI regions, their integrity is still ensured by the watermark information embedded in 
the other regions. The same tamper localization resolution is achieved both inside and 
outside the unwatermarked regions. Moreover, we have also discussed that the 
proposed framework can be applied to other watermarking schemes that embed the 
watermark bits in separate image units, such as in a block-based way.  
6.2 Future Work 
In both the watermarking algorithms for natural images and synthetic images, we have 
used an authentication code as the watermark that is generated under the control of the 
secret key. The authentication code is independent of the image content. As the next 
step, we plan to use some content-based features to substitute the authentication code. 
The properly selected features can enhance the sensitivity of the watermark to 
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intentional/malicious content manipulations and simultaneously reduce the false alarm 
rate caused by incidental distortions from the common image processing.  
In the proposed watermarking scheme for synthetic image authentication, we have 
classified the existing colors to binary sets and therefore it can only identify two kinds 
of pixel categories in the tamper recovery process. As discussed in Section 4.7, we plan 
to extend the proposed embedding methods by introducing more dummy mapping 
entries. This extension will consequently require more kinds of flippable pixels to 
fulfill the pixel modifications in every single block. In future work, to enlarge the 
watermark capacity for synthetic images, we intend to use more available entries in the 
palette for the watermarking embedding of the color synthetic images. In addition, 
more complex pixel flipping rules can be defined to identify more flippable pixels. For 
example, the current rules are only based on the single pixel flipping. By taking into 
account flipping a group of pixels together, the number of flippable pixels can be 
further increased.  
In this thesis, we have introduced the concept of non-ubiquitous watermarking by 
developing a watermarking framework with region of interest masking. Under this 
framework, high image fidelity in the user-defined regions is achieved. However, 
although the fidelity of the specified regions can be perfectly preserved, the 
authenticator still performs a holistic content verification. Any content tampering either 
inside or outside the ROI regions will render the whole image unauthentic. 
Unfortunately, in many practical applications, this is not the most desirable way of 
verifying the image content. In these applications, not all kinds of content-changing 
manipulations are deemed as malicious attacks. For instance, visual annotation, which 
adds additional visual content on the images like a logo or time stamps, is usually an 
acceptable manipulation in most cases. Moreover, the importance of different regions 
in an image is also different. The content of regions of interest, which is usually 
determined by the specific application, is of most interest and importance and therefore 
requires more or higher level of protection. To tackle these requirements, semantic 
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authentication mechanisms are needed to be developed based on the content analysis 
and image understanding techniques.  
In multimedia authentication research, content-based authentication is still an open 
issue. To accomplish semantic image authentication, not only the syntactic features 
need to be utilized based on visual models, but also the underlying semantic content 
and features have to be defined and applied in the watermarking process. We have done 
some preliminary studies with regard to the semantic image authentication. We have 
developed a semantically extended watermarking model by illustrating the relationship 
of digital watermarking and content understanding. Both the semantic and syntactic 
image features are considered in the proposed watermarking model. This model 
provides a framework solution for the semantic watermarking. Based on the proposed 
model, we have then developed a semantic watermarking scheme that enables semantic 
image content authentication with multiple security levels. In this scheme, we consider 
the human faces as the particular regions of interest because they are increasingly 
important for security issues and massively present in different visual contents. 
Multiple watermarks are embedded in different image regions so that our approach is 
able to trace the type of the manipulation and identify the attacks among the face 
regions, such as face adding, moving, deletion, and so forth. This information can help 
us to infer the attacker’s motives. More detailed introduction can be referred to 
[LSFS04][LSFS05a][LSFS05b]. In future work, we plan to improve the proposed 
semantic watermarking model by integrating the semi-fragile watermarks to provide 
more effective integrity protection against slight tampering inside face regions. Another 
open issue is to achieve moderate robustness against geometric distortions, such as 
scaling and rotation, because in some cases slight geometric transformations are also 
acceptable manipulations as long as they do not change the image meaning. In addition, 
we also intend to test the semantic watermarking model with other popular regions of 
interest, such as cars, people, trees and so forth.  
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